Recent happenings in Persia

Recent Happenings
in Persia

BY

HON. J. M. BALFOUR

LATE CHIEF ASSISTANT TO THE FINANCIAL ADVISER
TO THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT

William Blackwood and Sons

Edinburgh and London

1922

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

,,,,,, '

TO

WIFE

pe,

PEE FACE.

THE following pages represent my first, and in all
probability my last, attempt at authorship. That
even this venture would have been undertaken
is improbable in the extreme were it not that the
great majority of those who are familiar with
recent developments in Persia are, from the very
nature of the positions which they occupy, de-
barred from making their knowledge public,
and that events which have resulted in the
extinction of British prestige in Persia, with in-
evitable consequences in the adjacent countries,
ought to have a wider publicity than they at
present possess. Moreover, although it is ad-
mittedly dangerous to argue from the particular
to the general, it is not altogether unreasonable
to regard the Cabinet's doings in Persia as exempli-
fying their methods in wider spheres.

Judging from the criticisms levelled against
certain books during the last year or so, there
exists a school of opinion which regards criticism
of those in high places as little short of heresy,
considering that their errors, however notorious
in inner circles, should be carefully concealed from

484 7 !>

vi PREFACE

the general public. The argument advanced in
support of this position is, I believe, that such
publicity strengthens the forces of disorder. To
this view I cannot subscribe. To leave the blun-
derer in power is to invite the perpetration of
further errors, and it is accordingly surely better
to expose such mistakes in the hope that thereby
some blindly given popular support may be diverted
from the individuals concerned. The late war has
furnished enough instances to prove to all the
risk of leaving those guilty of one error in a posi-
tion where they can cause further mischief, and in
India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine alike the
Government seems determined to pursue a course
which must certainly lead to disaster. In Persia
the damage is meantime beyond repair. For these
reasons I believe that it is the duty of all who
become familiar with instances of mismanagement
in high quarters to make their knowledge public,
in order that others may have a clearer under-
standing of matters which vitally affect the Empire.
I must admit that when reading the following
pages some months after they were written they
have left me with the impression that I had set
out to attack all and sundry connected with Persia.
This was certainly not my intention, and if others
receive a similar impression, I can only say that
it has resulted from my endeavour to depict
events as they occurred. That I set out to attack
certain politicians in both countries and the policies
for which they stand I do admit, but for the rest
I have endeavoured so far as possible to avoid

PREFACE vii

mention of individuals, since the official is subject
to the politician with whom the responsibility for
errors of policy must rest. Too often, it is to
be feared, the position is reversed — the politician
claiming all credit, and the official, doomed by
his position to silence, shouldering undeserved
blame.

I would, then, ask my Persian friends to believe
that my criticism is actuated by no feeling of un-
friendliness, but solely by a desire to present facts
in their true colours.

I have to acknowledge my great indebtedness
to H. H. Hormoz Mirza for having kindly offered
to read that portion of this book which had been
written prior to my departure from Persia, and for
having placed at my disposal his wide knowledge
regarding events and conditions. The opinions
expressed are, however, my own, since he agreed
with me that it would be out of place for a
native of the country to attempt to influence
the impression formed by a sojourner.

J. M. BALFOUB.

February 1922.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. PAG»

I. INTRODUCTORY .1

II. THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS .... 32

HI. THE GOVERNMENT 54

IV. FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN

AGREEMENT 75

V. THE ANGLO -PERSIAN AGREEMENT . . . 108

VI. FINANCE 135

VH. THE ARMY 165

VLtt. FROM RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, AND THE ENZELI

LANDING 175

IX. TO THE FALL OF MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 190

X. SIPHADAR AZAM'S CABINETS .... 206

xi. THE COUP D'ETAT 215

XII. THE GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN . . 231

XHE. QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH AND REACTION . . 254

XIV. THE OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 281

ILLUSTRATIONS.

PROCESSION AT THE SLAUGHTER OF THE CAMEL Frontispiece

MOUNT DEMAVEND Facing page 6

ON TREK „ 16

NEAR TEHERAN „ 32

A PERSIAN GARDEN .... „ 32
THEY CRIED ALOUD AND CUT THEMSELVES

WITH KNIVES ..... ,, 40

PERSIAN COURT DRESS .... „ 60

COURT OF THE SALAM, SHAH'S PALACE . „ 60

DOULEH GATE, TEHERAN .... „ 80

THE BOND STREET OF TEHERAN . „ 80

THE SHAH'S PALACE, TEHERAN ... „ 112

KASR-I-KAJAR, TEHERAN . . . . „ 112

IN THE BAZARS, TEHERAN . . . „ 144

PILGRIMS AT KANGAVAR . . . . „ 176

THE CITADEL, KASR-I-SHIRIN ... „ 176

HAMADAN BAZAR ..... „ 180

TOMB OF ESTHER AND MORDECAI . . „ 180

STREET SCENES IN TEHERAN . . . „ 190
GENERAL WESTDAHL, COMMANDING THE

PERSIAN POLICE 202

xii ILLUSTRATIONS

MOHTJRRAM PROCESSION, TEHERAN . . Facing page 202

KEREDJ BRIDGE „ 222

PERSIAN CHILDREN . . . . „ 222

A ROADSIDE HALT „ 256

BABYLON THE GREAT IS FALLEN . . „ 290

ISHTAR GATE, BABYLON .... „ 290

Recent Happenings in Persia,

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

EVEN in these times of higher education and
wireless telegraphy, it would appear to be inevit-
able that the first consequence of an attempt to
describe either events of political interest or gene-
ral conditions in one of the less generally known
countries of the world is to be faced with the
choice between the Scylla of redundancy and the
Charybdis of omission, and to be compelled to
determine whether to inflict upon the reader a
more or less voluminous mass of data anent the
conditions and history of the country in question,
or alternatively to assume upon his part a know-
ledge of the requisite facts necessary to an ade-
quate comprehension of the author's narrative.

That the country of the Shah is one with which
the general reader is but little acquainted may,
I think, be justly claimed, despite the mass of
literature relating thereto. Much of this, how-
ever, deals with conditions which have long passed
away, and is not, moreover, readily accessible ;
while another large section is the outcome of brief
visits to the country, and deals either with isolated

A

2 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

episodes or individual experiences, which are in
the main of ephemeral interest. Even Lord
Curzon's monumental compilation, originally chiefly
consisting of the experiences undergone during a
rapid journey through the country nearly thirty-
five years ago, and data collected during his resi-
dence in the British Legation in Teheran, the
whole covering a period of about eight months,
has, through the efflux of time and change in
political problems, become chiefly of use as a
Baedeker de luxe. Indeed, it could hardly be
otherwise considering the changes which have
taken place since Lord Curzon's brief visit. Three
Shahs have succeeded Nasir-ed-Din Shah, the
country has in name at least become constitu-
tional, the situation of Russia has materially
altered, the outlook of some Persians at least has
been vitally altered through European travel, and
the war has taken place.

Most books on Persia have, moreover, been
perforce written after a more or less brief visit
to the country by passing travellers or journalists,
since the circumstances debar many of those best
fitted for the task from making public their know-
ledge and experiences. In a small community
such as the British colony in Persia, very many
are debarred from authorship by the official posi-
tions which they hold, and by relations official,
commercial, and social. It thus comes about that
while Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and Alexander the
Great are household words, it is otherwise when
more modern times are in question. Consequently,
the name of Persia is apt to conjure up little more
than a vision of the roses and nightingales of
Omar, blended with the fairy pictures of Moore
(so far, alas ! from the truth), and varied by the
adventures of the immortal Hajji Baba, that ever-
living portrait of the Persian.

INTRODUCTORY 3

This lack of familiarity must, in the main, be
attributed to the isolation of the country and its
remoteness from the world's main traffic-routes.
Even although Teheran might, prior to the war,
be reached in a fortnight from London, there was
little incentive to induce any one to make the
journey. The country contains but little to tempt
the tourist to face the discomforts of travel in a
country where carriage-roads and reasonable ac-
commodation are alike seldom met with. That
little, moreover, is widely scattered, and only
accessible to those who are prepared to undertake
long and wearisome journeys not unattended by
personal risk. In the latter respect things are
very much worse than formerly owing to the
decrease of the power of the central government.

An additional deterrent to travel at the present
time lies in the fact that in many parts of the
country the roads are unsafe to such a degree that
even an escort does not necessarily ensure immunity
from attack, as the Persian delegate to the League
of Nations found to his cost in September 1920.
It appears probable that this lack of safety will
be very greatly increased in the near future in
Southern Persia through the disbandment of the
South Persia Rifles, which have hitherto main-
tained order in the south. Not only will the force
which maintained order have ceased to exist, but
some at least of the men alienated from their
tribes by their service in a British force may be
expected to take to the road for a livelihood.

Generally there is a disinclination to attack
Europeans, since some governments at any rate
show an unreasonable readiness to resent ill-
treatment of their nationals. Judging by the delay
in dealing with the claims for compensation of
the British subjects who were imprisoned and
robbed at Shiraz in 1915 and 1916, and those of

4 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

others, the British Foreign Office cannot be accused
of any undue precipitancy in this respect. " Out
of sight out of mind " appears to be the rule at
Whitehall, specially when, owing to the censor-
ship, the public can, as in Persia, be kept in
ignorance of events. Unless rumour speaks falsely,
one book at any rate published after the war was
deprived of much of its interest by the censor.
A striking contrast is furnished by the prompti-
tude with which the German Foreign Office ex-
acted compensation for the death of its Consul
at Tabriz during the last year. In spite of the fact
that there was a strong presumption that it was
either a case of suicide or murder by the servants
in the Consulate, heavy compensation was ex-
torted. An ironical touch is supplied by the fact
that the Consul in question was largely responsible
for the arrest of the Englishmen at Shiraz just
mentioned.

Partly owing to the fact that in all ages the
chief constructive medium has been sun-dried
brick, readily resolvable into its component parts,
and partly through the destructive invasions of
which the country has throughout the ages been
the victim, Persia, in proportion to the length
and fulness of its history, probably contains fewer
objects of interest than any other country. These,
apart from the remains of antiquity, which are
in the main such as to appeal to the scientific
inquirer rather than to the ordinary traveller, are
to a very great extent forbidden to the infidel,
consisting as they do of mosques, shrines, and
other religious buildings. The non-Moslem is con-
sequently compelled to content himself with such
glimpses as he may be able to catch from a dis-
tance, or through doorways, or from adjacent
roofs.

Owing to the fact that the French hold a

INTRODUCTORY 5

monopoly for research in Persia, modern archaeol-
ogists have had but small opportunity of studying
the antiquities of Persia. Apart from their work
at Susa, the French have taken but little advan-
tage of their privileges, and although it may be
pleaded that the question of cost renders wider
researches impossible at the present time, it is
regrettable that such a dog-in-the-manger policy
should deprive the world of the information which
might be obtained were other nations permitted
to excavate in other parts of the country. That
fruitful results might be hoped for from such work
may be inferred from the discoveries which have
from time to time resulted from the sub rosa
excavations undertaken by individuals.

At the present time there is a distinct need of
a comprehensive and informed book upon modern
Persia, its problems and history, by one qualified
by residence in the country to deal adequately
with his subject. To undertake such a task,
much more than a passing visit to the country
is required, since only by long residence can a
proper understanding of Persian mentality and
views be arrived at, and for this a knowledge of
the language is essential, since otherwise the in-
quirer runs the risk of acquiring the standpoint
of the political hack alone. The present book
does not profess to be more than an attempt to
describe the events which took place during a
sixteen months' visit to the country, with such
other matter as is necessary to an adequate under-
standing of these and their probable consequences.
Indeed, my only excuse for venturing to inflict
upon the public another book of this class is that,
so far as I am aware, no account of recent happen-
ings in Persia has appeared ; and some of these,
although comparatively unimportant in themselves
from the standard of world politics, vitally affect

6 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

British prestige in the Middle East, with the
inevitable repercussion upon India and Afghan-
istan. In addition, they throw an interesting
light upon the mentality of those who are re-
sponsible for the direction of British foreign policy,
and explain how our prestige, which stood very
high at the end of the war, has practically ceased
to exist.

To revert to the alternative presented in my
opening paragraph, I must confess to having ex-
perienced considerable difficulty in determining
which course to adopt in the present instance, since
I hesitate to attribute to others the ignorance of
the country to which I frankly own prior to a
residence therein. What finally decided me to
venture upon some detail at the risk of wearying
the reader was a statement in Mr Churchill's
speech in the House of Commons upon the Govern-
ment's decision to withdraw the British force from
North- West Persia. In explaining to the House
the reasons which had influenced the Government
in arriving at this decision, he stated, as showing
the strategical unsoundness of the position, that
the force had to be maintained at the end of an
immense line of communications 600 miles long,
by a service of Ford cars. From whence this
figure was derived it is difficult to imagine. It is
true that Teheran is 600 miles from Baghdad, but
as railhead was approximately 120 miles from
Baghdad, and the British Headquarters was at
Kazvin, which is over 90 miles from Teheran,
this hardly appears to be relevant to the question.
The actual distance was something over 370 miles.
It is, of course, possible that the official responsible
for preparing the data confused the two distances ;
but having had experience of the care taken in
preparing data for Parliament, and in particular
to avoid giving a full and candid answer, I am

INTRODUCTORY 7

loath to believe this. That the error did not
affect the soundness of the argument may be
admitted, but the mere fact that an error of 60
per cent relating to a country in British occupa-
tion could pass unchallenged, would appear to
justify the belief that some information regarding
the country may not come amiss — to members of
the Government at least. I propose accordingly
to mention some of the main facts relating to the
country, the people, and their recent history,
restricting myself so far as possible to what is
necessary to give a picture of life and conditions
in Persia, and avoiding unnecessary detail.

Geographically, Persia, or, as it is known to
the natives, Iran, consists, in the main, of the
western part of the tableland which separates
Mesopotamia from the plains of Northern India.
On the east it is bounded by Afghanistan and
British Baluchistan, on the west by Mesopotamia,
on the north by the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea,
and Turkestan, and on the south and south-west
by the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. In
area it is slightly larger than France, Spain, Ger-
many, and Belgium together. The plateau for
the most part lies at an elevation of from 2000 to
6000 feet above sea-level, and is bounded and
intersected by numerous mountain ranges. Of
these, the highest peaks are Demavend, near
Teheran, which is over 19,000 feet ; Mount Dina
Kouh, on the borders of Fars, 17,000 ; and Mount
Ararat, in the extreme north-west, just under
17,000. To the above generalisation two exceptions
must be made : the low coast-lands bordering the
Persian Gulf, and the northern portions of the
provinces of Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Astrabad,
which he along the southern shores of the Caspian.
The latter are covered by dense jungle, where the
Hyrcanian tiger may still be found, and are in-

8 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

habited by a rice-eating population, whose habits
of life vary greatly from those of the inhabitants
of the tableland. How the latter regard this dis-
trict cannot be better illustrated than by the
inquiry made upon the appointment of a certain
official as Governor of Mazanderan as to what
offence he could have possibly committed to merit
such punishment. While these two districts, al-
though politically part of Persia, do not form part
of its geographical entity, the reverse is the case
with Afghanistan, which, consisting of the eastern
half of the plateau, has throughout the greater
part of its history formed part of the Persian
Empire.

Situated as it is between Western and Central
Asia, Persia has in all ages sustained the first
shock of the violence of the nomadic hordes on
their movements towards the west, the massacres
of Genghiz Khan and Tamurline being but extreme
examples of what the country in whole or in part
has suffered throughout history. Even to-day the
desolation caused by the Afghan invasion during
the first half of the eighteenth century is in evi-
dence ; while further injury was caused by the
civil wars which raged during the latter part of
the same century. The treatment meted out to
Kerman by Mohamed Aga Shah, the founder of
the present dynasty, is perhaps a somewhat ex-
treme case, but indicates the brutality of these
times. On capturing the town the barbaric eunuch
directed his officers to collect twenty thousand
pairs of eyes from the inhabitants.

The heart of the country consists to a very great
extent of salt desert, the site of a prehistoric sea,
which, approaching in many places close to the
centres of population, breaks the country into
separate entities, and adds materially to the diffi-
culties both of communication and government.

INTRODUCTORY 9

The consequence has been that throughout history,
except under a strong ruler, the local governors
have attained to a high degree of independence,
with a corresponding weakening of the central
power.

Persia possesses few rivers of any size, the
Karun, which flows into the head of the Persian
Gulf, alone being navigable. For the most part
the rivers, such as they are, are either mountain
streams, or, flowing inland, ultimately lose them-
selves in the desert or in marshes. Moreover, they
are for the greater part seasonal in character, the
torrents of the spring and early summer shrinking
later to mere trickles of water lost in wide stony
beds, if, indeed, they do not entirely disappear.

The lack of water is in most districts the vital
factor in the life of the country, for while the soil
is generally fertile, cultivation is restricted to the
vicinity of rivers, and to districts artificially irri-
gated. The value of water cannot be better realised
than by considering the method of irrigation which
is in general use in the plains. A well is sunk at
the foot of the mountains until water is struck,
and a lateral channel is then driven, additional
wells being sunk every twenty or thirty yards.
In this manner water is conveyed for very con-
siderable distances — ten or fifteen miles, or even
farther. The labour and expense of constructing
and maintaining these kanats, whose lines of well-
heads, stretching in all directions, form a con-
spicuous feature of Persian landscapes, is of course
enormous, even in Persia, and only to be justified
by the general scarcity and consequent value of
water.

This scarcity is not indeed beyond remedy, or
at least very great amelioration, for it must be
admitted that at the present time no attempt is
made to conserve the large bodies of water which

10 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

run to waste in the spring, often inflicting great
damage in their course. Judging by the remains
of ancient works, a very different state of affairs
must have existed in former times, and, were
conservation to be undertaken on modern lines,
it would appear to be beyond question that the
cultivated area could be very largely increased,
and a very much larger population maintained upon
the land. Such conservation would, in a country
such as Persia, be by no means a difficult task,
but is utterly beyond the country's powers at the
present time. Lacking as she does alike the
technical ability and the material resources (there
is at the time of writing not a pound of cement
in the country), she is incapable of restoring those
works which were suffered to fall into decay dur-
ing the anarchy of the eighteenth century, or of
initiating new engineering undertakings. At the
same time, given the necessary technical guidance
and machinery, there is no reason, so far as I am
aware, why such works should not be undertaken
with the most beneficial results both to the country
and to their promoters, for the crude materials
exist in abundance. This, however, cannot be
hoped for until such time as the country has
been opened up by railway development, and a
sufficient degree of security attained to attract
foreign capital.

From the above it necessarily follows that trees,
and, except in the spring, vegetation of every kind,
are as a rule almost entirely confined to the vicinity
of towns and villages, for Persian towns may in
aspect be truly described as garden cities. Such
timber as exists suffers heavily from the demands
made upon it for fuel, some fifty thousand tons
of wood being consumed annually in Teheran as
against five or six thousand tons of coal. The
moment that the boundaries of irrigated fields

INTRODUCTORY 11

and gardens are passed, the country, except in
the spring, presents an aspect of brown desolation,
and it is easy to understand the store which both
ancient and modern Persians set by gardens.
These differ radically from the European concep-
tion of a garden, grass being practically non-
existent, and they may more aptly be compared
to groves of fruit and other small trees intersected
by small streams. The great desideratum is shade.
So great, indeed, is the dearth of timber that,
when a former Shah decided to construct a navy
upon the Persian Gulf, it was found necessary to
transport the requisite timber from the shores
of the Caspian — a colossal task truly, when it is
remembered that the distance by road is not far
short of a thousand miles. It will readily be
understood that the construction of that navy
was discontinued at a very early stage, and that
no attempt to renew it was made.

Into the question of mineral resources I do not
propose to enter, in view of the very scanty data
which is available. These are generally regarded
as being insignificant, but there is reason to believe
that further investigation will greatly modify this
view. The difficulty of arriving at any opinion
on the matter is largely enhanced by the fact
that much of the existing information is in the
possession of private individuals, and is not gene-
rally accessible. The fact, however, remains, that
whether from the paucity of the deposits, the lack
of fuel, or the difficulties of communication, but
little mining is done at the present time, or, at
least, little publicly. A further deterrent to mining
enterprise exists in the fact that since the begin-
ning of the constitutional regime, minerals have
been declared to be State property. Compensation
may possibly be paid in theory, but for the average
man this would in practice prove illusory. Con-

12 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

sequently, rather than incur the risk of losing his
property, the owner prefers to keep to himself
such information as he may possess, being well
aware that the benefit of any discovery would
accrue to some official or his associates.

A case which occurred during the winter of
1920 is typical of the arbitrary and tyrannical
manner in which the right of the State is enforced.
The inhabitants of a certain village between
Teheran and Amol combined to sink a new well.
When water was reached, it was found to be salt
and useless for the purpose in view, but the vil-
lagers, being of a frugal turn of mind, decided
that in the existing shortage of salt, an oppor-
tunity of earning an honest penny had occurred.
But they had reckoned without their host — in this
case that place of peace, the Ministry of Public
Works, Mines, Agriculture, &c. For once some
one in that department showed some activity,
and the poor profits of the peasants were appro-
priated— in name at any rate — to the use of the
State. Protests availed nothing ; the Ministry
had discovered a new mine.

By far the most important mineral product at
the present time is petroleum. This — consequent
on the active policy of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, which, as holder of the D'Arcy con-
cession, has a monopoly (except for the five northern
provinces) — is being produced in rapidly increasing
quantities in the Bakhtiari country, which lies to
the north-east of the head of the Persian Gulf.
Red oxide is mined upon the island of Hormuz,
and copper, coal, and various minor products in
primitive fashion. Early in the war, the Russians
prepared to undertake active development in the
vicinity of Lake Urmiah in Azerbaijan ; but al-
though large quantities of machinery were im-
ported, production was not undertaken. Very

INTRODUCTORY 13

extensive coal and iron deposits exist here in close
conjunction, the latter being reported to assay as
high as 70 per cent. The greater part of the
machinery has been stolen, and it may safely be
assumed that what remains is of little value, and
that no immediate resumption of the undertaking
is probable. In any case these deposits lie within
the Russian sphere, and it may be regarded as
certain that any British activity in this region
would meet with immediate opposition from the
Moscow Government. Such exploration as has
taken place would appear to justify the belief
that these deposits are by no means an isolated
case, and that there are numerous deposits of
coal, iron, and oil throughout the north.

The cost of coal in those parts of the country
where it is obtainable is very high. In Teheran,
which is in the vicinity of the coalfields, it is in
the neighbourhood of £9 a ton, and even higher
in winter. In view of the cost of fuel, there would
appear to be scope for the introduction of modern
methods of mining, although it is doubtful whether
the deposits would justify development upon a
large scale. All things considered, there would
seem to be little chance of any serious develop-
ment of the mining industry in the immediate
future. The two essential conditions are improved
communications and cheaper fuel. The former
cannot be hoped for in the absence of railways,
but, given these, the oil-fields should ensure an
ample supply of the latter. A revision of the
present law, so as to give to the owners of land an
incentive to development, and a termination of
the present state of unrest are also vital.

In the matter of communications Persia has
made but little advance from the immemorial
methods of the East, and the horse, mule, camel,
and donkey are still the most usual means of

14 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

transport. Prior to the war the Persian railway
system consisted of six miles of narrow-gauge line
running from Teheran to a local shrine. Before
the Russian debacle the Caucasian system was
extended to Tabriz, and although this line is
being now operated to a very limited extent, if
at all, it is very probable that in the not distant
future it will furnish the means for Germany to
oust us from the trade of Northern Persia. In
the south the British Army laid some forty miles
of light railway from Bushire to the foot of the
mountains. This the Persian Government was
most anxious to acquire ; but, whether through
delay upon their part or not, it was sold to Indian
contractors and torn up. This is to be regretted,
in view of the nature of the country traversed
and the fact that Bushire must be regarded as
the base of British interests in Persia,

Prior to the war an international syndicate of
French, British, and Russian financiers had in-
terested itself in railway development in Persia,
but beyond a survey being undertaken for a line
to run north from the vicinity of Mohummerah,
nothing was accomplished. Since the restoration
of peace a line from the vicinity of Qaraitu to
Teheran has been surveyed, and, I believe, an
alternative route from the south. Whether this
is to be regarded as the prelude to an era of rail-
way development remains to be seen, but it is
legitimate to doubt whether the promoters took
the vagaries of the British Government into their
calculations, for, should the country, in conse-
quence of the British " bag and baggage " evacua-
tion, fall into the hands of the Bolshevists (a by
no means improbable contingency, although one
which I do not anticipate), it may be found im-
possible to proceed with the undertaking.

In any case, it is very doubtful whether such

INTRODUCTORY 15

an extension of the Baghdad railway, although it
fits in with the ultimate ideal of a direct line to
India, can be regarded as being in the best interests
of either Britain or Persia. Under normal con-
ditions Northern Persia must be regarded as lying
within the Russian sphere of influence, and a
return to such a condition seems to be in-
evitable. Thus it might well come about that
such a line might serve as an access for Russian
trade to Mesopotamia rather than for British to
Persia, to say nothing of serving Russia's military
requirements. From the Persian point of view,
it has the disadvantage that all goods passing
over it would be liable to Mesopotamian customs
duties, which, in the financial condition of that
country, promise to be anything but light. I
make no claims to any knowledge of strategy,
but considering that British interests lie in
the south, there would be distinct advantages
in a line based on a Persian port and im-
mune from attack so long as we maintained
amicable relations with the local tribesmen. This
should not be difficult, seeing that the develop-
ment of the oil-fields is greatly to their pecuniary
advantage.

The Baghdad route, on the other hand, suffers
from the additional disadvantage of depending
upon the line from Basra to Baghdad. The Arab
rising in the autumn of 1920 showed the vulner-
ability of this, and, in the by no means improbable
recrudescence of such trouble, the same damage
to the line is to be anticipated. As regards
the interests of the promoters, a southern route
would tap an equally fertile territory, while
the engineering difficulties are, I understand, no
greater. In fact, the only interests who stand
to lose by the adoption of such a route are
the Mesopotamian Government and the Baghdad

16 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Jews, neither of whom are entitled to considera-
tion in the matter.

For the above reasons, a direct route from the
Persian Gulf running through Ahwaz and Buro-
jird (very much on the lines advocated by Lord
Curzon in his book), with extensions to Teheran
and Hamadan, would seem to be infinitely prefer-
able. Moreover, on this route the line would pass
in close proximity to the oil-fields and so simplify
the fuel problem. I found that some such route
was favoured by all the Persians with whom I
discussed the matter.

Another though small development which prima
facie has profitable potentialities is the extension
of the line through British Baluchistan from the
railhead at Dozdab to Seistan, something over
seventy miles. This would tap one of the richest
territories in Persia, and by rendering possible
the export of wheat, cotton, and dried fruits,
would not only develop the district, but would
provide freight for the return haul, where at the
present time there is but little export traffic.

The lack of roads in the European acceptance
of the word is wellnigh as great as in the case of
railways, the majority being little more than traffic-
worn tracks, at times impassable for wheeled trans-
port. In the winter and spring, even if not blocked
to the depth of several feet by snow or floods,
there is a very fair chance that the bridges may be
washed away, or that, at the least, traffic may be
seriously delayed by wash-outs. The best road in
the country at the present time is that from
Qaraitu to Kazvin, which, begun by the Russians,
was brought to a very fair condition during the
British occupation. Even on this, however, trans-
port during the winter has taken as much as six
weeks to cover the hundred and forty miles be-
tween Kazvin and Hamadan. What its ultimate

e

H
O

INTRODUCTORY 17

fate will be remains to be seen, but, judging by
the extent to which it had fallen off when I
travelled by it five months after the evacuation,
it is more than doubtful whether it will be pass-
able for motor traffic by the spring of 1922.

Meantime the Persians at least show sufficient
interest in it to have established an endless series
of toll-bars, with the result that travelling has
become an expensive luxury, although it may be
doubted whether the revenue derives any benefit
therefrom. In all probability the road will shortly
fall again into the hands of the Russian road com-
pany, although Russia abandoned the concession
by the Russian-Persian Treaty of 1921. Truth to
tell, it looks suspiciously as if the abandonment of
Russian concessions was only intended to be tem-
porary, the aim being to put Britain in the position
of the grasping Power which insisted upon enforc-
ing rights against Persia, as compared with Russia,
which was ready to abandon all claims and meet
her upon a footing of equality. That it was ever
contemplated finally to abandon the concessions
is most doubtful, and since the Treaty expressly
stipulated that they should not be ceded to other
nations, there was small risk that they would
not be readily available when desired.

The paucity of roads and their poor condition
has not prevented the Persian from taking up
motoring, and considerable numbers of cars are
imported at the present time, those in Teheran
having risen from 10 in the spring of 1920 to 250
eighteen months later.

A country which is difficult to enter or leave is
in these days somewhat of a curiosity, but Persia
is at times difficult if not impossible of access.
In normal times by far and away the quickest
and most direct routes were either across the
Caucasus or through Moscow to Baku, and thence

B

18 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

across the Caspian to Enzeli. To-day these are
most effectually closed to the ordinary traveller
by the Bolshevist regime, and it is necessary to
resort to much more circuitous routes. Until re-
cently an additional obstacle was a local republic
established between Enzeli and Kazvin. Apart
from the approaches to Eastern Persia, three alter-
natives are presented — the above-mentioned road
to Baghdad, the road from Isfahan to Bushire, and
the Lynch road from Isfahan to Ahwaz. Of these,
only the first is passable throughout for wheeled
traffic, although cars can be man-handled over the
passes on the Bushire road. The last will only
appeal to those who are attracted by the prospect
of fifteen days on a mule. During the winter all
three are at times rendered impassable by snow,
so that the would-be traveller must perforce wait
upon the weather. A very similar state of affairs
arises at other times through unsettlement, as in
the autumn of 1920, when the Baghdad route was
closed by the Arab outbreak, while the southern
route was for those unable to command a large
escort a somewhat uncertain proposition owing to
the number of robber bands.

The Persian thief is a very different individual
to his European confrere. For the most part he
is a petty thief, anxious, in the main, that his
peculations shall not be discovered. This, in all
probability, is due to the severity of the Koranic
penalties, until recently in force. When, however,
the Persian takes to highway robbery he becomes
a very different person, although not usually blood-
thirsty, provided that his victims are not so ill-
advised as to offer resistance. Ali Baba's famous
forty would compare poorly with some of the
bands which from time to time come into ex-
istence. One which during 1918 terrorised the
neighbourhood of Isfahan numbered at one time

INTRODUCTORY 19

over seven hundred, and although this was ex-
ceptional, very considerable numbers are not
infrequently attained. The powerlessness of the
Government is well illustrated by the difficulty
experienced in dealing with the band in question.
The only method which appeared practicable to
them was to appoint a Bakhtiari Khan Governor
of Isfahan, in the hope that he might induce some
of the younger khans to assist him in suppressing
the marauders. In this he was successful, and
siege was laid to the robber headquarters. There,
however, in so far as results were concerned, the
matter ended. The robbers came and went as
they pleased without being interfered with. The
Bakhtiari had, it is true, two guns, but fearing the
loss of prestige which would have resulted from
an exhibition of their gunnery, preferred not to
risk firing them. After the affair had dragged on
for months, it was finally ended by a detachment
of South Persian Rifles, who settled it in a matter
of forty-eight hours. So much for the vaunted
fighting powers of the Bakhtiari !

It is difficult to generalise about the climate of
a country so extensive as Persia, but, excepting
always the two low belts to north and south, it
may be said that the extremes of temperature are
modified in summer by cool nights and in winter
by bright sun. At the same time the cold, specially
in the more elevated districts, can be great, while
in the south the summer heat is extreme. The
Persian climate cannot be considered to have
suffered at the hands of those who have troubled
to describe it.

With regard to the population of the country,
it is impossible to do more than hazard a con-
jecture. This is inevitable from the very nature
of the problem, for, in respect of a country where
no attempt is made to hold a census, — partly on

20 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

religious grounds and partly owing to opposition
to the idea arising from the suspicion that such
a proceeding could but be the prelude to further
taxation ; a country, moreover, in which a large
portion of the population is nomadic and outside
the ordinary machinery of government, — conjec-
ture alone is possible. Since Europeans first visited
the country the widest differences of opinion have
existed on the subject. Nor is this difficult to
understand. During the seasons when agricul-
tural operations are being carried on, the country
gives the impression of being much more densely
populated than at other times, while much depends
upon the route taken by the traveller, since the
unsettled and arbitrary nature of the government
offers an incentive to avoid the main routes of
travel, with the result that much of the popula-
tion is not settled near the main roads, as in a
more civilised country. For these reasons the
general impression left on the traveller is apt to
vary greatly, and this would seem to have been
a consideration in many of the estimates pre-
sented in the absence of more reliable data.

In the seventeenth century Chardin estimated
the population at forty millions, while a native
historian put forward the preposterous figure of
two hundred millions. Even after making every
allowance for the fact that Persia was at that time
very considerably larger than it is at the present
day, comprising as it did Afghanistan and Georgia,
and keeping in view that the anarchy of the
eighteenth century must have largely reduced the
population, Chardin's figure is excessive. During
the last century the population was greatly re-
duced by epidemics and famine, which recurred
at intervals of less than ten years, and it is be-
lieved that between 1830 and 1880 the population
fell by a third. For instance, Kerman in the

INTRODUCTORY 21

decade following 1840 is said to have lost, includ-
ing emigrants, 700,000 inhabitants, while the de-
crease in Mazanderan and Astrabad is eloquently
attested by the extent of the land which has
reverted to jungle.

One of the most uncertain factors in the problem
is the nomadic section of the population, which
migrates in search of pasture for the flocks from
which it derives its livelihood. Many of the
nomads, particularly those near the centres of
government, have come more or less under con-
trol, but the larger tribes such as the Lurs, Bakh-
tiaris, and Kashghis, constitute imperia in imperio,
and the estimates of their numbers are therefore
largely conjectural. Consequently, too much weight
must not be laid on the commonly quoted number
of two millions.

Sir Percy Sykes, the last author to refer to the
subject, is of opinion that, after making allowance
for all the factors which have operated to reduce
the population, the country cannot at any time
have supported more than fifteen millions ; but
this would seem to be a somewhat conservative
estimate, judging from the remains of ancient
conservation works and from the decreases which
are known to have occurred through famine and
anarchy. At the same time, it is necessary to
guard against forming an exaggerated estimate of
the former population based on the remains of
deserted villages scattered throughout the country.
The Persian appears to have been in all ages a
building enthusiast, a-nd even to-day the first act
of a Persian on the acquisition of wealth is to
build, regardless of whether his resources are such
as to justify the scale of his operations. The
result is that there are to-day many families in
Teheran which, if judged by the scale of their
establishments, would be reckoned wealthy, but

22 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

which in actual fact are saddled with a white
elephant of little or no selling or letting value.
In addition, the country has been in all ages
peculiarly liable to movements of population. The
capital has been changed frequently, this being
the usual consequence of a change of dynasty ;
and similar movements have taken place in the
village population. When a man acquires a village,
the usual form of investment, he is naturally
anxious to increase the population thereof. Given
that he is a person of influence, he will probably
have no great difficulty in so manipulating the
water supply as to deprive neighbouring villages
of an adequate supply, and a movement of its
inhabitants will take place. The Persian Naboth
has indeed but poor chances, and little or no hope
of obtaining redress. Other factors influencing
the movement of population are the incidence of
taxation and the military levy. These being based
on an antiquated survey, it necessarily follows that
once the population of a village has begun to
decrease, the incidence of taxation on those re-
maining tends to become progressively heavier,
until a point is reached when it becomes a vital
inducement to a change of domicile.

In 1810 Sir John Malcolm placed the population
at approximately six millions, and since that date
published estimates have ranged from six to ten
millions. In 1884 General Schindler considered
that something over seven millions was the cor-
rect figure, while five years later Lord Curzon put
it at nine millions. To-day reference books usually
give ten millions, but this cannot be regarded as
more than a conjectural figure somewhere between
the two extreme estimates. These vary as widely
to-day as in former times. For example, a high
official put the population at something under
fifteen millions, probably about thirteen, while at

INTRODUCTORY 23

the other extreme a European of long residence,
who in addition had had opportunities of gaining
an insight into the question in the north during
the famine of 1918, considered that prior to that
disaster the total population was seven millions,
and that two millions had died at that time.
This estimate was admittedly based on experiences
in the north-west, but the extent of the mortality
at least was borne out by my own experiences
when inquiring into the affairs of the province of "'
Teheran, when I found that approximately a
quarter of the agricultural population had died
during the famine.

Where experts disagree to such an extent, I do
not venture to hazard an estimate as to the true
figure, but am content to regard all estimates of
population as being as empirical as most statistics
regarding Persia. For what it is worth, however,
I append a statement received from a Persian
friend who has devoted considerable study to the
question, and which was compiled by him from
information gathered from local officials. At the
least, it represents an honest attempt by a Persian
official to arrive at the truth, and serves to indicate
the general distribution of population according
to men responsible for the administration.

Lowest Figure. Reasoned Higher

Teheran, town . . 250,000 380,000

Do., province . . 700,000 800,000

Azerbaijan . . . 2,000,000 3,000,000

Ghilan .... 600,000 700,000

Mazanderan . . . 500,000 600,000

Astarabad . . . 500,000 700,000

Khorasan and Seistan . 1,000,000 1,300,000

Kerman and Baluchistan 600,000 750,000

Fars .... 1,000,000 1,400,000

Arabistan . . . 400,000 500,000

24 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Lowest Figure.

Burojird and Luristan . 600,000 700,000

Kermanshah . . 700,000 800,000

Kurdistan . . . 600,000 700,000

Khamseh . . . 250,000 350,000

Kazvin . . . 500,000 600,000

Hamadan . . . 600,000 700,000

Araq .... 600,000 700,000

Kum .... 200,000 250,000

Kachan . . . 350,000 450,000

Isfahan . . . 800,000 1,000,000

Yezd .... 300,000 500,000

Other districts . . 350,000 450,000

13,400,000 17,330,000

The most striking fact which is brought out by the
above estimates is that even local officials are
unable to furnish anything better than what are
evidently wildly conjectural approximations.

As will have been noticed above, even in the
case of towns it is difficult to arrive at any definite
figure. The population of Teheran, for instance,
I have heard placed at anything from two hundred
thousand to half a million. The usual figure given
is a quarter of a million. This, I believe, is based
on a calculation of eleven inhabitants per house,
In the poorer districts, however, this figure is
largely exceeded, as many as seventy occupying
a house, while amongst the upper classes very
large households are maintained, ranging up to a
hundred or more. When it is remembered that
the middle class is of trifling dimensions, and
allowance is made for those who sleep in their
places of business and for the homeless, it is pro-
bable that the actual population is considerably
in excess of the figure usually given.

I have somewhat laboured the question of
population, since it serves to emphasise the fact

INTRODUCTORY 25

that all statistics regarding Persia must be received
with the utmost caution. The best that can be
said for them is that they may represent the true
position.

It follows as a natural corollary to the invasions
to which Persia has at all times been exposed that
her population is composed of many and various
elements. The original inhabitants appear to have
been Aryans, but upon these have been super-
imposed Mongols, Arabs, and Turkomans, not to
mention other races which in a lesser degree have
contributed to form the present population.

A century ago Sir John Malcolm described the
Persians as falling into four main groups — the
Turkoman tribes, mainly located in the north and
north-east ; indigenous tribes whose chief habitat
is in the mountains which form the western boun-
dary of the country ; the settled population of the
towns and the agricultural population ; and the
Arabs on the shores of the Gulf. This classifica-
tion, although not above scientific criticism, is
probably still sufficiently accurate to give a general
idea of the nature of the population. The various
races have now become considerably mixed, not
only through individual movements, but through
former Shahs following the old Babylonian policy
of moving their subjects for political reasons.
Thus Kurdish tribes were transferred from the
west to Khorasan to strengthen the defence of
the frontier against Turkoman raiders ; while
some thousand families of Armenians were com-
pelled to migrate to Isfahan in order to reinforce
the trading community. In addition, tribes which
had become inconveniently powerful would be
broken up into two or more entities settled in
different parts of the country. Consequently,
to-day settlements of the same tribe are to be
found widely separated, and the racial distribu-

26 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

tion of the population is subject to very many
exceptions.

It has been usual to talk of the nomad tribes
of Persia as a separate section of the popula-
tion, but it is necessary, when considering them,
to use the words tribe and nomad with extreme
caution, and to have clearly in mind exactly what
is intended. If we use the word tribe in the
Persian sense, we must include at a low estimate
80 per cent of the population, for the vast majority
of the townsmen keep up a connection with their
tribal organisations. They cannot, however, be
regarded as being part of a tribal organisation for
practical purposes any more than members of clan
societies or county associations. Nevertheless the
Persian considers them to be tribesmen.

Equally liable to misconception is the use of the
word nomad. If we are to regard those who move
in search of pasture as nomads, then a large section
of the population must be held to be nomads at
one season and settled at another. In reality they
are no more nomads than the Swiss herdsmen who
move their flocks up to the mountain pastures
during the summer, pursuing the same route, and
returning to the lower levels in the autumn. The
reason for moving and the routine are precisely
the same in Persia. Thus the word tribe may
equally describe the nomad and settled popula-
tion, and, apart from a detailed examination, it is
not possible to define accurately the extent to
which each is under the control of the central
Government. Generally speaking, tribe must be
regarded as in the main meaning those commu-
nities in which the tribal entity is strongest,
and which are most apart from their neighbours.
Over many of these the Government in its
present enfeebled condition has little or no
control.

The largest tribes are the Shahseven, Turkoman,

INTRODUCTORY 27

Kurds, Arabs, Lurs, Bakhtiari, and Kashghi. Of
these, the three latter are credited with being able
to put into the field the first sixty thousand, and
each of the latter thirty thousand men. Whether
or not these figures bear any relation to their
actual strengths, they are far higher than anything
with which the Government can oppose them. It
is extremely doubtful whether, even in the most
serious emergency, anything approaching these
figures could be put into the field, when allow-
ance is made for tribal differences, and in any
case their value and numbers would decrease
greatly outside their own districts.

During the so-called revolution of 1909 the Bakh-
tiari, in spite of the active part which they took,
at no time contributed more than two thousand
men. The really large migratory tribes, which live
permanently in tents, are few — Arabs and some
Kashghis ; while the smaller do not fall to be
considered, apart from Government control. Some
of these, such as the Assanlu, are even to be
found in the vicinity of Teheran. Such tribes as
the Bakhtiari and Lurs live in villages, and culti-
vate the land like their neighbours, from whom
they only differ in the greater proportion of live
stock in their possession. It is those in charge of
the flocks who normally move in search of pasture,
although naturally conditions are different in times
of feud and disturbance, when, for reasons of
mutual protection, it is unsafe to separate.

The tribes are ruled by their khans, the ilkani,
or supreme chiefs, being nominated by the Govern-
ment from the members of the ruling family, or,
in the case of the Bakhtiaris, from one of the two
ruling families. Many of the khans, particularly
in the south, maintain considerable bodyguards,
and lead a life resembling that of the mediaeval
baron. Some of the Bakhtiari khans since the
revolution have discovered the attractions of town

28 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

life, with a consequent degeneration and loss of
authority. This process is at present only in its
infancy, but should it spread, must do much to
weaken the cohesion of the tribe. The Bakhtiari
khans, indeed, did very well out of the revolution,
for in return for their services the four governor-
ships nearest to their territory have since been
allotted to them, and they have shown no diffi-
culty in adapting their predatory instincts to their
new positions, so that those under their control
have little cause to bless them.

The tribes are taxed upon a special basis, a tax
being imposed upon families and another upon
flocks. These are collected through the chiefs,
and whether or not anything reaches the hands
of the Government depends largely upon the rela-
tions subsisting for the time being between the
khan and the latter. That any progress is possible
under such conditions in the south, where the more
independent tribes are located, seems too much to
hope for. The suicidal disbandment of the South
Persian Rifles has meantime destroyed any hope
of establishing a settled Government in the south,
although this must be one of the first tasks of a
strong Government, should such ever arise.

This would not be by any means a difficult
task. What is required is to demand and obtain
from the tribes the proper military quota, and
to carry out a policy of disarmament. The latter
should not require a large force if undertaken
during a period of migration, but it is utterly
beyond the power of the present Government,
whose best troops, the Cossack Division, are well-
nigh worthless for military purposes. Each dis-
trict, however, requires special treatment. The
Turkoman and the Lurs have proved themselves
better able to grasp the necessities of the time
than the southern tribes when they have been

INTRODUCTORY 29

called upon to co-operate in the work of local
government and police, as the two years' adminis-
tration of Qavam-es-Salteneh in Khorasan has
proved to a remarkable degree.

With regard to opportunities for trade develop-
ment, little can be said with advantage at the
present time. Normally the greater volume of
trade destined for Northern Persia passes through
the Caucasus, but since the Russian debacle it has
been diverted to more southern routes. This
change is brought out by the alteration in the
incidence of the customs revenue since the war.
Roughly speaking, the average customs revenue
for the three years to 1914 was 39,000,000 krans,
of which over 31,000,000 was derived from the
northern customs, and the remainder from the
southern. In 1919 the total was rather over
25,000,000, of which more than 18,000,000 was
derived from the southern customs. From these
figures it is evident that a purely artificial condi-
tion exists at the present time, dictated, not by
economic conditions, but by political factors, and
that sooner or later trade must inevitably return
to the cheapest and most direct channel. Although
the British Foreign Office may regard the southern
customs as adequate security for Persia's indebted-
ness, they could not be so regarded from a business
standpoint, and it must be frankly admitted that
any calculations based upon present conditions
are dangerous in the extreme, if they cover more
than the near future.

An even more serious factor is that Persian ex-
port trade is to-day a small and rapidly diminish-
ing quantity, which is utterly inadequate to pay
for the imports. For example, the last return for
the Baghdad route, which I obtained on my
journey, showed imports at five hundred tons and
exports at sixty. It is impossible for such con-

30 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ditions to continue in the absence of foreign loans,
and at the present moment it is difficult to see
whence these are to be derived.

That the British merchant has enjoyed oppor-
tunities since the war is certain, but it must be
confessed that adequate advantage has not been
taken of these. Some concerns trading in Persia
appear to have taken the view of letting the
morrow take care of itself, and have exploited
their opportunities to the utmost, regardless of the
unpopularity which such a policy must entail,
with the consequent certainty that Persians and
Europeans alike would welcome any opportunity
of dealing with competitors. Moreover, much
British effort has not been conducted upon sound
lines. For example, British catalogues usually
contain the proviso that prices cannot be guar-
anteed. When the difficulty of communication at
the present time is kept in view, it will readily
be understood that changes in price frequently
occur prior to the receipt of the Persian merchant's
order. The latter probably receives a telegram
to the effect that a rise has occurred, with a curt
inquiry as to whether he wishes his order filled
at the new rate. Even if he still desires to do so,
he may very well be compelled for financial reasons
to revise his order, with the chance that when his
amended statement is received, he may in all
likelihood be faced with a fresh rise in prices. In
striking contrast are German methods, as in-
stanced by a catalogue which reached Teheran
shortly before my departure. Not only were the
prices quoted firm, but they were quoted in terms
of Persian currency. The merchant who brought
it to my notice frankly stated that he would prefer
to continue dealing with an English firm, but that
under the circumstances he had no alternative in
the matter.

INTRODUCTORY 31

That many good orders could be secured at
remunerative rates (or could have been prior to
the present financial difficulties) is certain, but it
requires to be kept in mind, firstly, that the trade
is seasonal, and secondly, that the Persian knows
his own requirements, and that it is useless to
endeavour to foist upon him anything which the
manufacturer may have upon his hands. For
example, an American firm shipped a large con-
signment of boots. On the assumption that what
was good enough for the citizen of " God's own
country" was good enough for the Persian, the
consignment consisted of those square-toed, tip-
tilted productions which brand the American globe-
trotter throughout the world. The Persian, who,
as a rule, has long and narrow feet, did not happen
to see things from the same point of view ; and
although there was a shortage of boots at the
time, the consignment remained in the importer's
hands. Another factor which requires to be kept
in view is the already-mentioned smallness of the
middle class, from which it follows that there is
a corresponding lack of demand for middle quality
goods. Tea, for example, of which many million
pounds are imported annually, must either be of
the finest or the cheapest, and the same applies
in other directions.

Even had the most been made of opportunities,
only the most efficiently conducted competition
could hope to be successful when faced with open
northern routes, considering that freight from rail-
head to Teheran is anything from fifty to a hun-
dred pounds a ton according to demand. If ever
the day comes that Persia possesses a railway the
situation will be changed, but in the immediate
future the outlook for British trade is far from
rosy.

32

CHAPTER II.

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS.

IN * Herodotus ' we read that the Persian youth of
his time were taught three things — to ride, to draw
the bow, and to speak the truth. The Persian of
to-day is certainly taught to ride ; but as regards
the second item, the qualification is required that,
while in so far as the bow was used for sport he
certainly inherits the tastes of his ancestors, being
a keen sportsman, it is far otherwise in the matter
of war. Were it not that the South Persian Rifles,
under British officers, have proved themselves fair
material for second-class warfare, one would be
tempted to describe the Persian as the worst
soldier imaginable.

I shall return to the army in a later chapter,
but meantime it is worth recalling the story of
the man who exclaimed, " How the Persians
would fight if there were no dying in the case."
There is, indeed, a certain frankness about the
way in which cowardice is admitted without
shame. When the Russians in 1911 occupied
Tabriz, they found it necessary to restore order
with a firm hand, and, among other disturbers
of the peace, certain mullahs were hanged. This
caused consternation in the ecclesiastical com-
munity, and was made the ground of a violent
anti-Russian agitation. In Kerman, in the south
— and consequently far remote from the Russian
sphere — this assumed an extreme form, and under

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 33

the supervision of the mullahs, active drilling was
begun by enthusiasts with the avowed intention
of dethroning and executing the Czar. As luck
would have it, a band of robbers began very shortly
afterwards to infest the district, seriously inter-
fering with the trade of the province, and carrying
their depredations to the very gates of the town.
In their extremity the authorities appealed to the
British Consul to come to their aid and drive
away the robbers. After pointing out that, in the
first place, it was not his business, and secondly,
that even if it were, he could do nothing with the
half-dozen sowars who constituted his escort, he
added that since they had so many men training
to fight the Russians, it should be a very simple
matter to dispose of a few robbers. The reply was
illuminating. "It is quite true," they admitted,
" that there are many men getting ready to fight
the Russians, but then the Russians are a long
way off, while the robbers are very near ! "

As regards Herodotus's third item, one is almost
tempted to believe that the training of his time is
now reversed. Sadi wrote that an acceptable lie is
better than an unpalatable truth, and his country-
men are not slow to put his recommendation into
practice. In addition, it must be confessed that
in many cases a sense of the distinction between
meum and tuum is not over-highly developed.

But the Persian has many admirable qualities,
which go far to redeem his defects. Nimble-
minded, witty, and a lover of poetry and philo-
sophical discussion, he is an agreeable and cheerful
companion. In his case certainly oriental gravity
is conspicuously absent, and it does not require
much to cause the laughter which is ever near
the surface. His mind is subtle and alert, although
he has a rooted objection to facing hard facts.
Carpe diem would appear to be his motto, and his

c

34 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

optimism is of a kind which even Mr Micawber
would have found hard to surpass. On one occa-
sion, when the serious political outlook and the
Bolshevik menace were under discussion, the argu-
ment was summed up by one who said that, after
being an empire for three thousand years, Persia
was certainly not coming to an end now. It
seemed heartless to point out that, although the
land had remained, there had been little other
continuity, and that one race of conquerors after
another had held possession, and we accordingly
let the matter rest there. Further, they are fine
and reckless horsemen, and untiring in pursuit of
game, keen gamblers, and, I gather, good losers.
The peasantry are of fine physique, most hospit-
able, and perforce frugal in their way of life.
Above all, among all classes alike the standard of
manners is of the highest, and in courtesy the
lowest -class Persian could teach the European
much.

One of the greatest bars to progress lies in the
almost entire absence of a middle class. Of such
as there is it may be said that the merchants
constitute the best element of the population. Of
them it may generally be stated that their word
is as good as their bond, and that a verbal under-
standing in most cases will be scrupulously im-
plemented. Their numbers are, however, limited,
and thus the difficulty is — politically — that, apart
from the upper class and religious, there are but
few with sufficient education to undertake the
direction of affairs. It is this that makes it diffi-
cult to see whence a reform of the present system
is to come. The greater part of the population
consists, at one end of the social scale, of the
aristocracy, entrenched behind their privileges,
theoretical and practical, who, if they concern
themselves at all with affairs, are intent only upon

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 35

exploiting the country to their personal advantage.
There are, of course, exceptions, but these are
seldom men of initiative and ability. In this con-
nection it may be worth mentioning that it has
been suggested to me that the balance of power
is gradually shifting from the politicians of Teheran
(many of whose families are impoverished) to the
provincial magnates, rich alike in men and re-
sources, and that this has much to do with the
centrifugal tendency so much in evidence at the
present time. How much there is in this view,
and how far, if it is correct, the movement is
likely to spread, I am unable to say.

At the other end is the peasant, who, in spite
of his legal rights, is at the mercy of the local
magnates and officials, and, in some parts of the
country at any rate, occupies a position little
better than that of a mediaeval serf. For ex-
ample, in at least one district of Mazanderan, the
peasant is compelled to obtain the proprietor's
consent to the marriage of his daughter, and also
to use the proprietor's bath-house. Between the
oppressions of the officials and the exactions of
the landlord, his hope of redress is but small,
and the wise man submits to the oppression to
which he is exposed lest worse befall.

On one occasion, when in camp in the moun-
tains, a nomad was brought in whose hand had
been, in pure wantonness, half -severed by a Cossack.
Fortunately for him there happened to be a doctor
in the party ; but there was no hope of obtaining
the punishment of the aggressor, for those best
acquainted with the country were unanimously of
opinion that in the man's interest we must do
nothing, since any protest, while having no effect
so far as the punishment of the criminal was con-
cerned, would in all probability lead to the murder
of the victim by his assailant or his comrades.

36 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

With regard to the position of women, it is
naturally somewhat difficult to speak, since a
foreigner is compelled to judge by the scanty
chances of observation available, and in Persia I
am satisfied that these are misleading in the ex-
treme. Polygamy is universally recognised, and
in the towns the women are compelled to veil,
but so far as I could observe, the degree of care
exercised in this respect varied inversely with the
proximity of a policeman. Of course, among the
upper classes much greater care is observed, the
ladies of the blood-royal and higher nobility seldom
leaving their homes ; but even among these the
strictness of the supervision exercised is much re-
laxed, and far fewer eunuchs are employed than
formerly, probably a dozen in the royal palace
against a hundred a generation ago. In the country
districts there is much greater laxity in the matter,
while I understand that the women of the tribes
attach little weight to the injunction. As a result
of the higher education of women (everything is
a question of degree), there has been some agita-
tion for the repeal of the law making veiling com-
pulsory, but hitherto the mullahs have succeeded
in securing its continuance. So far as I can ascer-
tain, it does not rest upon the Koran, but at the
same time it is regarded as a religious ordinance.

The Persian woman must not be regarded as a
slave by any measure of means, since even the
disabilities under which she labours have their
advantages. Even the veil has its uses, for one
veiled and shrouded figure exactly resembles an-
other, and intrigue, for those so inclined, is thereby
vastly facilitated.

There are in Persia two forms of marriage, per-
manent and temporary. A man is restricted to
four regular wives or akdis at one time, but in
view of the ease with which divorce is arranged

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 37

this is no very serious limitation. The Koran lays
down that a man shall not divorce and remarry
the same woman more than three times unless she
shall have in the interval married another man.
In the case of temporary wives or sighehs, there
is no limit to the number which he so disposed
may take. These temporary marriages are based
upon a legal contract for a fixed period, usually
three or six months or ninety-nine years. At the
end of the stipulated period, subject always to
provision for any children of the union, the parties
are freed from any claim upon one another, and at
liberty to go their respective ways upon the pay-
ment of the sums stipulated in the contract. In
many cases such marriages continue for years,
even if not permanently, the contract being re-
newed from time to time. Of course, they may
easily under certain circumstances degenerate into
something little better than prostitution, and this
occurs at places of pilgrimage such as Meshed,
which entail long absences from home. There,
under the auspices of the local ecclesiastics, the
pilgrim is provided with a wife for the period of
his stay.

It is not easy to say to what extent polygamy
exists in practice, but some at any rate among the
upper class content themselves with one wife.
Among the lower classes the question is very
largely an economic one. Thus among the peas-
antry, since much of the field work is done by
women, every additional wife means extra labour,
which provides an incentive to polygamy. Among
the tribes it is more usual to be content with one
wife. In the towns the economic factor has the
reverse effect, since there the wife is an additional
expense, which provides a restraining influence.

A further restraint lies in the fact that the
woman may make it a condition of the marriage

38 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

that she shall be the only wife, and in this event
a breach of the contract would give her a legiti-
mate ground for divorce. This power of making
pre-marriage conditions in the hands of a clever
woman can be used to serve her whim in a way
which can only excite sympathy for the hapless
husband. A certain lady had married an ecclesi-
astic, whose home and means of livelihood lay in
a provincial town. Being a prudent young woman,
she had made a condition that she should choose
their home, and to this the bridegroom had some-
what rashly agreed. Between the religious and
civil marriages, as the homecoming of the bride
is called, there is usually a certain interval, and
during this time the lady came to the conclusion
that she did not like her husband, and wished to
be off with the bargain. Bethinking herself of the
condition about choosing a home, she postulated
the condition that her husband should provide
her with a home in Teheran, and despite the
appeals of the luckless mullah, who was in no
position to give up his appointment and move to
the capital, she stuck to her condition. The lady
having the legal right under the contract, the
husband was powerless. The matter had not been
settled when I left Teheran, but certainly the
bride's action bore out the dictum of a friend
with regard to women of the upper class, that no
Persian was a man in his own house. Instances
are also quoted of viziers and other dignitaries who
have been run politically by their wives behind the
purdah, while the case of a certain grandee who
was locked out by his wife is notorious. The
views of the first wife have also to be considered
by the man who would lead a quiet life when he
thinks of a second venture in matrimony, and all
have not the resource of a certain worthy of my
acquaintance, who, contemplating a second mar-

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 39

riage, despatched his first wife on a pilgrimage to
Meshed. If report speaks correctly as to the lady's
character, it appears probable that even he may
have had cause to regret his action.

The Persian servant problem is exactly the re-
verse of the European, for the difficulty is not to
get servants, but to get rid of them. The impres-
sion given is that to enter the service of one of
the greater families is to ensure provision not only
for life, but also to a great extent for the next
generation. For example, one grandee complained
to me that he had not only maintained his foster-
mother during her life, but that he was in addition
saddled with the support of her daughters and
their families. Where son succeeds father and
servants are not dismissed, staffs grow to the most
fantastic extent. One friend admitted that he was
uncertain whether there were eighty or a hundred
servants in his town house, and such numbers are
typical. They, nevertheless, sink into insignifi-
cance beside the establishment of the Sipah Salah,
who is reputed to have three thousand hangers-on.
When tradesmen and others who look to the great
families for their livelihood are added, it will be
appreciated that there is a large body in the
capital vitally interested, for personal reasons, in
the continuation of the present system.

The State religion of Persia is the Shiah form of
Islam. The main difference between this and the
orthodox, or Sunni, Mohammedanism is that the
followers of the former regard the first three caliphs
or successors of Mohammed — Abu Bekr, Omar, and
Othman — as usurpers (from which it follows that
all interpretations and rulings anent the Koran
given by them are void and of no effect), and
claiming that Ali, the nephew and son-in-law of
the Prophet, was appointed by him as his suc-
cessor. Thus it comes about that the Shiah faith

40 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

centres round the family of All. He and his
descendants, the Imams, are regarded as having
been the spiritual heads of the church on earth,
and it is generally believed that the twelfth and
last Imam did not die, but will return in the ful-
ness of time to subdue the world to the true faith,
and ensure the triumph of the faithful. Holding
this belief there is no room for a caliph, and hence
the Persians do not recognise the caliphate.

Ali was murdered, and his son Hasan, who re-
linquished his claims to the caliphate on condition
of being permitted to retain his harem and treasure,
shared a like fate. Hussain, the younger brother
of Hasan, encouraged by promises of support from
the citizens of Kufa, left Mecca with a small body
of kinsmen and followers, the seventy-two martyrs,
and marched to Mesopotamia. The men of Kufa,
proving true to their reputation for faithlessness,
abandoned Hussain to his fate, and at Kerbala,
on the banks of the Euphrates, the devoted band
met their end. As a consequence of their fate,
Ali and his sons have come to be regarded as the
great martyrs of the faith, particularly Hussain,
and his death is annually celebrated during Mo-
hurram. Mystery plays dealing with the tragedy
of Kerbala are given before grief -stricken audiences,
and on the tenth day of the month, the great day
of mourning, processions of devotees take place.
As examples of fanatical lamentation these would
be difficult to surpass, and accordingly for such
interest as it possesses I propose to describe the
only one which I had an opportunity of witnessing.

The first procession which I encountered was
that of the Cossack Division. It opened with a
contingent of lancers, with the led horses, which
form part of the funeral of a man of rank in Persia,
between each file. Thereafter followed a band
playing a lament, and behind it came a large body

1

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 41

of men with bowed heads, who slowly poured dust
upon their heads ; then another band and a second
body of mourners, who gently beat their breasts
with their right hands in unison. Behind these
followed more lancers, and amongst them children
on led horses, typifying the children of Hussain
who escaped from the slaughter.

So far things had been tame, and such as might
have been witnessed in Europe. With the next
troop of mourners the signs of lamentation became
much more vehement. These were stripped to the
waist, and beat their breasts in unison with their
clenched fists. The whole were admirably drilled,
and were it not for the resounding force of the
blows, might have been considered as giving an
exhibition of physical drill. At intervals the pro-
cession stopped, and the breast-beaters put in some
violent work in time to their chant. This party
terminated the Cossack procession, and I had an
opportunity of reaching the place opposite the
entrances to the bazars reserved for Europeans.

Almost immediately there emerged from the
dark entrance of the main bazar a procession the
like of which I had never seen before, and I must
say that I have no particular desire to see a similar
one again. It consisted of a long line of men
walking sideways. They were dressed in smocks,
which at the beginning of their march had been
white. Each man held a sword or large knife in
his right hand, and with his left clasped his neigh-
bour's waist. These were the modern imitators
of the priests of Baal. In front of them were men
with stout staves with which to mitigate any un-
duly violent blows. Slowly the line crawled into
the maidan, and as they emerged into the sunlight
it was possible to realise the horror of their aspect.
Each man's head was a blood-stained mass, the
scarlet stains spreading over, and in some cases

42 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

all over, their white garments. Chanting and
marking time with their swords, the line edged
round the square, while ever and anon one and
another would cut at the top of his head. Look-
ing at them, it was almost impossible to imagine
a greater exhibition of fanatical emotion. The
end of their course was opposite the place where
I stood, and there the procession broke up, all
except those who sought the neighbouring first-aid
station disappearing through an opposite door-
way. The impression left by their exhibition was,
I must admit, somewhat marred as, after a short
interval, one watched orderly groups of Cossacks
and mild-looking citizens, with nothing except the
edge of a bandage showing below their kolas to
mark them out from their neighbours, emerging
from the doorway which had swallowed up the
horde of blood-stained fanatics.

After some groups of civilian breast-beaters had
passed, whose energy fully equalled that of their
military brothers, the head of the main procession
emerged from the archway. This was headed by
the usual troupes of mourners with emblems of
lamentation. Then followed a bier whereon lay
Hussain's headless body with a child by its side.
Immediately behind this came the chief mourners,
a large group of mullahs and other ecclesiastics.
In the centre of the maidan they halted, and
while one delivered an address, the remainder sat
upon the ground. All, and the spectators also,
punctuated the speech with frequent outbursts of
sobs, from which genuine emotion was markedly
absent.

Following upon the mullahs came another bier,
upon which lay a headless and blood-stained corpse,
with two live doves attached to its feet. Men
with swords and cleavers surrounded the bier,
striking at it with their weapons, and when it was

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 43

lowered to the ground these were joined by others
with bundles of reeds. The solemnity of the whole
performance was, it must be confessed, completely
marred by the fact that the corpse at regular inter-
vals made spasmodic movements with its hands
and feet. I am told that it was intended to typify
the piety of the martyr, who in his dying moments
endeavoured to perform the prescribed movements
of prayer, but find it difficult to understand how
even a martyred caliph could achieve this after
being deprived of his head.

As to what followed thereafter I am unable to
say from personal observation, although I under-
stand that amongst others there was one party
who flogged themselves with chains, for at that
moment we were interrupted by an agitated major
of police who insisted on our immediate departure.
It appeared that an urgent message had just
arrived from a leading mullah to the effect that
the members of the next procession had expressed
the amiable intention of beating the Europeans,
and the police were taking no risks of a diplomatic
incident.

The scenes described above may be regarded
as typical of those enacted on a scale proportionate
to the population throughout Persia upon the
tenth of Mohurram. How far they are the out-
come of genuine emotion it is difficult to say.
That the spectators were much moved at the time
is unquestionable; but, justly or not, it was im-
possible to avoid the feeling that the sentiments
were artificially fostered, and were the quickly-
passing emotionalism of the religious revival rather
than the outcome of any deeply-founded convic-
tion. As to the performers, one could not help
wondering precisely what motives were responsible
for their participation in the procession. One
Governor of Kerman is credited with having

44 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ordered that every male inhabitant should take
part at least once in every five years, and the
discipline and training of the Cossacks were such
as to clearly indicate the interference of higher
authority. In other cases those who participate
in particular processions belong to some sort of
society or guild, membership of which would
appear to be regarded as an honour by those
belonging thereto.

It is frankly somewhat difficult to regard Hus-
sain and his relations as martyrs according to
European standards. He did not meet his death
through any question of adherence to his religion
or in a struggle against the infidel, but simply
in a bid for power against a more powerful rival.
The claims of Hasan to be a martyr are even weaker.
According to the Shiah tradition he was assassin-
ated by the agents of his rival ; but it is difficult
to imagine how any one could be so foolish as to
bring about the death of a weak and pusillanimous
opponent in order to clear the path to the succes-
sion for a younger and more ambitious relation.
Under these circumstances it is legitimate to sus-
pect that the Mohurram ceremonies owe their
prevalence to the fostering care of policy in the
first instance, rather than to conviction ; and that
at the establishment of the Shiah cult in Persia
they were encouraged by the Government with a
view to fostering the national spirit. It is also
interesting to wonder whether in these scenes of
universal mourning for a dead hero there may not
be embodied some traces of the cult of the dying
god, which was so general around the eastern end
of the Mediterranean some two thousand years
ago. After all, Kerbala, the centre of the Shiah
faith, is no great distance from the lands where
Osiris, Attis, Dionysus, and Adonis were wor-
shipped, and even in ancient times the communica-

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 45

tion was close and regular. It would thus not be
surprising to find in Mesopotamia some traces of
the worship of the deity or demigod who died
and was mourned each year. Since I write under
circumstances which preclude the use of books of
reference, I have been unable to ascertain whether
any such traces are known to have existed.

One custom which would appear to have come
down from some previous religion is the annual
slaughter of a camel at Teheran. The camel,
which is presented by the Shah, is brought, richly
adorned, to the principal square of the town, and
there killed. Afterwards it is dismembered by
the heads of the various trade guilds, each using
an instrument of his calling. Formerly the camel
was slaughtered by the guild chiefs and torn to
pieces by the mob. The flesh is believed to bring
good fortune to those fortunate enough to eat
thereof. I have not heard any origin of the cus-
tom suggested, but it is impossible not to see here
a survival of the camel sacrifice of the pagan
Arabs.

The Shiah sect would appear to be more fanati-
cal, or, hi any case, more emotional, than the
Sunnis. No heretic is permitted under any cir-
cumstances to enter their mosques and other
sacred places, and it would be difficult to imagine
anything more typical of fanatical ignorance and
vice than the faces of many mullahs. They and
the Seyds or self-styled descendents of Mohammed
cannot be regarded as other than an unqualified
curse to the country. It is at all times unwise to
generalise about bodies of men, and I have been
told that among the higher clergy there are many
men of ability who only indulge in fanatical talk
in order to maintain their influence, very much
as do certain Trade Union officials. In spite of
this, however, it is difficult to believe that the

46 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Persian who said that a good man was very seldom
found among them was very wide of the mark.
These worthies are to be found in the greatest
numbers in the great pilgrimage centres where,
like the priests and Levites of Old Testament
history, they batten upon the pilgrims who throng
to the shrines. When it is remembered in addition
that they and their endowments are immune from
taxation, they can only be regarded as a drain
upon the resources of the country with no counter-
vailing benefits, even if they are innocent of the
vices generally attributed to them, which one is
tempted to doubt.

The dervishes, of whom there are a large num-
ber, especially in Khorasan, live the life of the
begging friars of mediaeval times, and are of equally
little value to the country. A Persian friend puts
the matter much more strongly, declaring them
to be nothing short of a calamity. He describes
them as being to the extent of 95 per cent hypo-
crites, who are incapable of earning a livelihood
on account of being addicted to opium, hashish,
bang, and other drugs, in addition to carrying on
a regular traffic in these among the population.

The Waqf, or charity endowments, in Persia
are immense, and sufficient in one sphere alone
to maintain a hundred schools and universities
sufficiently endowed to provide for five thousand
students until the completion of their studies.
The administration of these during the last fifty
years, and in particular since the constitution, has
become excessively corrupt, and the revenues are
chiefly diverted from their proper destinations to
the benefit of the ecclesiastical body. For ex-
ample, the greater part of the accommodation in
the educational establishments is occupied by the
families of so-called students, who, established since
boyhood, remain indefinitely, declaring sophisti-

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 47

cally that they have not finished their studies.
There is at the present time a movement in favour
of reform, and the disposal of the revenues in a
manner more in accord with the intentions of
the donors ; but whether this will be more suc-
cessful than other attacks upon vested privilege is
doubtful.

As to the other differences between the Shiah
and Sunni sects it is difficult to speak without
careful study of the subject ; but it may be stated
that, while there is greater strictness in certain
matters, there is a corresponding laxity in others.
Thus while, as already stated, heretics are de-
barred from sacred buildings, and women are
strictly controlled in matters such as veiling, the
prohibition against strong drink is very generally
disregarded, and upon occasion even pork and
bacon are eaten, disguised under the euphemistic
name of nightingale's flesh.

For the most part the other religions and sects
which have followers in Persia call for only brief
notice. The chief Christian elements are the
Armenians, and the Chaldean or Assyrian Chris-
tians. The former are mostly found in the neigh-
bourhood of Isfahan, where the majority are
peasants inhabiting the same villages and occupy-
ing the same position as their Moslem neighbours.
Like the Georgians in Mazanderan, they have
mostly lost their original distinction. The chief
settlement of the Chaldeans is in the vicinity of
Lake Urmiah in the north-west. So far as it is
possible to ascertain, their numbers have been
largely reduced by the war and famine, but accu-
rate information is not easy of access either as to
the extent or origin of the troubles. The reduc-
tion would, moreover, appear to be, to some
extent at least, of a temporary nature, for numbers
of refugees are now finding their way back from

48 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Mesopotamia, where there are still extensive refugee
camps occupied by these people.

There are in addition representatives of numerous
missionary bodies, but it is scarcely to be doubted
that they have no following worth the name. Lord
Curzon in his book expresses strong doubts as to
whether any Mohammedans have ever become
permanent converts to Christianity. Converts are
indeed made, but sooner or later they revert to
their original belief.

Two examples may be cited. One is the case of
an elderly woman, one of the missionaries' oldest
and most prized converts, who suddenly an-
nounced her intention of going to Meshed. On her
surprised hearers inquiring the reason, she replied,
" Well, after all, Meshed is a place of pilgrimage,
and after being a Christian for twenty years, one
must do something to put things right." The
other concerns one of the chief servants of the
mission, who, having persuaded his wife to go to
Kum, promptly married two others, with whom
he departed to Teheran. In this case retribution
came quickly, for not only was the black sheep
expelled from the flock, but upon their arrival
the ladies, whose chief desire had been to be taken
to the capital, promptly procured divorces. Nor
is this lack of success to be wondered at when the
fundamental disparity between the conception of
the unity of God and the fatalism of the oriental
on the one part, and many of the dogmas with
which Christianity has been overlaid on the other,
is kept in view.

This difference of view is brought out by the
experience of an American medical missionary,
who pointed out to his cook the potential risk of
allowing his child to play in the drain. The un-
expected reply was to the effect that the Americans
were really very curious people, since, professing

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 49

to teach submission to the will of God, the mis-
sionary straightway endeavoured to persuade him
to try to interfere with His designs. " For," he
added, "it is clear that if it is the will of God
that my child die, die he will, whether he plays in
the drain or not ; while if it is not His will, there
is nothing to fear."

A possible exception to the failure to obtain
converts may be found in orphans educated from
infancy by the missionaries, and of these they have
a considerable number, whom they have adopted
during the famine. Whether these continue Chris-
tians after going into the world may be doubted.

Another reason for missionary failure, and for
this I must rely upon my Persian friends, is that
without distinction of church, they adopt too
polemical methods, instead of relying upon appeals
to philosophy and reason. One such friend, edu-
cated at a missionary school in Turkey, declared
that throughout his residence there every endea-
vour was made to prejudice him against his religion
and country. The reaction, which in the case of
intelligent men results from the use of such meth-
ods, can readily be imagined.

In these circumstances the missionaries find it
somewhat difficult to furnish the necessary number
of converts who are required to make their annual
reports acceptable to their financial backers, and
hence it arises that Armenians are readily received
into membership of western sects : a convert is
always a convert. So far as I am aware the Per-
sian missions are more fortunate than an American
one in Asia Minor, which, while in a position to
produce as a convert a Turkish lady, had a skeleton
in its cupboard in the fact that two of the women
members of the mission had embraced Islam and
departed to Turkish harems.

In all the circumstances, even admitting that

D

50 'RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

in certain cases work of very considerable medical
and educational value is accomplished, it is some-
what difficult to understand the mentality which
expends upon what from its very nature is bound
to be unproductive of any result or advantage,
money and labour for which there is such urgent
need in the slums of our great cities. That much
good can be accomplished by education, which,
leaving aside any attempts at conversion, contents
itself with endeavouring to instil a higher moral
standard is unquestioned. Indeed, the neglect to
establish an English school at Teheran is one of
the most regrettable of the long list of neglected
opportunities of which our recent Persian policy
is composed. There are an American and a French
school, and before the war there was a German
one, but no attempt at a British institution. The
result is that the young Persian is never brought
up to understand the British point of view, while
many of those who under other circumstances
might finish their education in England, proceed
to France, Germany, or the United States. This
contributes largely to the degree to which British
aims and intentions are misunderstood, and had
a fraction of the money squandered on secret
service and bribes been devoted to this purpose,
our position might well be far better than at the
present moment.

There are also in some parts of the country
communities of Sunnis, Parsees or Gabres, and
Jews. The Sunnis consist of the Turkoman of
Astrabad, some tribes in Khorasan, and the
majority of the Kurds in the west. In all they
amount to about a million. The Parsees, the sur-
vivors of the old Zoroastrians, have their largest
settlements at Yezd and Kerman, where they are
credited with ten and seven thousand members
respectively. There are about seven hundred at

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 51

Teheran, but otherwise their numbers are small.
They are not a growing community, for the greater
opportunities offered by Bombay induce consider-
able emigration, a close connection being main-
tained between the two countries.

The Jews are for the most part to be found
amongst the lowest class of the population, al-
though in Teheran, where they number about
twenty-five thousand, they have advanced in some
cases from the status of petty hawkers. Many
intermarry with Mahommedans, while others, as
a half measure, embrace Bahaiism. Converted
Jews, who are known as New Moslems, just as in
mediaeval Spain Jewish converts were known as
New Christians, form a considerable body, twenty
thousand in Meshed and ten thousand in Mazan-
deran.

Bahaiism is the only faith which makes a seri-
ous claim to be regarded as a rival to the State
religion. First preached in 1844, and at first sub-
jected to bitter persecution, it has made remark-
able strides, and to-day claims a large following.
As to its numbers it is impossible to speak with
any certainty, for although active persecution has
ceased with the exception of rare local outbreaks,
it is by no means an advantage from the material
point of view to be considered a Bahai, it being
asserted by them that all suspected of such adher-
ence have been dismissed from State service. It
is claimed that the religion is making rapid strides,
but in fairness it must be stated that this is dis-
puted by many, who regard the mass of the con-
verts as belonging not to the pure faith, but to
bastard offshoots therefrom. They keep their
numbers strictly secret, which furnishes some
grounds for the allegation that they claim as
Bahai all sceptics, and that they have actually
lost, to a great extent, their proselytising energy.

52 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Admittedly they have split into two rival sects,
the Bahai and the Azali, between which there are
many vital differences. They claim to higher
standards of morality and honesty, but some of
my informants assure me that their personal ex-
periences do not bear this out.

A clear comprehension of their tenets is some-
what hindered by the fact that their most im-
portant books do not circulate in Persia, which,
in view of the fact that the Persian is frequently
strong in philosophy and theology, is as well for
Bahaiism, if it is permissible to judge by the
literature which emanates from the Bahai press in
Chicago, and which cannot be described as pre-
senting a strong case or of being devoid of errors.
These publications bear a suspicious resemblance
to other theological curiosities originating in
America. For instance, the " time, times, and
half a time " of Daniel are requisitioned, and do
yeoman service in proving that the day of the
Bab's birth was exactly foretold by the Prophet.

Generally speaking, Bahaiism claims to be the
completion of former religions, and, while admit-
ting that there is some truth in all, maintains that
each revelation was limited in a greater or less
degree by the conditions of the age during which
it occurred, and that all are finally summed up
and completed in itself. Thus it is claimed that
the expectations of the Jews for a Messiah, of the
Christians for the Second Coming, and of the
Shiahs for a Mahdi, are alike implemented and ful-
filled in the Bab. For the rest, ethical standards
are the most important. A religion established on
such a basis naturally makes no claim to exclu-
siveness, and embracing the Bahai beliefs does not
entail the abandonment of the convert's former
faith. Thus there are to be found in Teheran
American Bahai missionaries ; and Musulman,

THE PEOPLE AND RELIGIONS 53

Jews, and Parsees are alike to be found within the
fold. How many are there because of belief
in its tenets, and how many for the more practical
reason that it affords an approach to Islam, with-
out the abandonment of previous beliefs, is another
question.

Incidentally, the execution of the Bab only
failed by a hair's-breadth to provide a well-authen-
ticated modern miracle. When placed against the
wall for execution, the first volley, while leaving
him entirely uninjured, cut the cords which bound
him. These were the days of black powder. The
Bab escaped and took refuge in a neighbouring
shop. Unfortunately for him this had no exit,
and he was recaptured and shot. It is permissible
to speculate what would have been the conse-
quence had he either made good his escape and
appeared elsewhere, alleging a miraculous removal
from danger, or had he had sufficient determina-
tion to stand forward and claim that he had been
freed by a similar agency. In the latter case he
might well have carried the surrounding multitude
with him, while in the former all the materials for
a legend of well-authenticated miraculous interven-
tion would have been ready to hand. It would
have been interesting to learn how contemporary
thought would have dealt with them.

54

CHAPTER III.

THE GOVERNMENT.

IN theory Persia has since 1906 enjoyed the bless-
ings of constitutional government, but for prac-
tical purposes it would be as correct to describe
Great Britain as an absolute despotism as to say
that Persia is governed in a constitutional manner.
The Persian constitution may fairly be said to
have come into existence, not as the outcome of
any sustained and national demand, but almost
by accident. The people, generally speaking,
were not interested any more than they are to-day.
During my stay in Teheran, fourteen years after
the establishment of the constitution, one news-
paper declared that the vast majority of the
people were not yet clear whether constitution
was something to eat or something to wear, and
although this may be something of an exaggera-
tion, it may be confidently asserted that popular
interest in the matter ceased when it became clear
that it was neither of these desiderata. To-day
few outside the political rings take any interest
in the matter, while the expense to Government
of assuring the return of acceptable candidates is
very considerable, and the consequent loss to the
Treasury through the remission of taxation corre-
spondingly great. Perhaps it would be more
correct to say that the loss would be so were it
not for the general embezzlement which diverts

THE GOVERNMENT 55

so much of the revenue for the benefit of indi-
viduals. Under the circumstances, it does not
perhaps make so very much difference, particu-
larly as elections are by no means universal.

Prior to 1906 the Shah was, in theory at any
rate, an absolute despot, whose power depended
upon the character of the reigning monarch, and
was restricted only by custom, expediency, the
power of the Government of the moment, and,
during the last half - century, the influence of
European opinion. The system, in form at least,
had in all probability not changed materially
during the last two or three milleniums. The
monarch's word was like the law of the Medes
and Persians, provided always that he had the
power to give effect thereto.

The Ministers were the personal servants of the
sovereign, dependent upon a continuance of his
favour, and for the most part men of humble
origin. Their position was by no means a bed of
roses, for although they had unlimited oppor-
tunities of enriching themselves, it was a not
unusual practice upon the part of the monarch
to regard his viziers as collecting agents for his
benefit, and ultimately to divert their ill-gotten
gains to his own uses. This was by no means
the greatest risk to be faced, for the loss of office
was not infrequently followed by loss of life. As
recently as last century no less than three grand
viziers paid with their lives for the loss of their
sovereign's favour. Even to-day a fallen Minister
often finds it expedient to take a hurried trip to
other countries. But these disadvantages have
not occasioned any dearth of candidates for
office.

In actual practice, it would appear that at most
times the real power lay not so much in the hands
of one man as in those of a small class, who,

56 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

having the ear of the Shah, either in council or
private, had in addition influence in the country.
In this respect there has been but little change
since the constitution, and hence it is that so
many mullahs and priests are to be found mixing
themselves in political matters, and having their
services recognised by political pensions. The
effect of this outside influence is seen when the
trifling forces at the disposal of those who ex-
pelled the late Shah are compared with those
which Kuchek Khan for so long had at his dis-
posal in Ghilan, with the avowed object of elimi-
nating Teheranis and the old grandees from the
government of the country.

In addition, the Shah has to submit in practice
to many restrictions to his authority. Thus,
while in theory he could appoint whom he chose
to office, in certain cases (such as those of the
Ilkhanis or head chiefs of the various tribes) in
practice his choice was, as it is to-day, restricted
to members of the ruling family, since any other
nominee could only be installed and maintained
by force of arms. The same held good in the case
of many minor appointments, for only a magistrate
acceptable to the people had the requisite support
to enable him to carry out his duties efficiently.

Over the persons and property of his family,
Ministers, and officers the Shah exercised absolute
authority. He could, and did, put them to death,
confiscate their property, and sell the families of
disgraced Ministers into slavery. With regard to
the mass of his subjects his power was much more
restricted, since, while he was chief magistrate,
his decisions were, in the main, regulated by law
and custom, although doubtless punishments in-
flicted depended at times upon the whim of the
moment. Indeed, arbitrary penalties no less ter-
rible than those of past times have not been un-

THE GOVERNMENT 57

known since the establishment of the constitution.
I have heard of cases where men were blown
from guns, and dipped head first in boiling pitch,
while, as recently as 1919, some of the Isfahan
robbers, already referred to, were walled up alive.
This must not be regarded as indicative of bru-
tality ; but in a country where prisons in the
European sense are practically non-existent, it is
necessary at times to visit particularly serious
crimes with punishments calculated to inspire
would-be imitators with a wholesome respect for
the law. The governor responsible for the punish-
ment of the Isfahan bandits had the reputation
of being a humane man, and he carried his
humanity to the extent of directing that the
criminals should be entombed head downwards
in order to assure a speedy termination of their
sufferings.

In judging an oriental monarch, it is necessary
to guard against considering as acts of individual
tyranny those which are actually dictated by the
custom of the country or the necessity of making
an example in times of weak government. Sir
John Malcolm has justly pointed out that were
such a system in force in England, under which
the king sentenced criminals to death, the sen-
tence being carried out forthwith in front of the
palace, it would be difficult for the most humane
rulers to escape being branded as bloodthirsty
tyrants.

Prior to the accession of the Kajar dynasty at
the end of the eighteenth century, the choice of
his successor depended largely upon the whim of
the monarch. Endeavours were made to assure
a peaceful succession by removing the eyes of all
those regarded as possible aspirants to the throne,
and the new rulers usually took care to rectify
any laxity which might have been shown in this

58 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

respect. With the Kajars a more humane system
came into vogue, it being regarded as a sine qua
non that the mother of the heir should be of the
blood-royal and, in addition, an akdi or full wife,
the children of all other members of the royal
anderun being debarred from the succession. The
inevitable result of this system has been to lead
to intermarriage in the royal family to such a
degree that serious degeneration has occurred.

To attempt to substitute at one stroke for such
a system a constitutional government was to
invite failure, and certainly that failure has fol-
lowed. To define the position of the Shah to-day
is somewhat difficult. His constitutional position
is clear enough, but in practice that counts for
little. It is probable that a strong and able man
would find in practice that his position was but
little weakened by a so-called representative body
which at times does not meet for years. The
present Shah is scarcely the man to take a strong
line. Placed on the throne as a child at the time
of his father's abdication in 1909, he has led a life
very different from that of his ancestors, most of
whom were keen sportsmen and often seen amongst
their people. Nasr-ed-Din, who has been described
as the last true Shah, used to spend several months
each year moving about the country at the head
of a retinue equal to a fair-sized army. The present
Shah, on the contrary, leads an extremely retired
life, and it must be confessed that, although quick
and intelligent and possessed of a certain dignity,
his prevailing characteristics are avarice and
cowardice. Moreover, he is possessed of a morbid
terror of infection and germs, to which he gives
way to such an extent that at times he refuses
to sign even the most important documents lest
he should risk infection through a contaminated
pen-holder. In a crisis his first idea is flight. In

THE GOVERNMENT 59

appearance he is short and exceedingly stout.
Owing, amongst other reasons, to his secluded
life he is the reverse of popular, and in this respect
is outdistanced by his brother the Valiahd, or
heir-apparent. He has at present no regular
wife. A marriage was indeed proposed in the
beginning of 1921, but having refused the lady's
condition that he should dismiss the ladies of his
anderun and undertake not to introduce others,
he was compelled to give place to his brother.

The Persian conception of kingship cannot be
better typified than by the procedure at a royal
salam. The European idea is that a subject
attends at Court to be presented to the head of
the State, whether king or president, but in Persia
the same set of officials are expected to present
themselves at very frequent intervals to rever-
ence the monarch. The ceremony on the more
important occasions takes place in an outer court-
yard of the palace. At the upper end is the
throne-room — a kind of portico open towards the
court — which contains the celebrated marble
throne. This resembles most nearly a species of
billiard-table, accessible by a couple of steep steps,
which His Majesty appears to find somewhat try-
ing. Upon this is placed a chair which, Lord
Curzon states, contains the fragments of the pea-
cock throne looted from Delhi by Nadir Shah in
the eighteenth century. Below the throne-room
runs a broad terrace with a fountain in the middle,
and some two feet lower the main court is divided
throughout its length by a long tank. On either
side of this is a double avenue with trees between.

On the occasion of a salam the space to the
right of the throne is occupied by a group of
princes dressed in sober black relieved only by
jewelled swords and sword-belts, while on the left
are the Ministers in all the splendour of robes of

60 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

honour and kolas. A robe of honour may most
aptly be compared to a Paisley shawl dressing-
gown, and a kola to a truncated bowler hat minus
a brim. On the terrace are grouped the chief
officials ; while the body of the court is filled
on the left with gendarmes in sky-blue uniforms,
and on the right with Cossacks whose uniforms
comprise every variety of colour. They are sturdy-
looking ruffians these Cossacks, Turkomans for the
most part, and one would be inclined to credit
the Cossack Division with possessing magnificent
material were it not that when those who are to
be seen everywhere in their ordinary uniforms are
remembered, it is impossible to banish a suspicion
that those who attend salams are a selected body
permanently detailed for that duty. In front of
the troops are grouped field-marshals, generals,
and colonels, who in splendour would hold their
own anywhere. Every one wears a cordon of one
kind or another, while decorations abound. The
regulations with regard to these do not appear
to be over strict, and there is nothing to prevent
the holder of the first-class of an order wearing
the insignia of all five classes. Consequently,
many of these gallant warriors have considerable
difficulty in finding room for their many stars
and medals.

Presently the national anthem plays and the
Shah appears, preceded by servants and ushers,
and followed by a seedy crowd of black-clad in-
dividuals— princes, courtiers, and others. The
livery of the palace servants would be gorgeous
were it either new or clean, and were their scarlet
tunics, faced with blue and gold, supplemented
by adequate nether garments and shoes. As it
is, there would appear to be no rule relating to
these.

As the Shah mounts the throne guns begin to

GO

r\

THE GOVERNMENT 61

fire, and continue to do so while he remains there.
The proceedings open with a speech of welcome
from a grey-bearded official, and then the Court
poet gets to work. To admire Persian poetry is
fashionable, although a literal and complete trans-
lation of even the much-quoted Omar Khayyam
would hardly prove suitable for a drawing-room,
but its merits I must leave to others. The sound
on first acquaintance is sufficiently startling to
the untrained ear. I shall never forget my first
experience when, without warning, a sudden out-
burst of such sounds as it seemed impossible for
the human throat to produce suddenly burst out
immediately behind my back. The only com-
parison which occurred at the moment was a dog
saluting the moon supported by a feline chorus,
and although familiarity led to a somewhat modi-
fied view, I never ceased to wonder how such
sounds were produced. Whether it was recitation
or singing I have not the remotest idea to this
day. When the poet has concluded his contribu-
tion, the Court orator gives a very similar per-
formance, and then the Shah and his attendants
leave, being in all probability compelled to edge
their way through the spectators, who have left
their places to obtain a better view.

The proceedings conclude with a march past in
an inner courtyard, where, on less important
occasions, the whole ceremony takes place. That
the whole affair has its humorous side cannot be
denied ; but there is a certain pathos about this
tawdry attempt to maintain a ceremony which
must have been a magnificent spectacle in the
days when the King of Kings was, for his subjects
at least, the centre of the universe.

The fact remains, however, that although the
Shah may in many respects be little more than a
figurehead, he is a very necessary component in

62 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the system of government. The constitution may
mean something in the capital, and the idea may
have become more or less familiar to the settled
population ; but to the tribesmen it means noth-
ing, and were Persia to become a republic, it is
almost certain that a general break-up would
ensue. Even to-day such may not be far distant.
That the Bakhtiari took an active part in the
constitutional movement is nothing to the point.
Among themselves their system of government is
purely mediaeval and feudal, and with one possible
exception they would appear to have been actu-
ated by personal interest. Four governorships were
their reward, but even this proved not entirely
satisfactory. One of their chiefs complained bit-
terly that he had not been so well treated as a
brother khan, and when it was pointed out that
he also had been rewarded with a governorship,
replied, " That is true, but his is richer than mine,
and so he can make more out of it."

Probably in proportion to the numbers of the
population Persia possesses more princelings than
any other country. This is hardly surprising
considering the productivity of the Kajar race,
and the large numbers of ladies who have filled
their anderuns. Fath Ali Shah, who reigned dur-
ing the first third of last century, is commonly
credited with having been survived by a hundred
and fifty-nine children, although I have heard
the number placed higher. As few of these cadets
have private means, and even the elastic Persian
civil service cannot provide for all, they are driven
to earn their living as best they may, and royal
princes may to-day be found working as peasant
cultivators, shoemakers, and coachmen. I even
heard of one who acted as body-servant to another
prince.

Generally speaking, but little regard is paid to

THE GOVERNMENT 63

the national interest in filling Government appoint-
ments, although at times the qualifications of the
nominee are taken into consideration with a view
to placating popular opinion. When, however,
there is no anxiety in regard to this, appointments
are apt to go either to the supporters of the
Government, as in America, or to be reserved for
the benefit of the vizier's private purse. Corrup-
tion throughout the Government service is almost
universal. Governorships are sold to the highest
bidder, and the new governor forthwith proceeds
to recover his investment by selling off all appoint-
ments within his gift, lest a change of Government
should lead to loss of office before he has made
his legitimate profit. Needless to say, it is well-
nigh impossible to bring home such transactions
to those concerned. It is comparatively easy to
obtain the evidence of the unsuccessful would-be
purchaser, but his successful rival is less ready
to speak, while the rejection of the tendered bribe
can always be represented as due to rectitude and
not to a desire for a higher price. Moreover, it
is to the interest of all politicians and officials that
such affairs should be hushed up.

The oriental appears to regard the State as a
fair milch-cow for all who are fortunate enough
to arrive at a position where they can take toll
of the national revenues. An interesting explana-
tion of this attitude of mind was offered by a
missionary of many years' standing, which I give
for what it is worth. His view is that the universal
corruption in public life is due not to any inherent
depravity in the individuals concerned, but to
the fact that the standard of perfection laid down
by the Koran is relative and not absolute. Thus
assuming that the sum of an individual's actions
is represented by 100, all that is necessary to
assure his future bliss is that 51 per cent shall

64 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

have been good, although in the uncertainties of
human life the more cautious may well regard
this as a somewhat narrow margin for working
purposes. From this it follows that when an
individual has acquired an adequate credit balance
in the recording angel's book, it is clearly unsound
policy to increase this unnecessarily, and that con-
sequently he who wishes to make the best of both
worlds will be wise to draw upon his balance,
provided always that this is not unduly depleted.
It follows that a reasonable amount of evil may
be indulged in without any fear of unpleasant
consequences hereafter. My informant assured
me that he had frequently seen the same prin-
ciple at work in other spheres, and to it he attri-
buted the general lack of thoroughness so notice-
able in the Persian. Amongst his own pupils he
found that this invariably held good, and that
the time always came when the most promising
scholar considered that he had done enough and
began to idle. Another salve to the conscience
lies in the fact that the giving of the prescribed
tithe to charity purifies the remainder in the
hands of the owner. Thus the politician who has
sold a governorship for, say, five thousand tomans,
may, by giving five hundred in charity, retain the
balance with a clear conscience.

I need hardly say that my Persian friends will
have none of this theory, nor does it appear to be
entirely adequate, seeing that the Mohammedan
religion is not universal in India, nor, for that
matter, in America.

Tradition has it that when his elevation to the
Papal throne was announced to Alexander Borgia,
he exclaimed, " Since God has given us the Papacy,
let us enjoy it," and it would be difficult to imagine
a more suitable motto for the Persian politician
and official. The former's view of his position

THE GOVERNMENT 65

appears to coincide with the Irishman's definition
of patriotism as, " To serve one's country for a
good salary, and provide posts for one's nephews
and other relations." The Persian must not, how-
ever, I think, be judged too harshly in this matter,
for he acts according to the immemorial custom
of the East, and every politician and official has
intrigued for and won his position. It is well to
remember that our boasted purity in public life
is a plant of very recent and — if credit be given to
certain scandals and rumour thereof — of somewhat
tender growth. It is little more than a century
since the office of Paymaster-General of the Forces
was regarded as a road to rank and fortune for
its fortunate holders. Moreover, in a country
where a stock exchange, directorships, and party
funds are alike lacking, the politician is compelled
to resort to more direct methods of remunerating
himself for his patriotic services, although the
practices of his European confrere would, if open to
him, prove much more in accord with the subtlety
of his character. It does not, by any means,
necessarily follow that, because he is compelled
by force of circumstances to resort to cruder
methods of enriching himself, he is inherently
worse than his European or American brother,
and at least Persia does not trouble to set up white-
washing machines when a scandal occurs.

In England the official is regarded as existing
because the State has need of his services, and as
being fairly dealt with if paid a fair return for
these ; but in Persia it is different, and the
public service is regarded as providing a means
of livelihood for those who would otherwise be
destitute. In England, prior to the establishment
of the Civil Service Commission and competitive
examination, the Civil Service was to a great
extent reputed to be a refuge for the incompetent

E

66 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

who was possessed of influence, while the evil was
increased by the fact that the range of profes-
sions which were regarded as open to gentlemen
was very limited.

The same causes have been productive of the
same results in Persia. Except the Army, the
Civil Service is the only profession open to edu-
cated men who do not wish to embrace an ecclesi-
astical career. Consequently, every possible effort
is exerted to secure the recommendation and pro-
tection of Ministers, and merit and long service
count for little. The relation of a Minister will
be found in enjoyment of a salary of a hundred
tomans a month, while a clerk sharing the same
desk and doing the same work, but without in-
fluential backing, is paid twenty. Naturally in
such circumstances discontent is universal, and
officials are compelled to look to illegal perquisites
for a livelihood. An additional incentive to cor-
ruption exists in a system of disponibility which
cannot be too strongly condemned. Under this
an official, through no fault of his own, may find
himself on what might be described as indefinite
half-pay, were it not that the pay is almost if
not entirely lacking. When to this is added the
risk that a change of Government may at any
moment result in the dismissal of the placeman,
it is easy to understand that he makes the most
of his opportunities.

Further incentives are to be found in the low
scale of salaries and the immemorial sanction of
custom. Indeed, so far is peculation from being
regarded as disgraceful, that a man who does not
make use of his opportunities is considered not
only as a fool, but with suspicion, as one who is
a potential spy, and at any rate an inconvenience
to be got rid of at the first favourable opportunity.

In making use of the opportunities which a turn

THE GOVERNMENT 67

of the political wheel may place in his hands, the
Persian has little to learn from the American,
and public opinion is as little against such prac-
tices as it is among many classes in New York
against Tammany and all that it stands for. I
remember some years ago when in New York
during the course of a municipal election, listening
to a tirade against the iniquities of Tammany.
On inquiring how, if things were as bad as stated,
the people supported the party, it was explained
that in the past many people had become wealthy
through their support of Tammany, and that
were things to be reformed, those who so far had
been exploited, or at the least enjoyed only minor
pickings, would lose any chance in their turn of
becoming the exploiters. The chance for each
individual might in truth be remote, but it at
least existed and appealed to the sporting instinct.
This explanation showed a very similar outlook
to that of the Philadelphia journal which, after a
peculiarly disgraceful municipal scandal had come
to light, pleaded that Philadelphia politics were
at least only pale grey by comparison with the
deep black of Chicago and New York.

The scale of salaries is inadequate in the ex-
treme, and is, moreover, regulated more by per-
sonal interest than by the responsibilities under-
taken. Under such conditions staffs naturally
tend to reach utterly unwieldy proportions, two
or three men pretending to occupy themselves
with work easily within the capacity of one. In
one branch of a certain Ministry some sixty clerks
were employed, and a European, who had frequent
occasion to visit the department officially, stated
that on no occasion had he seen pen put to paper.
When, during the government of Seyd Zia, an
attempt was made to reduce the staffs of Govern-
ment departments to reasonable proportions, it

68 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

was found that the central office of the Opium
Department alone could spare four hundred em-
ployees, which indicates a scale of establishment
of which some of our war-time Ministries need not
feel ashamed. The result of staffs so vastly in
excess of requirements is that the placemen, hav-
ing no work with which to occupy themselves,
pass their time in endeavouring to add to their
own and their patron's incomes. The worst that
can result from exposure is dismissal, and this is
improbable, while in this event a present, judici-
ously placed, will almost certainly assure another
appointment. The authorities, however, have no
desire to be troubled with scandals, as is shown
by the following experience of a young official
who has been educated at the American College.
While holding an appointment in the provinces,
an unusually gross piece of corruption on the part
of his chief having come to his notice, he an-
nounced his intention of informing the inspecting
official upon his next visit. When the inspector
arrived, he informed him that he had a complaint
to lodge against his chief, and was instructed to
go to the inspector's lodging that evening. Upon
his arrival he found that worthy completing his
report, and was asked as a personal favour to
delay his complaint until this was finished, on
the ground that he, the inspector, had been in-
structed to make a favourable report upon the
official in question should this be by any means
possible, presumably to serve as an excuse for
preferment ! The report having been completed,
the complaint was duly received and noted, but
it is legitimate to doubt whether it went any
further.

It must not be assumed that there are not some,
particularly among the younger men who have
been educated under European and American

THE GOVERNMENT 69

auspices, who would welcome reform, but, so far
at any rate, circumstances have proved too strong
for them. One Minister frankly stated that he
would welcome the presence of a European ad-
viser in his department, if only to occupy the
position of whipping-boy. He explained that if,
under present circumstances, he were to dismiss
an official for corruption, he would be inundated
with requests for his reinstatement from mullahs
and other persons of influence, and that were
these to be ignored, he would have to face the
hostile intrigue of the writers when next a change
of Government occurred.

Reform of the Civil Service would not by any
means be a difficult task, provided always that
those responsible therefor were invested with ade-
quate powers. A regular and sole means of entry
to the service, coupled with fixity of tenure,
reasonable prospects of advancement and an as-
sured pension, added to the certainty that the
discovery of corrupt practices would inevitably
lead to dismissal apart from other penalties, and,
above all, removal of the service from the power
of the politicians, would eliminate all excuse for
and incentive to the present practices; and given
this, I believe that a sufficient number of the
younger generation, trained to higher ideals of
public service, would be available. I must con-
fess frankly that I see not the very slightest pros-
pect of such reforms being introduced under native
auspices. A foreign adviser vested with absolute
power could alone carry through the necessary
reforms, and it may be regarded as certain that,
save in the very last resort, such powers will not
be given. Anything less would be absolutely use-
less, and make the adviser's position a sinecure.
Meantime there is no hope of reform from within
through the influence of the younger generation,

70 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

for those of them who press for reform are likely
to leave the public service after a very short trial.

The methods of corruption in vogue are legion,
and a passing reference will be sufficient. Apart
from the sale of offices, favourite devices are to
give personal receipts for taxes, returning the
official receipts with an explanation that owing to
drought, locusts, or some similar cause the taxes
are irrecoverable ; to sell the grain collected in
payment of the taxes in kind for a nominal price
to a ring in which the official is interested, on the
plea that there is a glut locally ; to submit de-
mands for funds for non-existent road guards,
or at the least to divert the funds when received ;
and to extort payment for immunity from military
service. The devices resorted to are, however,
numberless, nor is great ingenuity required when
the taxpayer is as a rule without the power of
resistance or appeal, while should the matter come
to the knowledge of higher officials, a division of
the profits avoids unpleasantness. When the tax-
payer is rich or powerful a present may be ex-
pected to secure immunity, — unless, that is, he
happens to be sufficiently powerful to ignore the
official entirely.

In attempting to outline the system of local
government and the various links in the chain
of authority, it will probably be most convenient
to begin at the bottom. I must premise that,
in view of the extent to which conditions differ
in the various localities, and the modifications
and breakdowns in the old system since the con-
stitution, what follows cannot be regarded as more
than a general description of the present condition,
and is subject to modification and amendment.

At the bottom of the Government machine is
the village community, presided over by a kad-
khoda or mayor. This functionary, in cases where

THE GOVERNMENT 71

the peasants are the proprietors, is usually chosen
by the rich sefid, or grey-beards, as a rule the
heads of the various families. Where the village
belongs to a proprietor, the kadkhoda is nomi-
nated by him and approved by the villagers, or
vice versa. But the methods of choice are very
various, and the above are only examples. In
cases of dispute the choice is usually made by the
local governor. The kadkhoda is assisted by the
Pakar, the executive man of the village, and the
Mirab, who is in charge of the water distribution.
With their aid in small villages, and with that of
the rich sefid in large, he is responsible for the
allotment of the village lands and the apportion-
ment of the water amongst the respective culti-
vators. In owned villages this is a subject of
great abuse, although the rights of the peasant
are clearly defined, and in many cases codified or
officially approved. When disputes arise the matter
is usually referred to the arbitration of some
mullah or other person of standing, while, in the
last resort, the peasant can in case of injustice
leave his holding, abandoning his fixtures and
instruments of cultivation. As to what these
consist of there are various opinions, but build-
ings and his share in such common articles
as fruit-trees may be considered the most im-
portant. The proprietor has then to expel the
cultivator, although in many districts this right
is denied him, and to pay for the abandoned
property. The mayor is also responsible for the
general control of the work of the village, and for
the maintenance of order and local policing. He
approves and pays all common expenses, and
collects all revenues and taxes.

Formerly the village entity was much more in
evidence, but since the constitution it has been
to a great extent ignored. The powers of justice

72 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

being largely in the hands of local magistrates,
the local grandees have, in the absence of Govern-
ment control and supervision, usually exceeded
their legal rights. The modern Government has
ignored the village community to a great extent,
although in the past the kadkhoda was the repre-
sentative of the Shah, and the Government re-
tained the right of supervision, and to this many
attribute the failure of the constitutional regime
in the spheres of police, justice, and finance, con-
sidering that any constructive policy must under-
stand and utilise the village entity. In the tribes
the control exercised by the immediately superior
chief tends to a much more thorough control and
efficiency, but when for any reason this control is
relaxed, greater disorder is likely to ensue on
account of their migratory habits.

Next above the village comes the " blouk,"
consisting of a group of villages, and administered
by a bloukkhoda. At times he is nominated by
the local proprietors, but more often he is selected
by the Government from among prominent local
men. He represents the blouk in the civil gover-
nor's and the mullah's courts, and acts as adviser
to the Government in matters concerning his dis-
trict. Formerly his powers in matters of police
and control of revenue were much greater, and
in some remote districts, or through the influence
of the proprietors, as, for instance, in Kolidjan-
restagh and Kiakola in Mazanderan, he still re-
tains these powers. This link in the chain of
government appears to have been ignored more
than the others, and the question of its reorganisa-
tion is one of the most vital.

Above the blouk come the groups of blouks
controlled by sub-governors, and above these again
the districts ruled by local governors. These are
established units, but their efficiency may be

THE GOVERNMENT 73

doubted, thanks to the incapacity of the central
administration. In former times the central Gov-
ernment was the Shah's Court, and its actions
represented the opinions of the men who were
in intimate association with him. Usually the
prevailing opinion was that of the Grand Vizier's
party ; but men with knowledge were consulted
privately by the Shah or the durbari (counsellors),
while important matters were often publicly de-
bated and decided by the whole body of counsellors.
Whatever the decision the minority were secure,
while to-day even the parliamentary minority is
not immune from pressure. Thus the Durbar was
the mirror of the central Government, where every
class was represented, including the ulema and
seyds. At times, it is true, the Shah and Grand
Vizier acted without consultation, but upon these
occasions the reasons were always publicly stated.

The provincial governor always dealt with mili-
tary affairs, his vizier concerning himself with
financial and civil matters. This concentration of
authority gave much more efficient results than
the system introduced under the constitution,
where there is a civil governor, and other officials
are in control of military and financial concerns,
all acting independently. Under the former system
the local expenses, other than those of a general mili-
tary character, were not paid by the central treas-
ury, and consequently the exact local revenue was
unknown to the central administration, the surplus
only being remitted to the central treasury. This
admittedly gave opportunity for irregularities in
taxation, but the certainty that undue excess would
be sharply dealt with if it became known to the cen-
tral Government provided a wholesome deterrent.

Under the constitution, ignorance of details of
local taxation and expenditure, aggravated by the
diminution of the powers of the local governors

74 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

through the establishment of independent financial
and military authorities, led to the financial diffi-
culties which threaten to plunge the country in
bankruptcy at the present time. Instead of
attempting to reform the administration of the
system of local government, Persian ways, cus-
toms, and history were ignored, and recourse had
to panaceas derived from foreign sources or due
to the invention of the would-be reformers. The
result was what might be expected. Where under
the old regime some seven million tomans were
received annually from the provinces for the ex-
penses of the central administration; the latter
under the new system soon found itself compelled
to find money for local expenses, and this has
increased to such a degree that I doubt whether
the treasury receives anything from the provinces
at the present moment apart from a small con-
tribution from Yezd. The weakness of the Govern-
ment has been increased by the timidity which
has been displayed under the constitution where
popular demonstrations are concerned. This has
led to an increase of such demonstrations by the
dissatisfied, and it is said that the expenditure of
ten thousand tomans will provide a demonstration
sufficient to bring about the resignation of all
except the strongest Governments.

The system of agriculture is primitive in the
extreme, and more usually the villages are the
property of the State or individual proprietors.
The Koran lays down that the produce should be
divided into five parts for the land, water, labourer,
ox, and seed corn, but in practice the share falling
to the peasant is more favourable. Usually it is
seven-tenths, but in certain districts two-fifths or
two-thirds. The proprietor generally recognises
that the value of his property depends upon a
contented and prosperous peasantry.

75

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN
AGREEMENT.

IN order to understand modern Persian history
clearly, it is necessary never to lose sight of the
fact that, since the days of Peter the Great, Rus-
sian policy has regarded Persia as lying within the
Russian sphere of influence, and as destined ulti-
mately to become a Russian possession. Whether
or no the will of Peter is a genuine document, it
embodies clearly the motives which have actuated
Russian statesmen. During the last century,
Russia's steady advance resulted in her becom-
ing Persia's neighbour for the whole length
of her northern frontier, while Persia's Cauca-
sian provinces were absorbed by her northern
neighbour.

This being the position, it will readily be under-
stood that opposition to Russia has at all times
been the motive underlying Persian policy. That
her rulers have been compelled to resort to the
weapons of the weak must be admitted, but this
follows from the very nature of the case ; and the
policy of intrigue which this has entailed must
always be viewed from this aspect. Thus, during
the war, Persia to a great extent favoured Ger-
many, not because of any particular liking for
Germany, but because a German victory would,
through weakening Russia, result to her advan-

76 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

tage. We, as Russia's ally, shared in the dislike
entertained for her.

In 1906 British prestige was, as it is to-day,
at a singularly low ebb in Persia, although for
different reasons. The British Foreign Office had
been busily occupied in endeavouring to make
bricks without straw, while Russia, on the other
hand, had not hesitated to spend money freely ;
on the Cossack Brigade, on road construction, and
on the development of trade and banking.

The Cossack Brigade, although part of the
Persian Army, was commanded by officers upon
the active list of the Russian Army, assisted by
/ a numerous body of Russian N.C.O.'s, and con-
sequently formed a very useful outpost for Rus-
sian influence. The roads were naturally designed
to facilitate Russian strategic needs and trade
requirements. The Russian Bank, being, like the
sister institution in Pekin, an offshoot of the
Russian Government, was enabled to undertake
business of a class which could not justifiably be
accepted by an institution doing a legitimate
banking business, and was consequently able, by
means of loans and mortgages, to secure a strong
grip upon the resources of Teheran and of many
who exercised great weight politically. Lastly, a
customs revision had secretly been concluded a
few years before, skillfully designed to foster
Russian trade at the same time that it crippled
that of the British Empire. Moreover, the Rus-
sian Army was ever imminent upon the frontier,
while the British Navy was a very shadowy thing
to a people whose centres of population are remote
from the sea, for which they have at all times
evinced a marked disinclination. Consequently
upon all these factors Russian influence was
supreme at Teheran, while the British position
was at best a poor one.

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 77

To enable the reader to understand clearly sub-
sequent events, it is necessary to refer briefly to
the causes which had occasioned the internal con-
dition of Persia at this time.

After the death of Nasr-ed-Din Shah in 1896,
the control of affairs had fallen into the hands of
the cabal which surrounded his successor, Mozaffer-
ed-Din Shah. This group, whose sole object was
personal benefit, sought its advantage in pander-
ing to the ignoble vices of the monarch, an easy-
going voluptuary. Pensions were increased, and
the Persian pension, if not a free gift to a favourite,
is usually given in payment for political services,
active or negative, and Crown lands were distri-
buted to the favourites and their associates. The
successive Sadr Azam (Prime Ministers) were the
only persons from whom this group had anything
to fear, and these being nominees of the Shah,
could do but little, even when so disposed.

The consequence of this course was, that when
the Shah, or rather the cabal, decided upon a
journey to Europe, the treasury was empty, and
for the first time Persia was compelled to contract
foreign indebtedness. It need hardly be said that
the requisite loan was obtained from Russia.
Thereafter the situation went steadily from bad
to worse, robbery increased, and rebellion became
more general. It was impossible to obtain justice,
and bribery and tampering with judges became
universal.

In this crisis another Russian loan was secured,
and the Shah and his favourites departed upon
another visit to Europe. In his absence the
Valiahd (heir - apparent) and his counsellors, in
an endeavour to find a remedy for the disastrous
condition of the country, introduced amongst other
reforms some radical changes in judicial procedure.
For example, it was decreed that a bureau be

78 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

established in connection with every court of
justice, whether civil or religious, whose function
was to see that after final judgment had been
delivered, all previous documents relating to the
case were destroyed. The object in view was to
ensure that cases were brought to a final conclu-
sion, and so eliminate the chance of their being
reopened in some other civil or religious court,
for which an adequately bribed official could
usually find an excuse in one or other of the
voluminous mass of accumulated papers.

This reform, striking as it did at the perquisites
of the almost universally corrupt officials and
mullahs, met with violent opposition, which was
instigated and fostered by them. A riot was
organised by the talabieh (law students and assist-
ants in religious schools), and after three days the
hated reforms were repealed. Whatever may be
thought of their wisdom, and although it must be
admitted that the Government made many false
steps in attempting to deal with the situation, its
efforts represented a serious attempt to grapple
with the prevailing corruption. The vested in-
terests and the influence of the mullahs were,
however, too strong, and from the agitation
fomented at this time against the Valiahd dates
his unpopularity, which was finally to lead to his
enforced abdication.

Visits to Europe, which had become much more
frequent since Nasr-ed-Din's foreign tours, had
opened fresh aspects of life to some of the more
thinking travellers, so that the possibility of find-
ing in representative institutions a panacea for the
national misfortunes had begun to be considered.
Although such ideas were restricted to a limited
circle, it was largely felt amongst the educated
that some serious action was necessary, and con-
sequently from this time the intellectuals and the

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 79

better type of religious functionaries began to
press for the convention of a representative as-
sembly where the reform of justice might be con-
sidered, with a view of tendering to Government
the advice of those best qualified to assist in the
direction of affairs. But this was still far from
the conception of a constitution which was shortly
to develop.

Upon his return from Europe the Shah, instead
of supporting the Valiahd's attempts at reform,
or endeavouring to find alternatives therefor,
ignored the growing demands for reform, and
dismissed the Sadr Azam. Thereafter matters
drifted along as before, until they terminated in
the disturbances which led to the establishment
of the constitution.

The situation was finally brought to a head by
a demand for the dismissal of the then Sadr Azam,
who, even more rapacious than usual, had carried
his interference in judicial matters to such an extent
as seriously to interfere with the emoluments of
those usually accustomed to concern themselves
therewith. Accordingly it was decided to organise
an agitation for the removal of the offending
Minister, but before describing the form which
this took, it will be necessary to say something
about the peculiarly Persian custom of bast.

In its original form bast was not so usual, nor
the opportunities therefor so extensive, as they
have become to-day. In its origin it appears to
have been very similar to the mediaeval idea of
sanctuary. A man flying before a more powerful
enemy would seek the protection of some chief
or ecclesiastic, or, at the least, of some one more
able than himself to negotiate upon equal terms
with his pursuer. In periods of strong Government
no one was, of course, strong enough to protect
against the Government itself, so that in such

80 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

cases the help of those possessing personal influence
at Court could alone avail to secure immunity.
Under weak Governments such interference natu-
rally tended to increase. It was also customary at
times to take refuge in mosques and shrines,
although in such cases the onus of permitting the
fugitive to remain appears to have devolved upon
the official responsible for the care of the place in
question. Refuge appears to have been as a rule
admitted by the Government, when any of the few
higher religious dignitaries intervened, if only to
avoid friction and to ensure justice where the
viziers and durbari (through whom alone access
to the royal ear could be obtained) were concerned.
But at no time did the Government admit the
theory that the sanctuary was inviolable, and both
at Meshed and Kum refugees have been removed
by military force and executed. The Government
might find it inexpedient to exercise its rights,
but these nevertheless remained, so that although
the fugitive might obtain time for his case to be
heard he could not be sure of ultimate immunity.
Even this was a valued privilege, and the greatest
fault alleged against Mirza Taki Khan, Nasr-ed-
Din's first Sadr Azam, at the time of his fall was
that he had not left anywhere to take bast, not
even the royal stables, which from time immemorial
gave absolute security against all save the Shah
alone.

At first sight this form of bast would seem to
introduce an element of comedy into the matter,
but on closer inquiry the custom is found to have
a logical and reasoned origin. As has been said,
it was customary to give ear to the requests of
the higher clergy, but when the Shah was on a
campaign or travelling (and the old Shahs were
accustomed to spend at least six months in each
year travelling through their dominions), neither

Douleh Gate, Teheran.

The Bond Street of Teheran.

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 81

ulema or shrines were available. Then, in the
words of Nasr-ed-Din, " the thoughtful and in-
dustrious Ministers established the custom that
the royal stables could extend protection to those
who were in fear and dread. The reason for this
was that when any one was summoned to the royal
presence he might not fly to foreign countries
through fear of being without a refuge. If soldiers,
whose faults require to be more severely dealt
with than those of others, had not this last refuge,
then, being accustomed to risk their lives and to
take desperate decisions, they might in despair
attempt something desperate." But if this is
the historical origin of bast, the custom depended
more on the strength or weakness of the central
Government, according to which the number of
places of sanctuary extended or decreased.

At a later period bast also extended to telegraph
offices, in the belief apparently that the telegraph
ended at the Shah's throne, and also to Foreign
Legations. This latter cannot, however, be re-
garded as true bast. Originally the Persian Gov-
ernment extended immunity to foreign representa-
tives alone. In the reign of Mahomed Shah, 1837
to 1847, this was extended to nationals of the
legation in question, but no right of protecting
Persians was admitted. As the Government grew
weaker, lists of proteges came into existence, and
the question became political and one of influence
and prestige. In the troubled period which followed
Nasr-ed -Din's death the question assumed great
importance, and from that time has played a vital
part in internal politics. Partly out of respect
for the feelings of the refugees, and partly to dis-
guise the weakness of the Government, such
foreign protection was described as bast, although
in reality it was foreign interference in internal
affairs. Thus it came about that the original

F

^

82 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

custom of sanctuary was turned by the nimble-
witted Persian into a means of political agitation,
and on the principle that the more powerful the
person to whom you made yourself a nuisance,
the greater your chances of success, legations were
specially favoured.

The only attempt at taking bast which took
place during my stay in Teheran was upon the
dismissal of the Russian officers of the Cossack
Division in the autumn of 1920. Upon that occa-
sion, in return for a cash payment an anti-British
demonstration was organised, but instead of de-
monstrating against the persons and property of
British subjects, the demonstrators attempted to
take bast in a mosque and the American Legation.
The attempt came to nothing, for the police
barred the way to the mosque, while the official
who at the moment was in charge of the Legation
was, having recently arrived, unaware of their
intention, and regarding the demonstrators as a
gang of riff-raff, refused them admission. Whether
the matter would have proceeded further it is
impossible to say, although it may safely be
assumed that demonstrations would have con-
tinued so long as funds were forthcoming; but
the news arriving that the provider of the funds
had left Teheran, the agitation came to an abrupt
conclusion, the organisers deciding that the best
method of disposing of the money available was to
act upon the adage that charity begins at home.

During last summer an instance of bast occurred
in Luristan which tends to show that the political
basts were really based upon foreign protection
and not upon the ancient custom. Upon this
occasion two Cossacks took refuge in a mosque,
but were promptly taken out of sanctuary by the
military authorities. As a protest a general bast
took place, but this did not obtain the release of

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 83

the original bastees. Thus, while foreign protection
secured immunity, sanctuary did not. I shall have
occasion later to refer to an episode which throws
an interesting aspect upon the Bolshevist attitude
towards diplomatic immunity, but this will be
better dealt with when discussing recent events.

To return meantime to the agitators of 1906.
In considering what form of demonstration would
best suit their ends, it was not to be expected that
bast would be lost sight of, since this entailed no
personal risk. The season was summer, the British
Minister was at his country residence, and the
British Legation possesses one of the most agree-
able gardens in Teheran. A bast under British
protection appeared to be clearly indicated, and
having previously ascertained that they would
not be ejected, a body of demonstrators marched
one evening to the Legation and established them-
selves in the garden. The weather was hot, and
it is no hardship to sleep in the open at Teheran
during the summer. Life in the garden was pleas-
ant, being passed in the Persian fashion in dis-
cussion and poetry. The consequence was that
the number of bastees increased rapidly, and before
long there were fourteen thousand persons estab-
lished within the precincts of the Legation. Under
such circumstances ideas readily take hold of the
popular imagination, and constitution became to
the bastees what the ever-blessed word Mesopo-
tamia was to the Scottish divine. That the vast
majority had but the very haziest idea of what
was implied is, I think, clear, and certainly in the
provinces it was translated into the right to do
as you like, with the result that the provinces
declined to remit revenue, while the individual
taxpayer declined to pay, and the tribes inter-
fering, mild anarchy ensued in some places. But
understood or not, the word " constitution " came

84 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

to be regarded as the infallible remedy for the
national evils, and a demand for a constitution
became one of the conditions of the bastees.

Whatever the origin of the agitation, and how-
ever far the claims of the bastees had veered from
their original demands, the fact remained that an
impossible situation had arisen. After an attempt
to blockade the Legation and starve out the bastees
had been promptly countered by a forcible diplo-
matic representation, the Government found itself
helpless. On his side the British Minister saw his
garden being rapidly ruined, while, as the season
drew on, the time approached when he would
require the Legation for his own use. Conse-
quently there was every incentive for those con-
cerned to bring the situation to an end, and upon
the representations of the Minister the Shah under-
took to grant a constitution and to agree to the
assembly of a body which should prepare a scheme.
Therefore the whole episode was regarded as a
British diplomatic triumph of the first rank, and
for a time British prestige ranked high, since the
British were regarded by the party in power as
their protectors, and as responsible for having
brought about the achievement of their objects.
Thus British prestige was restored, a constitution
was obtained, and the contractor who fed the
bastees made a fortune.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the
discussions which ensued. The Shah, who was
already failing, when presented with the concrete
proposals, used every artifice to avoid giving his
final consent, but was in the end compelled to
sign the constitution presented to him — a paste
and scissors compilation, mainly derived from
French and Belgian sources, which, ignoring na-
tional methods* of administration, was utterly un-
suited to the requirements of the country. Very

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 85

shortly afterwards the Shah died, to be succeeded
by the Valiahd, Mahomed All Shah, who was
emphatically opposed to the new scheme of gov-
ernment.

To obtain a constitution and to be able to
administer it are entirely different matters, and
when the Majlis or Parliament did assemble the
deputies very quickly showed themselves utterly
unfitted for their task. Discussions were of the
most general description, spectators who so desired
joining freely in the debates, while the deputies
showed their zeal by interfering upon every pos-
sible occasion with the work of administration,
even instructing the police as to the execution of
their duties. Later a British Minister stated in
a report to his Government that the Persians were,
and would continue for another two generations
to be, utterly unfit for constitutional government,
and this would not appear to be in any way an
overstatement of the case. What had been ac-
complished, however, was to break down the
authority of the executive and the central Govern-
ment, and so pave the way for anarchy and
eventual Russian intervention. Thus the British
Government's mania for scattering constitutions
broadcast irrespective of whether the people are
fitted for them or not, was to be largely respon-
sible for Persia's subsequent troubles, and Persia's
experiences are not devoid of interest in con-
nection with recent efforts in India and Mesopo-
tamia.

A fact which cannot be too strongly emphasised
is that the Majlis has at no time been a repre-
sentative assembly in the European sense. In the
first and second Majlis some deputies were elected,
and these co-opted others, while at all times the
influence of the mob was a potent factor in the
decisions of deputies. Moreover, at no time has

86 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

a sitting ever taken place at which the number of
deputies present exceeded a hundred. There is
no attempt to hold the elections at any one time,
those for the present Majlis having extended over
the better part of two years. Indeed, it may be
doubted whether they are even now complete, or
for that matter ever will be.

Even when it has been duly elected, it by no
means necessarily follows that the Majlis will meet.
When it was finally decided to convene the present
Majlis, it was only with the utmost difficulty that
a quorum was brought together ; while, in the
critical days at the beginning of 1921, when the
Government made repeated efforts to get a quorum
together to consider the Anglo-Persian Agreement,
this proved impossible. There were, it is true,
sufficient deputies in Teheran for the purpose ;
but some twenty members, who were opposed to
the Agreement, took the simple method of ensuring
the triumph of their views by refusing to attend,
thus rendering the assembly of a quorum impos-
sible. The remainder, seeing that this attitude
met with popular approval, and anxious not to
be outdone in bidding for popularity, signed a
declaration not to accept the Agreement.

It is only natural that under such circumstances
provincial deputies should be reluctant to under-
take the expense and risk of the journey to the
capital, and consequently it comes about that
when it does meet the assembly contains a pre-
ponderating majority of Teheran deputies. Under
these conditions it will be readily understood that
the Government and the civil and religious mag-
nates have little difficulty, by bribery and intimi-
dation, in ensuring the return of acceptable candi-
dates. I do not propose to repeat the current
reports of the intimidation exerted at the last
elections, since these are of altogether too per-

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 87

sonal a nature, but of the methods of bribery I
had an interesting experience when looking into
the finances of the Province of Teheran. In cer-
tain instances I noticed a falling-off of revenue,
and this was explained on the grounds that the
Government had in those cases found it necessary
to grant remissions of taxation in order to ensure
the return of their candidates.

When, in addition, it is remembered that the
Majlis at times does not meet for years, it will
be appreciated to how small an extent Persia is
in actual practice ruled in a constitutional manner.
But it must not be thought that because the mag-
nates still retain control the Majlis serves no useful
purpose. This is far from being the case, since
the very fact that there is a constitution is of the
utmost value to the Government in its dealings
with foreign nations. The one thing which the
Persian desires to avoid, in pursuing his policy
of evading bringing matters to a head, is to be
forced to come to a decision. In this the Majlis
is invaluable. For example, when the British
Government endeavoured to obtain a definite
decision with regard to the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment, Sadr Azam after Sadr Azam was enabled
to profess his desire to bring this about, but at
the same time to plead his inability to act since
the matter came within the competence of the
Majlis, while at the same time assuring himself
that that body did not assemble (no difficult
matter when the small number of available depu-
ties is considered). I may be doing the Persian
Government injustice with regard to this, but I
do not think so.

The subsequent adventures of the first Majlis
have frequently been narrated. As stated, the
deputies from the first proved themselves incapable
of anything except obstruction. For over a year

88 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the state of tension between them and the Shah
continued to increase, and finally in June 1908
matters came to a head after an attempt upon
the Shah's life. Pathetic pictures have been drawn
of the simple democrats being slaughtered in
defence of their beloved Majlis ; but although it is
difficult to obtain exact information with regard
to the casualties which occurred, such statements
must be received with the utmost caution, since
they would appear to have little foundation save
in the imagination of those who first transmitted
them to Europe.

What is clear is that in the fight which occurred,
the supporters of the Majlis were the aggressors.
What actually took place was that a body of
Cossacks was sent to effect the arrest of certain
agitators accused of plotting against the Shah.
In anticipation of some such development, the
supporters of the deputies had assembled to the
number of some three thousand, although it is
uncertain how many were actually present at the
time. That nothing in the nature of an attack
was contemplated upon the side of the Govern-
ment forces seems to be plainly shown by the fact
that the Cossack officers were not with their men,
but only drove up in cabs after the first collision
had taken place.

Upon the arrival of the Cossacks in the square
in front of the Majlis building, the defenders of
the constitution fired upon them, inflicting a score
of casualties, whereupon the Cossacks immediately
and hurriedly retired. The firing was apparently
due to a party of Caucasians who took the most
active part in the fighting. Indeed, when in
Persia's political upheavals bloodshed occurs, the
credit must as a rule be placed to the account of
Caucasian adventurers. Upon the arrival of the
Russian officers, one of them loaded, trained, and

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 89

fired a gun. This was more than sufficient for the
vast majority of those who had sworn to die at
their posts, and they effaced themselves with the
utmost speed. There was some further firing, but
it is very doubtful whether the constitutional party
sustained any considerable number of casualties.

Some arrests occurred, and the Shah was cred-
ited with the intention of dealing severely with
his prisoners. This was, however, denied upon
the intervention of the British Legation. It was
finally agreed that certain leaders should go abroad,
and a Gilbertian touch was introduced by the fact
that they declined to do so until the Shah defrayed
their expenses. Such was the end of the first
Majlis, and it must be admitted that the members
of subsequently elected bodies have proved them-
selves to be little better fitted for their task.

There are special circumstances which, in the
case of Persia, help to explain the failure of con-
stitutional government. These lie in the conse-
quences of the foreign diplomatic and military
intervention, as a result of which the people have
come to regard foreign relations with such nervous-
ness that these have assumed an importance far
in excess of constitutional questions. Those in
power, appreciating clearly the internal weakness
of the Government, direct all their efforts to cope
with the aggressive action of foreigners, aiming at
the preservation of the country rather than of the
constitution or the law. Although we may con-
sider the policy of successive Governments as one
of intrigue and weakness, we must admit that
they have so far been successful in their object,
and if the situation is looked at impartially, the
continuity of this policy of weak efforts may be
discerned. That more might have been effected
with popular support may be admitted, but it has
been customary for the people to regard the Gov-

90 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

eminent with distrust, and mainly as a tax-
extracting machine.

Such, briefly, is the Persian view of the ques-
tion, but the failure need occasion no surprise
when it is remembered that the idea of popular
government is directly opposed to oriental con-
ceptions on the subject, and that, moreover, a
constitution is regarded by many as contrary to
the precepts of the Koran, to which in Persia the
final reference invariably lies. Not that this weighs
with a large portion of the upper classes, among
whom, on the surface at least, scepticism is very
general, in spite of the strain of mystical fanati-
cism which underlies the characters of so many
Persians.

It is necessary to keep in view that the native
of such countries as Persia and India who visits
Europe for purposes of education or amusement
cannot be regarded as typical of the mass of his
fellow-countrymen, and that beneath surface re-
semblances of dress and deportment, there exists
an attitude towards the basic facts of life which
differs fundamentally and vitally from that of the
European. Thus the clamour for popular govern-
ment, of which we hear so much in certain oriental
countries, cannot be regarded as being the outcome
of any genuine popular aspirations. More often,
it is to be feared, it has its origin in the discontent
with existing conditions engendered by the in-
judicious attitude adopted by people in Europe
towards the oriental student, and his consequent
disillusionment upon his return to his native
country. It is also to be found in the desire for
personal advantage, or in the aspirations of a
former ruling class, such as the Brahmans, to
recover their pristine powers, with the consequent
opportunity of exploiting the lower ranks of
society for their own advantage — a right so un-

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 91

reasonably denied to them by the British Raj.
With regard to India I must rely upon the opinions
of others, but in view of the extension of so-called
popular government, the experiences of Persia are
not without interest.

While the greatest deference must be rendered to
the opinions of tourist politicians (with a main eye
upon the popular vote, and more often than not
preconceived ideas), the opinions of men who have
spent their lives in the administration and study of
a country are not entirely unworthy of considera-
tion, even though they are from their official posi-
tions debarred from making these opinions public
when distasteful to the politicians in power. The
harm which may be caused by the ignorant meddling
of the politician in the affairs of a people of whom he
has little or no knowledge cannot be estimated. For
example, when a member of Parliament proceeds
to address native strikers through an interpreter, re-
gardless of the risk that his remarks may inadvert-
ently or of set purpose take on a new significance
in translation, what proportion of the blame for
the subsequent riots and the suffering resulting
therefrom may be fairly apportioned to him ?

Whether those will prove true prophets who
consider that the first result of the new Indian
constitution will be an extension of corruption
to a higher class than at present remains to be
seen, but it is difficult to understand how the in-
creased number of native officials can be success-
fully carried by their British colleagues. Even
to-day it is, I believe, notorious that many of the
natives who rise to the higher ranks of the Civil
Service, drawn as they more often are from a
class unaccustomed to rule, can only be efficiently
maintained by placing them under the strongest
superiors and giving them the very best British
assistants. Also it is difficult to understand how

92 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

a class like the Brahmans, set apart from the
common herd by divine origin, can have any
genuine aspirations after democratic institutions.
Probably in India, as in Persia, not one per
thousand has any real interest in, or under-
standing of, the matter ; or, if they have, are
lacking in the practical ability to apply their
knowledge.

As regards Persia at any rate, it may safely be
affirmed that the chief consequence of the intro-
duction of constitutional government up to the
present has been to saddle the country with an
additional swarm of political parasites, whose de-
mands have to be satisfied at the public expense
(with an appalling consequent increase in the pen-
sions list), to bring the country to the verge of
bankruptcy, and to diminish law and order through-
out the country. In practice the country is run,
one cannot say ruled, by small rings of politicians
co-operating with a powerful and corrupt bureau-
cracy, whose aim is to enrich themselves so far as
possible before a turn of the political wheel brings
their tenure of office to an end. For any Govern-
ment to remain in power for more than a few
months is regarded as an unreasonable retention
of the sweets of office.

Persia, in so far as it is ruled at all, is ruled by
Teheran, and Teheran is ruled by perhaps three
hundred men, including the ins and the outs. It
is difficult to see what other state of affairs is
possible so long as the constitutional farce con-
tinues, considering that the vast mass of the
population is utterly unfitted, both by education
and experience, to take any part in political life,
while of those qualified, few are actuated by any-
thing except self-interest. At the last election
the officials of one province applied to the British
Political Officer to tell them whom to elect. In

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 93

conversation he mentioned two individuals as
being suitable, and they were duly returned.

As has been said, Russia had ever since the
time of Peter the Great regarded Persia as destined
ultimately to be absorbed by her, and as the period
of her active intervention in Persia may be con-
sidered as dating from the dissolution of the first
Majlis, it will be well to review briefly the previous
steps in her advance.

As a consequence of two unsuccessful wars,
which were concluded by the Treaties of Gulestan
in 1813 and of Turkomanchi in 1828, Persia was
compelled to cede to Russia, Georgia, Baku, and
her other Caucasian provinces. From the latter
date Persia must be considered as having to some
extent lost her former independent status, since
she was henceforth powerless to offer active op-
position to the aggression of her more powerful
neighbour. Thus, when in 1840, in response to
a request by the Persian Government for assist-
ance against the Turkoman pirates, the Russians
established a naval base upon the Persian island
of Ashurada, in the south-east of the Caspian,
which she thereafter refused to evacuate, Persia
could only lodge a protest, and when this was
ignored, submit as best she might. Another
development which brought about a change in
the relations of the two countries was Russia's
advance towards Central Asia, which, after absorb-
ing the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, ter-
minated with the suppression and annexation of
the Turkomans. The freedom which Persia thereby
gained from Turkoman forays was more than
counterbalanced by the fact that, instead of hav-
ing for neighbours on her north-east frontier a
group of native states, she was confronted by
Russia throughout the entire length of her northern
frontier. The adjustments which occurred along

94 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the new frontier were, it need hardly be said,
entirely favourable to Russia.

Such was the position which had developed by
1881, and Russia did not hesitate to push her
advantage in every possible manner, with the
consequence that during the ensuing quarter of
a century British diplomacy waged a hopeless
struggle, unsupported by either force or money,
against an opponent ready to squander both to
achieve her ends.

As has been said, the constitution was regarded
as a British triumph, with a resulting increase of
prestige and popularity. This, however, proved
to be short-lived, for in the following year the
Anglo-Russian Convention was signed. This was
designed, by clearly defining the spheres of in-
fluence of the two nations, to eliminate occasions
of friction and misunderstanding. Stated shortly,
the Convention recognised that Isfahan and the
country to the north thereof lay within the Rus-
sian sphere, while the Gulf littoral and the hinter-
land thereof was declared to constitute the British
zone. The intervening territory was declared to
be neutral. The Convention would appear to have
been an advantageous one for Russia; but while
Britain was not prepared to maintain her position
by either money or force, the terms were in all
probability as good as could be obtained, while
it must in fairness be recognised that at that time
a good understanding with Russia was regarded
as of vital importance, in view of the European
situation. Under these circumstances the Con-
vention must be considered from the wider aspect,
and not regarded merely as an abandonment of
our position in North Persia, which, in spite of the
recent " coup," was of little value, while in the
case of Russia it did little more than recognise
the actual position.

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 95

However that may be, the fact that remains
of chief importance is that from that time on-
wards we were regarded as Russia's accomplices
in her designs upon the integrity of Persia, and
although upon occasion we were able to intervene
to mitigate the severity of her actions, this did
little to lessen the unpopularity which we thence-
forward shared with her.

That the Convention should raise a storm of
protest in Persia was hardly surprising, since it
was not unnaturally regarded as a preliminary to
a contemplated partition of the country. This
belief was in no way allayed by the attitude of
the signatories, which was that the matter did not
in any way concern the Persian Government,
seeing that it merely effected a settlement of the
outstanding questions between the two Govern-
ments, and did not in any way contemplate a
partition of the country. So far as our posi-
tion in Persia was concerned, we were, in addition
to our loss of popularity, doomed to play second
fiddle to Russia at Teheran, and when the war
came, Persian feeling was almost entirely in favour
of Germany, or rather against Russia and our-
selves.

For the greater part of the year following the
dissolution of the Majlis, the struggle between the
Shah and the democrats centred round the siege
of Tabriz, the principal stronghold of the party.
Prior to his accession, the Shah, as is usual for
the Valiahd, had been Governor of Tabriz, and as
such had earned great unpopularity. The siege
was as remarkable for the heroism displayed by
the population under conditions of famine, as for
the total lack of military courage exhibited by
the vast majority. There was no lack of arms, but
out of a city of some hundred thousands only
about two thousand fighting men were available.

96 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

The besiegers were of little greater military value,
consisting partly of Government troops and partly
of tribesmen, neither of whom had any desire to
assault the walled gardens with which the town
was surrounded. They were divided into three
bodies which acted independently, and upon no
occasion did they combine for concerted action.
All were more intent upon loot than fighting, and
the capture of convoys was of greater interest for
them than the risk of an assault. Indeed, the
whole affair was fruitful in episodes which were
little short of farcical. For example, upon one
occasion a remittance of specie belonging to the
Imperial Bank of Persia was captured. The
Sipadhar, who commanded the royal forces, sent
into the town to purchase from the local branch
of the bank a draft for a thousand pounds on
Teheran, which was duly cashed long before the
bank had obtained compensation for its funds with
part of which the draft was purchased. That the
defenders had an equal eye to the main chance
may be judged from the fact that after the siege
fourteen grand pianos were found in the house of
one of the heroic leaders. The actual fighting was
of a similar nature. Upon one occasion a sortie
was attempted by the besieged. Some six hundred
men were to take part, but when the moment for
the assault arrived only some twenty-seven were
found to have followed their leaders. Notwith-
standing this the royalists were attacked, and in
spite of the fact that they were about two thousand
strong, driven back a considerable distance. Never-
theless, apparently feeling that enough had been
done for one morning, the attackers gradually
melted away and returned to the town.

At last, when success appeared to be within the
Shah's grasp through the effects of starvation, the
defenders spread a report that a massacre of

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 97

Europeans was contemplated, with the result that
Russia intervened and deprived the Shah of the
victory.

This intervention was shortly followed by the
advance from Enzeli of a small force chiefly com-
posed of Caucasian adventurers, who, nominally
at least, were under the command of the Sipadhar,
who, having been captured by the revolutionaries,
had promptly been chosen as their leader. This
body acted in co-operation with a force of Bakhtiari,
which moved on Teheran from the south. Some
skirmishing occurred between the Enzeli force and
Cossacks ; but the former, under cover of night,
avoided their opponents, and entered Teheran
through one of the northern gates, which had
deliberately been left unguarded. With such suc-
cess was this movement executed that some two
hours elapsed before it was realised that the demo-
crats were in the town. That the tactics of the
latter were sound cannot, however, be admitted,
since a march of a very few additional miles would
have resulted in the capture of the Shah at his
summer quarters, and so assured the triumph of
their cause. For some days thereafter an active
battle was waged between the revolutionaries, who
had established themselves in the vicinity of the
Majlis building, and the Cossack Brigade. Numer-
ous dogs and cats were killed, and certainly a few
civilians, while it is even asserted that a few
casualties were sustained by the combatants.
Hostilities were terminated by the Shah, who,
feeling that further resistance was useless, took
refuge in the Russian Legation. Upon this an
armistice was arranged.

By his action the Shah was regarded as having
abdicated, although a demand for his surrender
was disregarded. Considering that the revolution
had been fostered under the protection of foreign

G

98 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Legations, and saved from destruction by foreign
intervention, this demand shows an utter lack of
sporting instinct in the victors. The present Shah,
then a child, was declared to have succeeded his
father, and after considerable negotiations regard-
ing a pension, the latter left Persia under Russian
escort.

Russia's action in supporting the revolutionaries
is surprising when her internal policy is remem-
bered, but it would appear that a constitutional
Persia was considered as likely to prove weaker
than a country under a strong Shah. If this was
the reason, the judgment of the Czar's advisers
was certainly not at fault, for whatever the con-
stitutionalists have failed to do in effecting reform,
they have most certainly succeeded in reducing
their country to the last stage of weakness and
bankruptcy, and the situation as I write would
seem to be utterly hopeless were it not that in
Persia the laws of cause and effect do not seem
to apply. The situation has been as bad before,
and something has always occurred to relieve it.
Whether this will continue only the future can
show, but it may be safely asserted that the poli-
ticians will not make any effort in that direction,
since it is useless to attempt to convince them
that any action on their part is necessary to save
from disaster the ancient empire of which they
boast.

The first effect of the revolution was a general
outbreak of disorder throughout the country.
Local officials saw fit to withhold the revenues,
while the new Government inundated the pro-
vinces with instructions and sent out new officials
from its own ranks. All were eager to earn the
reward which, in their own opinion, their patriotic
services entitled them to receive. The Bakhtiari
occupied Isfahan to protect the reluctant citizens

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 99

from an imaginary enemy, and generally every one
appeared to consider that constitutional govern-
ment was equivalent to the right to do what was
desirable in his own good sight. Probably those
feudal democrats, the Bakhtiari, made more out
of the event than any one else. Since that time
the khans do not hand over to the Government
the maliat, or land tax. They receive the military
tax, in addition to that for their own districts, for
parts of the province of Burojird, and the districts
of Galpaigan, Shuster, and Isfahan. In addition,
they receive twenty thousand tomans monthly
from the Treasury for road guards, who, according
to common report, are in the main non-existent.
They hold the governorships of Burojird, Sultana-
bad, Isfahan, Yezd, and Kerman. Directly and
indirectly their toll upon the Government resources
is reported to amount to a hundred thousand
tomans a month. Hence the remark of a noted
robber, Naib Hussain of Kachan, who made a
point of robbing Bakhtiari, saying, " this is my
share of the spoils." Truly in Persia democracy
is not without its reward.

The only facts calling for notice during the
following year were two badly-organised insurrec-
tions in favour of the ex-Shah, which were sup-
pressed without difficulty.

The second Majlis had meantime realised that
financial reform was of vital importance to the
future of the country, and that to carry out this
with any prospect of success was utterly beyond
their power without foreign assistance. To obtain
this they turned to America, and Mr Morgan
Schuster was engaged as Financial Adviser to the
Government. 1911, therefore, witnessed a seri-
ous attempt to reorganise the finances of Persia.
Upon his arrival Mr Schuster realised that the
only prospect of his success lay in his obtaining

100 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the maximum powers possible, since only these
would render it possible for him to counter the
opposition which he was certain to incur. There-
fore upon his arrival he demanded and obtained
from the Majlis the position of Treasurer-General,
with powers which made him virtual dictator.
But nominal authority is of little value in Persia
without force to maintain and enforce it, and
accordingly one of his first acts was to set about
the organisation of a Treasury Gendarmerie under
European officers selected by him.

That the lines upon which Mr Schuster proposed
to proceed were sound, and the only ones upon
which success was to be hoped for, cannot, I think,
be questioned. Genuine co-operation is not to be
hoped for from politicians and officials whose
personal interests will inevitably suffer from the
successful establishment of a reformed adminis-
tration, and accordingly anything short of the most
absolute authority will prove useless for the object
in view. Promises of support will not be lacking,
but these will be accompanied by opposition,
active and passive, which must inevitably defeat
any reformer not endowed with absolute authority,
and he who relies upon Persian professions is fore-
doomed to failure.

Unfortunately for the success of his mission,
Mr Schuster from the first adopted an attitude
which, whether justified or not, was certain to
bring him into opposition with Russia. Firmly
convinced of the injustice of the Anglo-Russian
Convention, he carried his opinions to the extent
of refusing even to call upon the British and
Russian Ministers. However technically correct
this may have been in view of his opinions, it must
be admitted that in following this course he de-
barred himself from the opportunities for informal
personal discussions which in a small community

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 101

may so often be of the greatest value in clearing
away difficulties and misunderstandings.

Thus from the beginning there was latent oppo-
sition to the Treasurer-General upon the part of
Russia. The first serious clash was occasioned by
the former desiring to appoint as chief of the
proposed Treasury Gendarmerie, Major Stokes, a
British officer, who was beyond question the most
suitable man available in view of his experience
and qualifications. As, however, it was contem-
plated that the new force should operate through-
out Persia, it is hardly surprising that Russia
should oppose the contemplated appointment.
That objection should be taken to the appoint-
ment of a British officer to a high executive posi-
tion within the Russian sphere can hardly occasion
wonder, and was, indeed, to be anticipated from
the beginning. Had it been proposed to appoint
a Russian officer to a similar position in the British
sphere, a protest upon our part would almost
certainly have followed. The British Foreign
Office, in the first instance, offered no opposition
to the loan of Major Stokes' services, but there-
after, as the result of Russian representations,
adopted an entirely different attitude, and abso-
lutely refused to sanction the proposed appoint-
ment.

Sir Edward Grey's attitude in the matter meets
with unqualified condemnation from Mr Schuster
in his book, but his criticisms and denunciations
reveal the lack of grasp of European problems so
often manifested by his countrymen. That, in
view of the threatening situation which was de-
veloping in Europe, consequent upon Germany's
action, and after all the efforts which had been
made to eliminate causes of friction between our-
selves and Russia, we should risk a quarrel upon
such a matter was unthinkable. Mr Schuster

102 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

nevertheless chose to regard the appointment as
essential, and to consider the refusal of sanction
as part of a concerted scheme to ruin his mission.
The first quarrel led to others, and in the end
of the year Russia made a formal demand for his
dismissal, which Persia was powerless to refuse.

So ended the attempt to reform Persian finances
with American assistance. The official cause of
the failure was Russian opposition, but there are
some, whose opinions are worthy of consideration,
who consider that the true reason lay in the fact
that Mr Schuster realised that in the face of the
latent Persian opposition which existed success
was impossible, and that he deliberately forced
the quarrel with Russia to an issue, preferring to
be defeated by the action of Britain and Russia
rather than by Persian opposition.

At the same time that she insisted upon Mr
Schuster's removal, Russia, growing tired of the
increasing anarchy upon her borders, marched a
force to Tabriz, and after hanging several mullahs
and other mischief-makers, and insisting upon the
dissolution of the Majlis, effectively restored order.
In the same year the British Government felt
that action was called for in the south, and a
regiment of Indian cavalry was despatched to
occupy Shiraz. From this time until the outbreak
of war, Persia was compelled to give way to all
Russia's demands, while British policy did not
consist of more than at times acting as a restrain-
ing influence upon our ally.

At the beginning of the war, as a result of the
Anglo-Persian Convention, and the events con-
sequent thereon, anti-British feeling was only less
than' anti-Russian, which, as a natural corollary,
led to a predisposition in favour of Germany.
Moreover, both before and during the war, Ger-
many neglected no opportunity of conducting an

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 103

active and efficient propaganda in Persia and the
adjacent countries. The efforts of Germany and
her allies were in this respect efficiently co-ordi-
nated and controlled, while those of ourselves and
Russia were ill-regulated and without cohesion.
A further influence in favour of Germany lay in
the fact that the gendarmerie were commanded by
Swedish officers, who, by training and education,
were naturally predisposed to favour and believe
in the success of Germany's cause. With few
exceptions they did what lay in their power to
support her, and although they ultimately failed
and were compelled to fly the country, they were
able, prior to that time, to inflict serious injury
upon us, since their views had naturally great
influence upon those under their command.

The time has not yet come when a clear account
can be given of the events which took place in
Persia during the war, nor of the several individual
campaigns which were waged. In the north and
north-west considerable fighting took place be-
tween the Russians and Turks. At one time a
Russian force actually reached Keradj, some twenty
miles west of Teheran, but was at the last moment
diverted to the south-west in the direction of
Kum. So imminent had the occupation of the
capital become that under German advice the
Shah had decided upon flight to Isfahan. The
motor by which he was to travel was actually
ready when the forcible entreaties of two of the
highest dignitaries in the country, coupled with
the undue insistence of the German Military
Attache, induced him to reconsider his decision.

The Russian revolution brought this campaign
to an abrupt conclusion just at the time when
connection had been established with our Mesopo-
tamian army, and when practical co-operation
between the two forces appeared to be assured.

104 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

The British occupation of Mesopotamia, coupled
with the Russian debacle, materially altered the
situation, the former increasing our prestige, and
the latter removing the Russian menace which
had engendered Persian sympathy with Germany.
A fresh difficulty was at the same time created
by the fact that the disintegration of the Russian
army removed the obstacle, which had hitherto
existed, to Turkish action in the Caucasus, with
the possible opening of the route to the east. It
was in an attempt to counter this that General
Dunsterville's force was despatched. The original
idea was to send a body of officers and N.C.O.'s
to Baku in the hope that they might organise the
defence of that town against the Turks. The
adventures of the force read like a romance, al-
though any author who attempted to attribute
such doings to his hero would risk being ruled out
of court, upon the ground of their inherent im-
probability. Originally consisting of twelve officers
and two clerks, the little party succeeded in tra-
versing the three hundred and seventy miles be-
tween the frontier and Kazvin in the middle of
winter, and through a population which in the
main was at the least passively unfriendly. At
Kazvin the really dangerous part of the journey
began, since the forest-covered country lying be-
tween the mountains and the coast was in the
possession of the Ghilan rebels, known as Jangalis,
whose leader, Kuchek Khan, had announced his
intention of opposing any attempt to pass through
the territory which he controlled. Kuchek Khan
played a prominent part in Persian politics, and
continued to do so until his death, which was
announced at the end of last year. His policy
consisted of reform upon a more or less socialistic
basis, which included the elimination of the grandees
and Teheranis from the government of the country,

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 105

coupled with the establishment of a republic with
himself as president, and the removal of foreign
influence and advisers. He maintained himself in
the forests of Ghilan for several years, but failed
to extend his authority beyond their limits. As,
however, the only road to Resht and Enzeli runs
through this district, his tactical position was a
strong one. During and after the Zia regime
attempts were made to come to an agreement
with him, but these failed, as until recently did
such force as was used. In the autumn of last
year he declared a republic, and a large part of
Ghilan was under his control. In spite of his
threats, General Dunsterville and his party not
only reached Enzeli, but, finding that in face of
the opposition of the local Bolshevists further
progress was impossible, achieved the more re-
markable feat of returning in safety.

For the details of how the force retreated to
Hamadan ; gradually increased in numbers ; re-
turned to Enzeli, and from thence reached Baku ;
took part in the defence against the Turks, and
finding that the Armenians would do nothing to
help themselves, returned to Enzeli, I must refer
the reader to General Dunsterville' s book. Sub-
sequently fighting took place with Kuchek Khan
around Resht, and thereafter a treaty was nego-
tiated with him. For present purposes it suffices
that out of " Dunsterforce " grew the North Per-
sian force which was based on Kazvin.

Meanwhile another force had been pushed north
to Meshed through East Persia, in order to check
Bolshevist movements towards Afghanistan and
the frontier of India. About this it is unnecessary
to say anything beyond that it fulfilled its mis-
sion, since it has become well known through the
extravagance and waste which are now notorious.
The Persian Jews reaped a rich harvest out of its

106 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

surplus stores, for which, unless current reports
are wildly in error, ludicrously inadequate prices
were obtained. One example commonly quoted is
that five thousand greatcoats were sold at a toman
each, say five shillings. Circumstances may be
conceived under which it is cheaper to sell at
almost any price than to remove stores, but what
is more difficult for the lay mind to grasp is the
reason which rendered necessary so large a reserve
for the small force employed. As in Mesopotamia,
the distance from parliamentary control seems to
have acted as an incentive to the wildest extrava-
gance.

In the south our enemies had in the earlier stages
of the war practically a free hand. The British
Consul and other residents at Shiraz, at the in-
stigation of the German Consul, were arrested by
the guards told off for their protection, and handed
over to the Tangestanis, a local tribe, in November
1915 ; and despite every effort of General Douglas's
force, which was based on Bushire, were not re-
leased until August 1916. As has already been
mentioned, an interesting instance of Foreign Office
zeal is furnished by the fact that no compensation
has by 1921 been obtained for these men who were
robbed of all their possessions, and in some cases
at least seriously injured in health. So far as I
have been able to ascertain, this is typical of the
manner in which outrages against Englishmen are
dealt with, and is largely responsible for the
changed attitude towards the British, who, before
the war, had the reputation of being the only
nation which could travel anywhere in Persia with
absolute impunity.

The position was restored by troops from India,
and a small force was despatched under Sir Percy
Sykes, which reached Shiraz by a somewhat round-
about route. There local levies were raised under

FROM THE CONSTITUTION, ETC. 107

British officers, which became the South Persian
Rifles. Whether through ignorance of their feel-
ings, or because it was believed that if disbanded
and left without means of support they would
take to robbery, a large part of the Swedish-trained
gendarmerie, which had hitherto acted in German
interests, was not only incorporated in the new
force, but given their arrears of pay from British
funds. The result was what might have been
anticipated. A mutiny and plot to murder their
officers was organised, in which the whole six
thousand men constituting the force took part,
with the exception of a few hundreds. The officer
and N.C.O. in charge of one post were murdered,
and another and larger post sustained a protracted
siege, but the officer in command of the Indian
troops declined to fall in with the mutineers' plans
and leave Shiraz at their mercy. The force, which
amounted to some two thousand men, was ulti-
mately relieved by General Douglas, but a third
had died of influenza and others from cholera, in
addition to the casualties sustained in action.

In addition to armed intervention, the British
Government had recourse to an extensive system
of subsidies and bribes, which were, under one
name and another, distributed broadcast. For
example, one governor received a hundred thousand
tomans a month towards the re-establishment of
order. It need hardly be said that while disorder
proved so remunerative, he was not so foolish as
to bring it to a termination. But this subject
will be more fittingly dealt with later, since it was
the continuance of this policy after the war that
is responsible for much of the distrust with which
we are to-day regarded.

108

CHAPTER V.

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT.

RECENT British policy having centred round the
Anglo-Persian Agreement, a clear understanding
of the circumstances under which this was nego-
tiated, the respects in which it represented a re-
versal of previous policy, and the reasons for its
universal unpopularity in Persia, are necessary to
an intelligent appreciation of why it has resulted
in converting the predominant position which
Britain occupied at the termination of the war
into one of diminished prestige and universal un-
popularity.

At the conclusion of hostilities, Russia, formerly
supreme in Northern Persia, had, as the result of
the revolution, for the time being at least, ceased
to be a serious factor in the situation. The very
fact that the Russian menace was no longer present
had removed the cause of British unpopularity —
or rather, since such potential menace as remained
was in opposition to British interests, had pre-
disposed Persia to regard us as possible supporters.
Germany had also been eliminated, and those who
had hitherto been most active in forwarding her
interests were only too anxious to manifest be-
yond question their change of heart. Britain on
the other hand, in addition to having gamed
prestige from the outcome of the war, had become
the active protector and financier of Persia, and

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 109

the only Power from whom she was likely to ob-
tain practical assistance against Bolshevist action.

At that time the British force at Meshed pro-
tected the north-east frontier. The force based on
Kazvin, and having detached bodies thrown out
as far as Enzeli on the Caspian and Zinjan on the
road to Tabriz, covered, in conjunction with a
British flotilla upon the Caspian, the approaches
to the capital, while the north-west frontier was
rendered secure by the British cordon running
from Batoum, through Tiflis, to Baku. In the
south order had been established, and was being
maintained, to an extent utterly beyond the power
of the Persian Government, by the South Persian
Rifles, the expenses of which were borne by the
British and Indian Governments. Thus, if not
officially in British occupation, Persia was most
emphatically under British protection, and freed
from all danger of Bolshevist aggression in the
north and tribal disturbance in the south — both
vital matters when it is remembered that, while
the Cossack Division is of very doubtful value,
the remainder of the Persian Army can only be
described as utterly valueless from a military point
of view.

Not only was Persia under British protection,
but she was being enabled to a great extent^ to
defray the expenses of government by British
monthly advances. Apart from personal and local
subsidies, Britain was furnishing her with three
hundred and fifty thousand tomans monthly to-
wards meeting the ordinary expenses of govern-
ment, and a hundred thousand tomans for the
upkeep of the Cossack Division — altogether about
£225,000 monthly.

It was, of course, self-evident that of necessity
such a condition of affairs must, in respect of both
military and financial assistance, be of a temporary

110 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

nature; but nevertheless since Persia could not
hope to receive practical assistance from any other
quarter, national and personal interests alike ren-
dered it essential for her that the closest and most
friendly relations possible should be established
with Great Britain. Under such conditions, it
should have required no great measure of diplo-
matic skill to secure the confidence of the Persians,
and, by a judicious combination of support and
education as to British aims, to consolidate our
position against any possible Russian revival. It
is true that we are not in a position to offer mili-
tary opposition to a serious advance by a restored
Russia, but there was no reason why we should
not have come to be regarded as Persia's protectors,
to whom she might look for assistance and diplo-
matic support. One thing, however, was essential
in order to arrive at this result — namely, that we
should succeed in convincing the Persians of the
absolute disinterestedness of our actions. Any
suspicions that we had ulterior aims to serve must
inevitably cause us to be regarded with the same
suspicions and distrust which had previously been
shown towards Russia.

It should have been obvious that the very
strength of our position was such as — when taken
in conjunction with the fact that, by our occupa-
tion of Mesopotamia, we had become Persia's
neighbours upon her western as well as her south-
eastern frontier — might excite in a weak and help-
less nation, jealous of its independence, the most
serious apprehensions with regard to our inten-
tions towards her, and that in view of her experi-
ences at the hands of Russia, she would be prone
to look for any indication that a powerful neigh-
bour cherished designs inimical to her freedom.
From the British point of view such apprehensions
may appear to be so groundless as to be little short

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 111

of ludicrous, but when the history of the last two
centuries and the high value which Persians set
upon themselves and their country are remem-
bered, they are readily understandable. In such
circumstances the greatest frankness and tact were
essential in order to avoid the risk that our inten-
tions might be misunderstood, since any equivocal
action upon our part was certain to be misappre-
hended, and to occasion suspicion and distrust.
It is surprising that Lord Curzon, a reputed
authority upon everything relating to Persia,
should have so failed to appreciate this aspect
of the Persian character, and so misapprehended
the situation as to embark upon the policy after-
wards followed.

Apart altogether from the reasons which have
just been mentioned, there existed a very special
and vital factor in the situation which alone ren-
dered the utmost circumspection essential in order
to avoid the misconception which was almost
certain to result regarding British intentions. I
refer to the fact that, although the war was over
and the consequent necessity for combating Ger-
man intrigue was removed, subsidies and advances
were still being continued. How far it may have
been necessary to buy the support of individuals
during the war is not a question which I propose
to discuss, although it is at least obvious that by
adopting such a policy we were endangering the
reputation for straightforward dealing which is the
Englishman's greatest asset in dealing with orien-
tals. But when the subsidies and advances were
continued after the war, the matter assumed an
entirely different and much more serious aspect.
It cannot be claimed that the British Empire is
generally regarded as a charitable institution, and
Persians state frankly that the advances occa-
sioned apprehension as to our intentions both

112 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

amongst the recipients and those who were aware
of what was taking place.

Apart from doles to individuals, under whatever
name camouflaged, the Foreign Office continued
to advance the above-mentioned monthly pay-
ments of three hundred and fifty thousand tomans
for general purposes of administration, and a
hundred thousand for the Cossack Division, for
a period of two years after the Armistice. The
Foreign Office may have suffered under the bliss-
ful illusion that the money was being expended
under careful supervision upon the intended ob-
jects ; but it is difficult to credit this, and if it was
the case that such a view was adopted, it was cer-
tainly not shared in Persia. The general subsidy
was credited monthly to the account of the Per-
sian Government with the Imperial Bank of
Persia, but was not infrequently transferred to
native bankers in the bazar, and it is legitimate to
infer that the fact that any record of its ultimate
disposition was thus removed had its due weight
when this was done. In one case the failure of
the firm with which the money had been deposited
resulted in a large loss to the Government. The
money would appear to have been arbitrarily
disbursed by the Government of the day, and as,
so far as I could ascertain, no record exists at the
Ministry of Finance of either these or other sums
received from the British Government during the
war, it is legitimate to assume that there is an
equal lack of information with regard to their
ultimate disposal. There exists, it is true, a depart-
ment of the Ministry whose particular concern is
to keep a record of the national debt and all in-
formation relating thereto, but a request for full
details only resulted in the reply that they had no
information whatever upon the subject. The ad-
vances would accordingly seem, to a great extent

The Shah's Palace, Teheran.

,

Kasr-i-Kajar, Teheran.

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 113

at least, to have been disposed of by successive
Governments without any reliable accounts being
kept. This failure to keep any record of in-
debtedness gives rise to the uneasy suspicion that
when the time to discuss terms of repayment
comes, the Foreign Office may find itself faced
with the contention that the monthly advances,
at any rate, were not loans but subsidies. One
Minister of Finance frankly stated that they
would never be repaid, and it cannot well be
believed that he was alone in this opinion.

However remarkable it may appear that the
advances for the purposes of general administra-
tion should have been continued after the restora-
tion of peace, this is not so calculated to excite
surprise as the continuation of the payments for
the upkeep of the Cossack Division, since, had
there been any indication that during the con-
tinuation of the former, an attempt was being
made by the Persian Government to put its
finances upon a basis which would render the
country self-supporting, an argument would have
existed for assisting it through the period of
transition. The latter, however, must be con-
sidered as belonging to an absolutely different
category. From the time of its formation as a
brigade some forty years ago, the Cossack force
has formed a centre of Russian influence and has
acted in Russian interests. This has been carried
to such an extent that its training and discipline
have not been brought to such a standard that in
the event of its being called upon to act in opposi-
tion to Russia it would be capable of offering seri-
ous resistance. When the results achieved by
British officers with the South Persian Rifles are
considered, it would be paying a poor compliment
to the Russian officers concerned to believe that
they were incapable of producing a better force than

114 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

they did with the material at their disposal. In
any case, the fact has, I believe, been admitted.

Naturally, when the Russian debacle took place,
the Russians then with the Division continued to
do what lay in their power to maintain the prestige
of their country, as was only to be expected. No
secret was made of their attitude and sympathies,
the Commander of the Division openly stating
that, were the position reversed, he would not
use kid gloves in dealing with the British. In
the face of such an attitude upon the part of the
Russian officers, it is difficult to understand the
motives which induced the Foreign Office to con-
tinue to place at the disposal of the commanding
officer a sum which, with the sixty thousand
tomans provided monthly by the Persian Govern-
ment, was, according to inside information, greatly
in excess of the amount necessary to defray the
expenses of the Division, or why, indeed, any
contribution at all should have been made for this
purpose.

It might be argued that upon the ultimate
departure of the British forces the Cossack Divi-
sion would be the only body of troops capable of
offering any effective opposition to a Bolshevist
advance ; but if it was considered necessary for
Britain to finance a body of Persian troops for this
purpose, common prudence should surely have at
least indicated the advisability of eliminating the
anti-British element, even although it might be
considered inexpedient to insist upon this being
replaced by British officers. But at that time it
is improbable that there would have been any
Persian opposition to such replacement, since,
apart from other considerations, it was placing a
severe strain upon the loyalty of the Russian
officers to expect them to offer strenuous opposi-
tion to their own countrymen with all the con-

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 115

sequences for themselves which defeat might entail.
For some abstruse reason this course at no time
commended itself to the Foreign Office, and it was
only when confronted with an accomplished fact
that it grudgingly concurred in the dismissal of
the Russian officers, although this is hardly what
would be inferred from Lord Curzon's statement
upon the subject.

Further, it might reasonably be assumed that
some attempt would have been made to ascertain
whether the sums advanced were essential for the
object in view; but, so far from this being the
case, the Foreign Office was content to continue
payment at the same rate as had hitherto been
paid by the Russian Government, oblivious of the
fact that such payments might have been in-
tended to provide for expenditure which could
hardly be regarded as consistent with British
interests. The monthly payments were placed at
the uncontrolled disposal of the commanding offi-
cer, and no questions were asked as to how the
money was disbursed. Usually no accounts of
even the most general description were submitted ;
twice only, I believe, in recent years. I was
privileged to see the latter of these two docu-
ments, and can only say that it is impossible to
imagine a less informing statement. Although it
dealt with a sum equivalent to over a million
sterling at the time of receipt, the whole could
have been written upon a sheet of notepaper.

Thus the Gilbertian situation existed that the
Foreign Office was placing at the disposal of those
who were avowedly acting in opposition to British
interests, funds which they would otherwise have
lacked wherewith to carry on anti-British propa-
ganda. Were it not for rumours current in Meso-
potamia regarding the source from which the
rising of 1920 was financed, one would be disposed

116 KECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

to say that never had the long-suffering British
taxpayer been mulcted for an object less in accord-
ance with his interests.

Hitherto I have been content to' assume that
reasons existed which rendered it highly desir-
able, if not absolutely essential, to the interests of
the British Empire that Great Britain should, if
possible, occupy a dominating position in Northern
Persia. I now propose to consider how far such a
position appears to be not merely desirable, but
necessary, since under present conditions nothing
short of necessity can be regarded as justifying us
in undertaking fresh commitments. However un-
palatable the truth may be, it is futile to endeavour
to conceal from ourselves that at the present time
Great Britain is in a condition of insolvency. In
fact, she is in the position of a man who, accus-
tomed to maintain a large and costly establish-
ment, is suddenly confronted with the loss of so
great a part of his income that the remainder is
no longer sufficient to defray his expenses. The
alternative presented in such a case is obvious :
either expenses must be reduced within the limits
of available income, or sooner or later bank-
ruptcy must inevitably result. There is no third
alternative. The position of Great Britain is
indeed actually worse, seeing that she is not in
a position to meet her obligations. The fact that
her creditors find it contrary to their own interests
to demand repayment in no way alters the posi-
tion. Her assets are, it is true, amply sufficient to
pay off her indebtedness, but they are not at the
moment realisable, and it is solely due to her
creditors not pressing for payment that she is not
a declared bankrupt. When the time arrives at
which, after balancing income and expenditure,
she has accumulated a sufficient surplus to dis-
charge her foreign indebtedness, she will once

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 117

more be in a position to indulge in the luxury of
such diplomatic and military adventures as may
appeal to the imagination of the Government of
the day, in so far at least as the taxpayer can be
induced to provide the necessary funds. That
time is still in the distant future, and meantime all
expenditure upon objects, whether at home or
abroad, which cannot be shown to be vitally
essential, can only be regarded as criminal extrava-
gance, delaying as it does the re-establishment of
the national finances upon a sound economic basis.
The actual amount of the expenditure involved is
merely a question of degree, and in nowise of
principle.

Applying this standard to the Foreign Office
policy in Persia, upon what grounds can the ex-
penditure incurred and the undertaking of the
commitments entailed by the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment be justified ? Frankly, I do not know.

Leaving aside the fact that our interests in
North Persia cannot have been regarded as of vital
importance in pre-war times, since otherwise the
Government of the day would not have entered
into the Anglo-Russian Convention, thereby recog-
nising that North Persia lay within the Russian
sphere of influence, let us endeavour to ascertain
whether any reasons can be found which rendered
insufficient for British interests the position of
friendship and prestige which we occupied, and
necessitated our entering upon an attempt to
establish ourselves in a dominating position such
as that occupied by Russia before the war, entail-
ing as this did recourse to the same methods of
intrigue and intimidation, and the employment of
the same agents of doubtful reputation.

That British interests in the south are of great
importance, comprising as they do the protection
of the approaches to India, our position in the

118 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Persian Gulf, and the oil resources of Bakhtiari, is
obvious. None of these, however, necessitate a
strong position in North Persia, and indeed were
the country to relapse into anarchy they would
be but little affected. They may then be ignored.

Let us assume, in the first instance, that the
Agreement was nothing more than a benevolent
attempt to rehabilitate Persia. Philanthropy is
admirable, but there are circumstances which at
times render it quixotic rather than justifiable.
It is, moreover, difficult to believe that it was
seriously hoped that a small group of advisers
could, without strong backing from their Govern-
ment, succeed in effecting reforms which were
diametrically opposed to the interests of all Per-
sians concerned. If it was seriously hoped that
the Persian Government would without external
pressure place the advisers in such a position of
authority as would enable them to effect the root
and branch reforms from which alone success
could be hoped, a striking ignorance of Persian
mentality and the history of previous attempts
are alike displayed. If such pressure was con-
templated, either much greater financial assistance
was intended than indicated, or else the Agree-
ment must, as many Persians claim, be regarded
as quite other than appears on the surface, and in
this event the argument that the chief aim in view
was the reform of the Persian Army and finances
falls to the ground. In any event, there would not
appear to be any reasons why such reform was of
importance to British interests.

To turn next to the question of strategy, it is
scarcely possible to believe that the defence of
India weighed with those who negotiated the
Agreement. If so, they had forgotten the advice
(the late Lord Salisbury's, if I remember rightly)
to consult large-scale maps. A very brief experi-

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 119

ence of the difficulties of travel in Persia is suffi-
cient to demonstrate the almost insuperable diffi-
culties which any attempt to move a large force
across Persia would entail ; and even assuming that
such an undertaking was practicable, sound strategy
clearly indicates the desirability of meeting such
a force when at the end of a long and precarious
line of communication, rather than attempting to
oppose it close to its own bases. Mr Churchill's
admission of the strategic unsoundness of the
Kazvin force's position shows that this point was
clearly appreciated, and we may accordingly dis-
miss the question of India from consideration.
Were any further evidence required, this would
be found in the fact that the Indian Government
attaches so little importance to the position in
Southern Persia that it has not considered itself
justified in continuing the expense of maintaining
the South Persian Rifles ; much more then must it
fail to be concerned with the position in the north.
Very similar arguments apply in the case of an
attack on Mesopotamia. Nothing is to be gained
by defending the country upon foreign soil, while
even admitting the improbable contingency of an
attack through Persia, we could not expect the
Persians to do our fighting for us. Equally, as in
the case of India, a strategic ground for the policy
pursued would imply the intention to offer serious
opposition in North Persia, an intention which
cannot be imagined. To attempt to offer opposi-
tion on a small scale would only be to invite defeat,
with the consequent loss of prestige.

I have already referred to the trade position,
but even were our commercial interests very much
greater than they are, a dominating position in
Persian affairs is not essential to the maintenance
of our trade interests. In any case, few British
groups are vitally interested in Northern Persia,

120 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

and if some of these are not as popular as they
might be, the reason lies in the opinion which the
Persians have formed of their business methods,
and is not to be altered by our political position
becoming more influential. Political influence
counts for little when opposed to economics and
initiative.

If the object in view was to create an obstacle
to a Bolshevist advance, the method followed was
singularly ill adapted to secure the desired end.
Unless we were prepared to adopt the policy,
which we have seen to be unsound, of fighting near
the enemy's bases, we were powerless to stop a
serious Bolshevist move upon Persia. Although
the country may be ripe for a very drastic
reform, Bolshevist principles are so opposed to
its religion that there is little danger of their
finding general acceptance. As things stand there
is little to tempt the Bolshevists to turn their
serious attention to Persia unless provoked to do
so. This provocation was exactly what the Agree-
ment and the military occupation in the north
provided. Had we been content to rest satisfied
with our position and prestige, it is improbable
that the Bolshevists would have been provoked
to action as they were ; but instead of this, we
deliberately chose to run the most serious risks
when no corresponding advantage was to be antici-
pated. Then, when we had provoked the Bol-
shevists into action, we showed that we were not
prepared to follow our policy to the logical con-
clusion, with the result that we sustained a reverse
which destroyed our military prestige and ren-
dered our diplomacy helpless.

It is difficult not to feel a certain sympathy
with the Bolshevist view. We must remember
that Russia had regarded North Persia as falling
within her sphere of influence for the last couple

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 121

of centuries, and that by the Anglo-Russian Con-
vention we had recognised this in the most solemn
manner. That the Foreign Office should seize
upon the moment when Russia was in the throes
of revolution to repudiate the Convention, and
should enter upon a policy avowedly aimed at
supplanting Russian influence, could only be re-
garded from the Bolshevist point of view as an
act of deliberate aggression. As such it could only
be justified by success ; but as it is, it must be
considered as displaying a singular lack of both
vision and breadth of view. To employ a vulgar
simile, Lord Curzon acted exactly like a tramp who
steals the clothes of a bather who happens to be in
difficulties. If the bather drowns good and well,
but prudence indicates the desirability of being
sure upon this point prior to committing the theft,
particularly if the bather happens to be the bigger
man of the two. Otherwise the consequences are
likely to be somewhat unpleasant for the tramp.
In the present case the bather has not only de-
clined to drown, but has in North Persia proved
to be the better man, and consequently we have
only ourselves to blame if to-day our prestige in
Persia stands as low as it is well possible to imagine.
If I have correctly stated the position, there
were not any reasons which, in view of the con-
dition of the national finances, could be held to
justify the initiation of a forward policy in North
Persia, while there was at least one which fur-
nished a strong argument against such a line of
action. Assuming that the Agreement was nothing
more than what it purported to be — namely, a
disinterested attempt to assist Persia — its com-
pletion was obviously of greater importance to
Persia than to Britain, but this would scarcely be
inferred from the methods adopted and the anxiety
displayed to secure its signature and ratification.

122 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

The first proposals for an understanding, which
resulted eight months later in the signature of the
Agreement, came from three members of the
Persian Government. These were the Sadr Azam,
Vossugh-ed-Douleh, Persia's strong man ; Akbar
Mirza, Sarem-ed-Douleh, a son of the Zil-es-Sultan
and nephew of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah, a man of
character and ability, who some years before had
earned an unenviable notoriety by killing his
mother ; and Firouz Mirza, Nosrat-ed-Douleh, on
his father's side a grand-nephew of Mohamed Shah,
and on his mother's a nephew of Muzaffer-ed-Din
Shah. The latter, who is well known in England,
is at the present time our most active and subtle
enemy in Persia. The family connections of the
two last are alone sufficient to indicate that they
belonged to a class whose interests were bound to
suffer by any successful attempt at reform, and
the group with which we were negotiating must be
regarded as representative of the royalist and re-
actionary faction which was afterwards described
in the Teheran press as robber princes. Of all
three it must be admitted that their reputation
for probity could not even in Persia be described
as of the highest.

The proposals of the triumvirate having met with
a favourable reception, negotiations were entered
upon and carried on with the greatest secrecy.
The latter fact is illuminating regarding the value
to be attached to the statements of our Ministers
in favour of open diplomacy, to which they were
so freely giving utterance at this very time. What
open diplomacy is I do not profess to understand,
since the two words would appear to be self-
contradictory.

The Foreign Minister, Mushavim-el-Mamaulik,
not being considered simpatico to what was pro-
posed, was despatched to Paris to lay Persia's

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 123

case before the Peace Conference. It is freely
alleged that this was done by arrangement with
the British Foreign Office. Certainly his experi-
ences were sufficiently unfortunate to furnish
ground for such an allegation. Refused an inter-
view by a plenipotentiary, lectured by a high
official, and refused permission to visit England by
Lord Curzon, it is hardly surprising to learn that
from that time his sentiments have been violently
anti-British. Should he at any time become Sadr
Azam, for which position his name was freely
mentioned after the fall of Seyd Zia-ed-Din, we
must expect consistent opposition from an enemy
of our own creation.

The negotiations progressed steadily, and by
June the Agreement had assumed its final form,
and only awaited the approval of the Foreign
Office. This was for some reason delayed, and it
was not until the 9th of August that the Agree-
ment was signed. Keeping in view the extent to
which Persia was at the time receiving military
and financial assistance from the British Govern-
ment, the Agreement can hardly be considered as
one concluded between two free and independent
states.

Before proceeding further, however, it will be
desirable to give the text of this much-discussed
document, which accordingly is as follows : —

PREAMBLE : In virtue of the close ties of friendship
which have existed between the two Governments in the
past, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and
mutual interests of both in future that these ties should
be cemented, and that the progress and prosperity of
Persia should be promoted to the utmost, it is hereby
agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand,
and His Britannic Majesty's Minister, acting on behalf of
his Government, on the other, as follows : —

1. The British Government reiterate, in the most cate-
gorical manner, the undertakings which they have re-

124 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

peatedly given in the past, to respect absolutely the
independence and integrity of Persia.

2. The British Government will supply, at the cost of
the Persian Government, the services of whatever expert
advisers may, after consultation between the two Govern-
ments, be considered necessary for the several depart-
ments of the Persian Administration. These advisers shall
be engaged on contracts and endowed with adequate powers,
the nature of which shall be the matter of agreement between
the Persian Government and the advisers.

3. The British Government will supply, at the cost of
the Persian Government, such officers and other munitions
and equipment of modern type as may be adjudged neces-
sary by a joint commission of military experts, British and
Persian, which shall assemble forthwith for the purpose
of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the forma-
tion of a uniform force which the Persian Government
proposes to create for the establishment and preservation
of order in the country and on its frontiers.

4. For the purpose of financing the reforms indicated
in Clauses 2 and 3 of this Agreement, the British Govern-
ment offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the
Persian Government, for which adequate security shall
be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the
revenues of the customs or other sources of income at
the disposal of the Persian Government. Pending the com-
pletion of negotiations for such a loan, the British Govern-
ment will supply on account of it such funds as may be
necessary for initiating the said reforms.

5. The British Government, fully recognising the urgent
need which exists for the improvement of communications
in Persia, with a view both to the extension of trade and
the prevention of famine, are prepared to co-operate with
the Persian Government for the encouragement of Anglo-
Persian enterprise in this direction, both by means of railway
construction and other forms of transport ; subject always
to the examination of the problems by experts and to agree-
ment between the two Governments as to the particular
projects which may be most necessary, practicable, and
profitable.

6. The two Governments agree to the appointment forth-
with of a Joint-Committee of experts for the examination
and revision of the existing Customs Tariff, with a view

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 125

to its reconstruction on a basis calculated to accord with
the legitimate interests of the country and to promote its
prosperity.

Signed at TEHERAN, 9th August 1919.

PREAMBLE : Contract between the British Government
and the Persian Government with reference to an Agree-
ment concluded this day between the two Governments.
It is agreed as follows : —

Article 1. The British Government grants a loan of
£2,000,000 sterling to the Persian Government, to be paid
to the Persian Government as required in such instalments
and at such dates as may be indicated by the Persian
Government after the British Financial Adviser shall have
taken up the duties of his office at Teheran, as provided
for in the aforesaid Agreement.

Art. 2. The Persian Government undertakes to pay
interest monthly at the rate of 7 per cent per annum
upon sums advanced in accordance with Article 1 up to
20th March 1921, and thereafter to pay monthly such
amount as will suffice to liquidate the principal sum and
interest thereon at 7 per cent per annum in twenty years.

Art. 3. All the revenues and Customs receipts assigned
in virtue of the contract of 8th May 1911, for the repayment
of the loan of £1,250,000, are assigned for the repayment
of the present loan, with continuity of all conditions stipu-
lated in the said contract, and with priority over all debts
other than the 1911 loan and subsequent advances made
by the British Government. In case of insufficiency of
the receipts indicated above, the Persian Government
hereby assigns to the service of the present loan, and of
the other advances above mentioned, in priority and with
continuity of conditions stipulated in the foresaid contract,
the Customs receipts of all other regions, in so far as these
receipts are or shall be at its disposal.

Art. 4. The Persian Government will have the right of
repayment of the present loan at any date out of the pro-
ceeds of any British loan which it may contract for.

On the same date the British Minister addressed
two letters to the Persian Prime Minister. The
first of these expressed the British Government's

126 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

readiness to co-operate in the revision of the
existing treaties, to aid Persia's claim for damage
suffered at the hands of other belligerents, and to
agree to the rectification of the frontier at certain
points. The second stated that the British Gov-
ernment did not intend to claim for the mainte-
nance of troops whose presence had been rendered
necessary by Persia's lack of power to defend her
neutrality.

It will be seen from the foregoing that five
objects were contemplated : the reorganisation of
the Persian Army, and the provision of such expert
assistance and munitions as might be necessary
thereto ; the loan of the services of such advisers
as might be necessary to effect a similar reform
of the civil administration ; the provision of such
credits as might be necessary for carrying out
these reforms ; the revision of the existing Customs
tariff, which had been negotiated in the interests
of Russia ; and the development of communica-
tions, railways in particular. Such being the
objects in view, the impression is left that the
arrangement was of a distinctly one-sided nature,
and that if any one had a right to object it was the
British taxpayer. Such was not the view which
was taken by Persian opinion.

The Agreement, being on the face of it such a
one-sided bargain, it was not unnatural that sus-
picions should have been aroused that all had not
been disclosed, and that there existed secret clauses
which would put an entirely different complexion
on the matter, and subsequent events only tended
to increase this suspicion. While some suspected
the existence of secret clauses, others read into
the British undertaking to respect the integrity
of Persia the implication that this was equivalent
to implying that henceforth she was only to remain
independent on the sufferance of the British Gov-

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 127

ernment, or, in other words, under British suze-
rainty.

In other cases the opposition was due to the
secrecy with which the negotiations had been con-
ducted, and personal pique on the part of indi-
viduals who considered that they should have been
consulted. It is possible that had the Persian
Government adopted a somewhat less high-handed
attitude, and taken the leaders of other parties
into consultation, much of the later opposition
might have been avoided. It was only natural
that the bureaucracy should be whole-heartedly
opposed to the proposed reforms, for should these
be carried out in the spirit as well as the letter,
their opportunities of peculation would at the
least have been greatly curtailed.

Further, the proposal to employ British advisers
throughout the administration struck at the policy
beloved of Persia and Turkey of employing advisers
of different nationalities in different departments
in order that by playing the one off against the
other they might render of null effect any action
upon their part. Advisers in such countries are
desired not in order that they may effect reforms,
but that under cover of the camouflage of reform
under European guidance credits may be more
readily obtained in Europe and criticism disarmed.
Clearly with British advisers in all Ministries, this
would no longer be possible, and with all advisers
enjoying the support of one Legation, it would be
difficult to maintain the pretence of reform with-
out submitting to some practical results.

Lastly, the Agreement was in some quarters
regarded as a corrupt bargain, and unfortunately
it is almost impossible to disprove this accusation.
It will have been noted that under Article 1 of
the Loan Agreement the loan of two millions was
" to be paid in such instalments and at such dates

128 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

as may be indicated by the Persian Government
after the British Financial Adviser shall have taken
up the duties of his office at Teheran." From this
it is clear that it was contemplated that the two
millions, which it will be remembered were, under
Article 4 of the main Agreement, to be expended
upon the contemplated reforms, were to be dis-
bursed under the supervision of the Financial
Adviser. At the last moment, however, the Per-
sian trio stipulated, as a precedent condition of
signing the Agreement, that a sum equivalent at
the then rate of exchange to £131,000 should be
turned over to them. This was agreed to, and the
payment was made very shortly after the signa-
ture of the Agreement. It is utterly impossible to
explain away this payment upon any straight-
forward view of the transaction. Firstly, it was
diametrically opposed to the intention of the
Agreement that all advances thereunder should
be expended under the advice and control of the
Financial Adviser; and, secondly, the method of
payment was so peculiar, and the ultimate destina-
tion of the money so veiled in secrecy, as to justify
the most sinister inferences regarding the trans-
action. The money was paid direct to the three
Ministers, with, I believe, the express proviso that
no inquiry should be made as to its expenditure.
So great was the secrecy observed, that when the
Siphadar Azam, who was a member of the Council
which was supposed to have negotiated the Agree-
ment, became Sadr Azam some fifteen months
later, he was in absolute ignorance of the trans-
action. It need hardly be added that the one
thing which is certain is that the money never
reached the Treasury.

It is impossible to consider as well founded the
contention that this payment should be regarded
as having been made in terms of the Agreement,

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 129

and to justly hold Persia as liable for its repay-
ment. It cannot be believed that the British For-
eign Office failed to realise that the payment was
not in accordance with the terms of the Agree-
ment, nor from the very nature of the transaction
can it have been under any delusion that the
money was destined for legitimate purposes. In
all the circumstances, and considering the total
absence of any explanation as to how the money
was expended, it is hardly to be wondered at that
the very worst construction has been placed upon
the action of the Foreign Office.

It has been suggested that it was contemplated
that the money should be expended in securing
the confirmation of the Agreement by the Majlis,
but no one appears to have troubled about this
at the time, and when the Majlis finally met
nearly two years later, the question of obtaining
ratification no longer existed. In any case, if this
was the intention, it in no way enables a less
unsavoury interpretation to be placed upon the
transaction, for there is no difference between
buying the signatures of Ministers and bribing
deputies to endorse these signatures, and it is
difficult to think of any other purpose which can
have necessitated the secrecy insisted upon. The
question was not discussed until over a year later,
when, it being obvious that the Agreement was a
dead letter, the British Government, apparently
desirous of being quit of its liabilities, pressed for
acknowledgment of the debt.

Although the Agreement had been signed, it
was not, according to the Persian Constitution,
binding and operative until it had been confirmed
by a vote of the Majlis, a fact which was either
overlooked or disregarded by Lord Curzon. Had
it been possible to bring the issue to a vote forth-
with, it is possible that a favourable decision

I

130 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

might have been arrived at, since the opposition
had not yet had time to take form, while some of
the most active opponents had, on one excuse or
another, been banished to Kum.

That Vossugh-ed-Douleh intended in the first
instance to submit the Agreement to the Majlis,
and endeavour to obtain its ratification, is, I think,
clear. The Teheran deputies had been already
elected, and it was not anticipated that they would
support the Government, nor that others, if the
choice was left to the unfettered discretion of the
electors, would be returned whose support could
be counted upon. Accordingly the elections which /
followed were accompanied by every circumstance \
of fraud, intimidation, and corruption, in which,
according to local belief, the British Legation was
concerned. It is to this belief that the extreme
anti-British attitude adopted by the present Majlis
must in the main be attributed. The anxiety
uppermost in the minds of the deputies is to clear
themselves of the suspicion of being British
nominees.

Long, however, before the elections could be
completed the situation had changed, so that there
was no longer any hope that the deputies would
consider the Agreement favourably. The first
cause of this change was the evacuation of the
Caucasus, and this apparently so shook the con-
fidence of Vossugh-ed-Douleh that he abandoned
the idea of convening the Majlis, considering that,
in spite of the manner of their election, there was
little chance that the deputies would support him.
He is also reported to have alleged that he had
been let down by the British, and would in his
turn let them down. The consequence was that
during the ten months in which he continued in
office he made no attempt to convene the Majlis,
and was content to merely mark time.

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 131

What would have been the result had active
steps been taken to carry the Agreement into effect
immediately after signature it is now idle to sur-
mise. Nevertheless it is permissible to consider
that had prompt action followed, the ultimate
result might well have been different. Had British
officers been despatched forthwith from Mesopo-
tamia to sit upon the Military Commission, and a
Financial Adviser sent instanter from India, while
the question of railway construction was at the
same time actively taken up, the result might have
been that by the ensuing spring the formation of an
army under British officers and the reform of the
finances might both have advanced so far as to
render the Agreement un fait accompli. Had there
been, in addition, concrete signs that railway con-
struction was about to become a reality, a situa-
tion would have been created which the deputies
when they met would have hesitated to overturn.
In the event, the development of the situation was
entirely different, since it was not until the ensuing
year that any active steps were taken. The Mili-
tary Commission did not complete its deliberations
until the end of March, while it was not until the
end of April that the Financial Adviser arrived in
Teheran. By then both the termination of the
subsidies and the fact that military evacuation
was contemplated had become known ; while the
Bolshevist landing at Enzeli, which utterly shook
Persian confidence in our capacity to defend them,
and the fall of Vossugh-ed-Douleh's Cabinet, which
followed thereon, were imminent.

From the date of the Bolshevist landing the
Agreement may be regarded as dead, although it
did not receive its coup-de-grdce at the hands of
Seyd Zia-ed-Din until nearly nine months later.

The history of the Agreement during the eighteen
months which elapsed between its signature and

132 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

repudiation is, to a great extent, the history of
Persia during that period. But it will be well to
indicate briefly here the main facts.

So far as practical results were concerned, the
only intention to which effect was given was the
revision of the Customs tariff. This was carried
through early in 1920, and the revised tariff was
immediately put into force. The only criticisms
which the new tariff invites are that the duty on
sugar was maintained at too high a rate, and
that Manchester goods were very leniently treated.
A Financial Adviser and assistants, two Advisers
to the Ministry of Public Works, and four officers
to organise a gendarmerie in Azerbaijan were indeed
engaged, but it is scarcely too much to say that
none of these were given an opportunity of show-
ing of what they were capable. A mixed Commis-
sion also sat and drew up a scheme for a reformed
Persian Army, but it may be doubted whether this
ever received serious consideration from either
Government; certainly there were no visible re-
sults. Lastly, a railway survey was carried out
during the summer of 1920.

In June 1920 Vossugh-ed-Douleh fell, and was
succeeded by Mushir-ed-Douleh, who immediately
suspended the newly-arrived advisers from their
functions pending the ratification of the Agree-
ment. That he ever seriously contemplated sum-
moning the Majlis, I for one never at any time
believed, and I do not stand alone in this opinion.
Mushir-ed-Douleh was succeeded in November by
the Siphadar Azam, who followed a similar policy,
with the exception that he did attempt, without
result, to convene the Majlis in the beginning
of 1921.

What is most difficult to understand during this
period is the persistency with which the Foreign
Office clamoured for ratification. Considering the

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 133

changes which had taken place, it is incredible
that it can seriously have been believed that there
was a possibility of any Majlis voting favourably,
least of all that which was in existence.

I have already pointed out how, at the time
when the Agreement was concluded, Persia was
being defended and financed by Great Britain.
By the autumn of 1920 the situation had changed
in every respect. The Meshed force had gone, as
had that in the Caucasus. The Caspian flotilla
was in the hands of the Bolshevists. The Kazvin
force was to depart in the spring, and, owing to
the restraining orders under which its commander
acted, had suffered seriously in prestige, and had
been compelled to fall back before the Bolshevists
(of which more hereafter) and to evacuate Ghilan.
Lastly, the subsidies to Government and indi-
viduals alike had ceased.

The consequence was that Persia found herself
abandoned to her own resources, and left to the
tender mercies of the Bolshevists, deprived alike
of military and financial aid. When there was
nothing to be hoped for from the British Govern-
ment, and the ratification of the Agreement could
only result in incurring the resentment of the
Moscow Government, it would have been pure
folly to attempt to comply with Lord Curzon's
demands for ratification.

In such circumstances Lord Curzon's statements
that he was the best friend that Persia possessed
only resulted in provoking an outburst of fury,
derision, and contempt throughout the country,
where he is considered to be Persia's greatest
enemy and would-be oppressor.

Why, then, did he press so strongly for ratifica-
tion ? There would appear to be only two ex-
planations : either he utterly failed to understand
the situation, or the British Government desired

134 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

to be free of the Agreement, while throwing the
onus of repudiation upon Persia. The argument
adopted by those who favour this view is that
the Agreement was a jeu d? esprit of the Foreign
Office, and that the War Office and Treasury had,
if consulted at all, not had the nature of the
obligations implied brought home to them ; and
that when the two Departments appreciated the
possible commitments in which they might find
themselves involved, they not unnaturally pro-
tested, with the result that the Foreign Office, in
the prevalent wave of feeling in favour of nominal
economy, found itself alone, and left to save its
face as best it could.

That there was something in this view one is
almost tempted to believe, judging by the attitude
adopted by the Foreign Office when the Agree-
ment was finally denounced by Seyd Zia-ed-Din.
Although repudiating the Agreement, and renounc-
ing any desire to profit by the loan thereunder,
he expressed himself anxious to avail himself of
the services of Military and Financial Advisers, so
that, the Customs having been revised and rail-
way construction never having been opposed, the
policy of the Agreement would have been given
effect to practically in its entirety. The Foreign
Office, however, was unwilling or unable to dis-
tinguish between the form and the substance, and
one is tempted to wonder whether they were un-
able to realise that they had obtained the nominal
results at which their policy had aimed, or whether
they would have preferred that the Agreement
should be repudiated both in spirit and in letter.

135

CHAPTER VI.

FINANCE.

CONSIDERING that any hope of a successful attempt
to re-establish Persia's position must be based
upon the reformation of her finances upon such a
scale as will once more bring expenditure within
the limits of revenue, an inquiry into the Persian
financial system, and the possibilities of effecting
a reform thereof which would achieve the desired
object, is necessary to the appreciation of whether
such financial adjustment lies within the sphere
of practical possibilities, or whether the Persian
financial position must be regarded as being irre-
trievable.

At the outset, let me say that I am absolutely
satisfied that the resources of Persia are amply
sufficient to provide an adequate revenue for all
her legitimate requirements without increasing the
burden of taxation in any respect. Readjustment
and honest administration are all that are required
to render the country independent of foreign assist-
ance, but these are precisely what cannot be ob-
tained under the present Government ; and just as
I am convinced that adequate reform is possible,
equally I am assured that it will never be carried
into effect so long as the direction of the affairs
of the country remains in the hands of the present
ruling class, unless such external pressure is brought
to bear as it is beyond their power to oppose.

136 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Were the League of Nations a practical body with
power to intervene in the internal affairs of nations
when these reached such a state of disorder and
complexity as to be adverse to international in-
terests, the matter would be simple ; but, as it is,
I cannot see any hope of serious reform being
undertaken unless either a revolution occurs or
foreign intervention terminates the present regime's
control, and such intervention can only be looked
for from Russia.

We must not consider the Persian as not appre-
ciating the position and as failing to realise the
defects of the present position. There is no lack
of young men who have been educated abroad,
and have returned fully supplied with ideas upon
the subject, while the discussion of theoretical
reform is fully in accord with Persian mentality ;
but, unfortunately, there is no accord between
words and actions, and for practical purposes
there is as much result as ensues from the discus-
sions of a village debating society. In theory
everything is admirably organised, but when it
comes to practice, there is the same objection
which a cynic alleged against running away with
another man's wife — namely, that it does not work.

I cannot take a better example of this than the
present organisation of the Ministry of Finance.
It will be remembered that Mr Schuster was
invested with what were little less than dictatorial
powers. After his elimination at the instance of
Russia, he was succeeded as Treasurer-General by
a Belgian official. While the Majlis had been
content to invest Mr Schuster with unusual powers,
it was by no means prepared to agree to these
being exercised by any official who happened to
occupy the post which he had held. For the time
being it was not possible to alter the position,
since one of the first acts of Russia when she inter-

FINANCE

137

vened in 1911 had been to dissolve the Majlis.
When, however, during the war a new Majlis
found itself free to act, it took the opportunity
of framing a law for the constitution of the Ministry
of Finance, which greatly diminished the import-
ance of the appointment in question.

A scheme was evolved and put into operation
of which it is hardly too much to say that it
defined in the minutest detail the duties of every
official in the Ministry. In their anxiety to provide
adequate safeguards against any official enjoying
excessive powers, the legislators succeeded in pro-
ducing an organisation which, apart from the
objection that it called for a large staff, was for
practical purposes unworkable. This would not
appear to have occasioned them any concern, and
the consequence is that Persian finances are to-day
controlled by an organisation which, while ade-
quate to provide in theory for all possible con-
tingencies, is either unduly involved or unnecessary
for practical purposes. As a consequence staffs
have been inflated to a grotesquely excessive
degree, and departments are fully staffed which
have never been called upon to carry out their
functions.

As an example I will take one branch into
whose organisation I had occasion to inquire —
that supposed to deal with national debt, the
budget, accounts, and auditing and pensions. On
perusal of the section of the law which defined its
functions, the only criticism which appeared to
be called for was that too many departments were
concerned with the same matter, and that the
safeguards provided were excessive. On inquiry
the results proved to be somewhat surprising.
The department whose duty it was to deal with
the budget had never functioned, for the good and
sufficient reason that there had never been a

138 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

budget for it to deal with. The national debt
department readily undertook to provide a full
statement of the foreign debt, but upon receipt
this proved to stop prior to the war. The feel-
ings of the officials concerned appeared to be so
hurt at the idea that they should be expected to
be conversant with the debt incurred during the
war, that I refrained from pressing them further.
In this I must confess to being influenced by the
accuracy of their information, which was indicated
by the fact that the service of the largest British
loan was stated to be in default for the last seven
years, whereas actually both interest and sinking
fund had throughout the loan's duration been
punctually met. The department which was sup-
posed to examine the accounts of the various
Ministries was practically in a state of suspended
animation, since the latter seemed to have a
rooted objection to rendering accounts in anything
under three or four years. The section whose
duty it was to consolidate the accounts and pro-
duce a record of the national expenditure was, as
a consequence, in the same position as the depart-
ment responsible for the budget. There remained
the section which dealt with pensions, and this
readily undertook to provide a statement of the
annual amount of these. Now there are in Persia
two classes of pensions — those paid monthly and
those paid annually. The former have usually
been given for political services, although in some
cases annual pensions have been converted. These,
which generally speaking have been legitimately
earned, are, as a rule, paid to the extent of 25 per
cent, although some are paid to the amount of
50 per cent, and some fortunate individuals are
even paid in full. The occasions which this gives
for corrupt practices may easily be imagined.
Even the 25 per cent is not at all times forth-

FINANCE

139

coming, and nothing is simpler than for the friends
of a Minister to buy their rights from the pen-
sioners, disheartened by long waiting. So soon as
purchase has been effected the period of waiting
comes to an end, and, in addition, the pension is
placed in the list of those which are paid in full,
the profits being shared by the parties concerned.
When I received the promised list, it was so far
below my expectations that it was obvious that
something had been omitted. On inquiry it proved
that the monthly pensions had been disregarded
by the compiler, while a further inquiry elicited
the fact that, although the list had been declared
to comprise all pensions paid by the Government,
other Ministries, such as those of War and the
Interior, had their own pension lists. A second
list was in due course forthcoming, and upon this
occasion I received a solemn assurance that it
was really complete, subject always to the qualifi-
cation that the same pension might in some cases
be included in both the monthly and annual lists.
As to whether this was actually the case, it was
utterly beyond the power of the section to say.

The above may, I think, be regarded as typical
of a Persian Ministry, the facts being in no way
exaggerated. As I stated when discussing the
question of population, Persian statistics cannot
be depended upon, and this is especially the case
when dealing with questions of revenue and ex-
penditure.

Such being the condition of the central adminis-
tration, it can readily be imagined that the system
in force in the provinces leaves much to be desired.
As has been mentioned, the control of local ex-
penditure and the collection of revenue were for-
merly in the hands of the local governor. Under
the new regime a Financial Agent was appointed
in each province, the larger provinces being divided

140 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

into districts under subordinate agents. Since in
Persia the custom of collecting taxes by force is
universally in operation, except in the case of
persons of influence, who in all probability do not
pay at all, close co-operation between the Financial
Agent and the Governor is called for in the collec-
tion of the revenue. The consequence is that
usually these worthies are to be found working
in close co-operation, with the result that oppres-
sion can be indulged in with impunity, and the
peasant is not infrequently called upon to pay his
taxes two or three times over. A contributory
cause of the irregularities which exist in the collec-
tion of the revenue is the lack of practical organisa-
tion existing in the central administration. All
departments of this meddle in the matter, with
the consequence that, by playing off one of these
against another, endless delays can be occasioned
by officials whose actions are called in question.

The principal tax in Persia is the Maliat, which
in theory is based upon the Koran, and consists
of a tithe of the revenues or produce of the land
of an individual village (not of the revenue of an
estate or individual proprietor), which is payable
in money or kind, or partly in one and partly in
the other. Although in theory based upon the
Koran, the tax, or at least a tax upon land revenue,
existed in Persia prior to the introduction of Islam.
By successive reforms the tax was gradually evolved
until it assumed its present form of 10 per cent
plus the military tax, with which I will deal later.
Avoiding as it did any dependence upon indi-
vidual declarations, and being easy to collect, it
worked well both from the point of view of the
revenue produced and the justice of its incidence,
so long as the Government possessed the strengtli
and experience necessary to effect periodic revisions,
without which it is obvious that, by movements of

FINANCE

141

ion and other causes, it might fail in pro-
ducing revenue, and also become an instrument of
oppression and injustice. In the time of Shah
Abbas the Great (about 1600) it was considered
necessary to effect such revisions every five or
six years.

At the present time the tax has ceased to be
either productive or just in its incidence, owing to
the long period which has elapsed since the last
revision. The last general revision was under-
taken over half a century ago, and although local
revisions have been undertaken from time to time,
it is probably considerably understating the case
to assert that from three-quarters to four-fifths of
the country is assessed upon a basis adjusted at
least thirty years ago ; some authorities, indeed,

Eut the figure at a much longer period. The
>cal revisions which have been undertaken, not
being based upon any general principle, and being
influenced by the point of view of the officials
concerned, have resulted only in increasing the
inequality of the incidence, while in later years
they have usually been the result of an arrange-
ment between the taxpayers and the officials. The
consequence is that the revenue derived by the
Government bears no relation to the real taxable
liability of the country. This is well brought out
by the fact that tax-farmers have been willing to
pay more than the whole sum at which their
district was assessed for the privilege of collecting
the revenue. The chief source of hidden revenue
lies in the villages which have grown or sprung
up since the last revision, and which are con-
sequently unknown officially to the Government.
Correspondingly other villages have decreased in
prosperity, and so soon as the population begins
to decrease, the incidence of the tax naturally
falling more heavily upon the remaining inhabit-

142 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ants, an incentive is provided for these also to
migrate, with the result that unless a rebate is
granted the village ceases to exist. Generally
speaking, the oldest revisions show more sense of
equity and appreciation of the problems involved.

As collected at the present time, the tax con-
sists in the main either of the 10 per cent men-
tioned, or of a fixed proportion of the revenue,
agreed under a contract, where the land is Crown
land, which has been ceded to individuals. In
some cases it is replaced or augmented by a poll-
tax upon the inhabitants or upon their flocks,
while in all classes of taxes a percentage is very
frequently added (nominally to cover the cost of
collection), and in many a reduction has been
granted for one reason or another.

Attempts have from time to time been made
to centralise the tax rolls, and to regulate centrally
the collection ; but, so far from getting a grip
upon the collection, the central administration did
not even succeed in getting a complete list of the
rolls. Such as they did get together were destroyed
by a fire at the Ministry of Finance some three
years ago, which is commonly believed to have
been caused by interested parties. The difficulty
of consolidation arose from the fact that the tax
rolls were a legacy from the time when the whole
administration of a province was under the gover-
nor. At that time the rolls were kept by a close
corporation of accountants, who, using a peculiar
scrip, came to regard the rolls as their hereditary
possessions. I met with a case of this in Teheran
when visiting an official who belonged to such a
family. He showed me with pride an entire cup-
board stored with what were admittedly Govern-
ment records inherited from his father. When an
independent financial system was established, and
the old accountants saw their privileges threatened,

FINANCE 143

f

they had every incentive, so far as lay in their
power, to hinder the success of the new organisa-
tion, and rolls were handed over in a mutilated
and defective condition. In spite of the eighteen
years which have elapsed and considerable ex-
penditure, the Government have so far been un-
able to complete their records, and in the lack of
knowledge and state of uncertainty which exist
there has been ample opportunity for irregularities
to continue without fear of detection.

With the exception of certain individuals, who
are strong enough or possess sufficient influence
to defy the officials, and of certain persons and
tribes, such as the Bakhtiari, who not only do not
pay but collect tax from others, the whole tax is
collected subject to such abatements as may from
time to time be granted. It does not follow by
any means that the revenue reaches the national
exchequer, partly through incapacity or bad faith
on the part of the agents employed; partly
through a favourite device of giving a personal
receipt for the sum collected, and then returning
the official counterfoils with an explanation that
for one reason or another the tax is irrecoverable ;
and partly because of collusion between the officials
and the taxpayers. It is impossible to prevent
these frauds without radical reform of the whole
system, and the introduction of an adequate
system of inspection, coupled with prompt and
drastic punishment of delinquents.

The great and obvious disparity between the
revenues of the properties and the tax collected
have recently brought home the vital necessity
of attempting some revision and reform of the
present system. In the provinces of Ghilan and
Mazanderan attempts have been made in the last
few years to bring the Maliat revenue into greater
accord with the actual revenues of the proprietors,

144 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

by establishing what the actual 10 per cent amounts
to in practice. The Ghilan attempt may be dis-
regarded, since, owing to the local unsettlement
occasioned by Bolshevist and Jangali activities, it
cannot be considered as having had the chance of
a fair trial.

In the case of Mazanderan, however, results have
been obtained which are sufficient to indicate what
might be hoped for from a thorough revision
carried through to a conclusion. The opinion of
one of the officials concerned in the revision was
that the revenue could be increased by from 40
to 50 per cent on the basis adopted. The method
proposed was the separation of assessment and
collection, coupled with that of an annual declara-
tion, and an examination and collection of data
relating to the various properties, such as water,
arable land, population, and draught oxen. From
such statistics it is possible, by comparison with
neighbouring properties, to ascertain whether the
returns submitted are approximately correct, or
whether further inquiry is necessary. The 10 per
cent having been assessed upon the returns where
there is no reason to doubt the correctness of
these, the sum due is intimated to the taxpayer,
and the collecting office advised of what must be
recovered. The system of returns, coupled with
the separation of the assessing and collecting
agencies, rendered extortion upon the part of
the collectors much more difficult of concealment.
In better organised countries, it is only necessary
to guard against evasion by the taxpayer, but in
Persia an even greater evil to both revenue and
taxpayer must be guarded against in the dis-
honesty and extortion of the officials concerned
in the collection of revenue. The above method
provides safeguards against the larger part of
the existing abuses, since it assures that the

In the Bazars, Teheran.

FINANCE 145

amount due is known to both taxpayer and
collector.

At the present time slips showing the sums due
are given to the taxpayers, or in cases where
small taxpayers are grouped together, to one of
them, with the result that very frequently the
slips are in the course of a few years either lost or
destroyed, and the taxpayer is consequently left
at the mercy of the collector, and in ignorance of
the sum due. Since the collector is supported by
the governor's gendarmes, it may readily be realised
that full advantage is taken of this ignorance. To
exercise any control over the amounts collected it
would be necessary to collect the slips from the
individuals concerned, and compare them with the
tax rolls. Under the circumstances, it would be
impossible in view of the loss of many of the slips
to effect such a comparison, and actually no
attempt has ever been made to carry such an
examination into effect.

In dealing with the tax in kind the difficulties
of supervision are very much greater, and no
control whatever is exercised. Since the amount
due depends upon the price at which the grain is
disposed of, and seeing that, being without storage
accommodation of its own, the Government is
compelled to leave the grain in the taxpayer's
barn, the opportunities for fraud and collusion are
infinite. As a consequence a cash payment is
very frequently agreed upon with the farmer in
commutation of the tax in kind. Where this is
not arranged, the Government, in the absence of
transport facilities, is compelled to rely upon the
local officials for the price obtained, and more
often than not these will be found to be acting
in collusion with a local ring. For example, upon
one occasion when there was a shortage of grain
in Teheran province, application was made by the

K

146 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

responsible official for the transfer of grain from a
district of an adjacent province. This was re-
fused, and the grain was sold locally, only to be
bought back a week later by the Government in
the same village at a greatly enhanced price.
Numberless instances of the manipulation of grain
could be given, but the above is sufficient to
indicate the methods employed. At times the
consequences may be vastly more serious, for, in
the event of famine, there is nothing to prevent
the governor of the afflicted district from pro-
hibiting import and profiteering with accumulated
stores, while the governor of an adjacent province
may prohibit export on the plea of the risk of a
spread of the shortage, and so force the local
holders to dispose of their stocks at his price, after
which the need for an embargo upon export will
suddenly disappear. There is not the slightest
doubt that the distress of the 1918 famine was
gravely accentuated by manipulation on the part
of those in high authority. Such opportunities
would be eliminated by the imposition of a fixed
10 per cent, for it would then be easy to ascertain
whether the proprietor, upon whom the onus of
disposing of the entire crop would fall, had ren-
dered an honest statement of the prices obtained.
At present the collector takes from 5 to 10 per
cent in excess of the sum due under plea of expenses,
while, moreover, he is entitled to an additional
percentage in the case of the tax in kind to com-
pensate for dross. Two years ago a collector in
a province adjacent to Teheran collected between
35 per cent and 50 per cent in excess of the sum
due upon this plea. In addition, the collectors
and their retinues billet themselves upon villages,
and should these prove reluctant to pay the sums
demanded, pressure is brought to bear by pro-
tracting the visitation.

FINANCE 147

By the system proposed these irregularities are
to a great extent eliminated, since once the tax-
payer is in possession of information regarding the
exact amount due, any further demand must be
admitted extortion. Further, much information
is collected regarding the financial and commercial
possibilities of the various districts, while the
collectors and assessors act as spies upon one an-
other's actions.

The above method cannot be regarded as other
than a palliative pending the inception of a com-
prehensive scheme of reform. Manifestly the ideal
method of effecting this would be by a complete
cadastral survey of the country, but this is at the
moment a counsel of perfection, and beyond either
the technical or economic resources of Persia.
Moreover, when the long periods which were found
necessary to effect such a survey in France and
Belgium (forty years in one case) are remembered,
it is obvious that, although a Persian survey would
not entail such a mass of detailed work, it must
nevertheless prove a very long and costly business,
and involve the employment of a large number of
European surveyors. Such being the case, it is
necessary to endeavour to find a method of bring-
ing about a radical increase of revenue within a
reasonable period, even if a cadastral survey is
decided upon as essential to the ultimate reform.
This result might, I believe, be arrived at by a
system of returns such as instituted in Mazanderan,
or alternatively by an annual assessment of the
value of the crop by a body representative of the
Government and proprietors, reinforced by as-
sessors familiar with local conditions. In either
case at the end of five years an average would
be struck which would form a fair basis of taxa-
tion for a further period of five years. It would
also be necessary to separate the assessing officials

148 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

from those concerned with collection, and to estab-
lish a system of provincial audit in order to ensure
that the revenue collected corresponded with the
amounts noted in the assessment rolls. Provided
that an adequate system of inspection is estab-
lished, and adequate supervision exercised over
the auditors, it would be unnecessary that details
of individual properties should be submitted to
the capital. In view of the difficulties of com-
munication, the figures could not be supervised
efficiently from the centre, and the forwarding of
details would only furnish an excuse for multiply-
ing officials. If the totals due from the individual
districts are in the possession of the Ministry of
Finance, sufficient data would be available to
ensure that the revenue was being collected in a
satisfactory manner. The method indicated above,
necessitating as it does the preparation of annual
statistics, is far from perfect, but pending a ca-
dastral survey it would, I feel confident, produce
results more than justifying the necessary expense,
which would not be excessive under proper control.
In close relation to the Maliat there exists the
problem of the Crown lands, both those still in
the possession of the Crown and those which have
been alienated to individuals. The latter form the
most difficult part of the question. In theory
these were alienated as a reward for special ser-
vices, in return for a proportion of the revenue
which they produced, and in the hope that the
individual proprietor, being in a better position
to give attention to their improvement and de-
velopment, would be enabled to show a better
return, with consequent benefit to the revenues of
the Crown. In many cases, it must be admitted,
the lands have been alienated to favourites for
merely nominal sums. The difficulty of dealing
with the question is increased by the lands having

FINANCE 149

in many cases changed hands for a legitimate
consideration, and in these cases they would
appear to be beyond recovery. The matter is one
which is of vital importance to the national
revenue, and calls for immediate investigation,
since there is the strongest reason for believing
that land is being lost at the present time through
a system of encroachment — not a very difficult
matter for a magnate possessed of influence in
official quarters. The data for such an inquiry
still exists, or did recently ; but there is always
the risk that it may share the fate of the tax
rolls, and be destroyed in a nominally accidental
conflagration, or simply disappear, a not uncom-
mon event in the case of official documents.

Given that the Crown lands could be adequately
administered and supervised, they would prove
most productive of revenue if retained in the
hands of the State ; but, in the absence of expert
advice, the most satisfactory results would be ob-
tained if let by a system of open tender. Private
arrangements cannot be regarded as other than
undesirable, considering the opportunities which
are provided for an understanding between the
tenderers and the officials concerned. Seyd Zia's
Government announced its intention of distribut-
ing the lands among the peasants, but the diffi-
culties involved do not seem to have been appre-
ciated. So great were these that the officials con-
cerned regarded them as impossible of solution
without foreign assistance, and it was proposed
to employ American experts. The matter is rather
one of finance than agriculture, and it cannot in
any case be considered that the best choice was
contemplated when the difference between con-
ditions in Persia and those in America are kept
in view.

The chief indirect taxes are the opium and

150 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

tobacco excise, and the customs. Until very re-
cently there was also a tax upon wines and spirits,
but at the moment the policy of the Government
is the suppression of all alcohol, with, I gather,
very much the same result as in America. The
revenue from tobacco and opium is not what it
should be, since, like all other taxes in Persia,
the excise seems designed to be productive of
the smallest possible revenue with the largest
possible expenditure of time and labour. The tax
at the present time is upon the finished article,
and the opportunities for leakage which occur at
every stage of manufacture are endless. To take
opium, for instance, it is necessary to keep a watch
upon every field in order to ensure against illegal
picking by the owner as the plants become ripe.
Although the preparation is supposed to be con-
ducted under Government control, opportunities
for peculation arise both during the periods of
concentration and compression, when it is im-
possible to check accurately the evaporation which
occurs. Also, when worked up into its final form,
substitutes may be introduced. Banderoles are
not only used a second time, but forged freely,
and there is the risk of theft during transport.
Lastly, exported opium, which is immune from
duty, is largely reimported by smugglers. I heard
an interesting tale of a Bakhtiari khan, who shall
be nameless, who drove into Teheran, after declar-
ing that there was no opium in his possession, in
blissful ignorance that he was sitting upon a large
package of the drug, which belonged to a con-
fidential servant.

For all these reasons it would be much sounder
economically to tax the crop at the source by
imposing a tax upon the acreage under cultiva-
tion. This would not only eliminate the leakage
which at present exists, but would render un-

FINANCE 151

necessary the retention of the large number of
officials at present employed. Genuine cases of
crop failure would be easy to investigate and
prove. So far as exported opium is concerned, a
drawback might be allowed, if it is considered that
the export trade would suffer through taxation.
Considering the limited extent to which through-
out the world opium cultivation is in these times
permitted, I do not anticipate that this result
would ensue. What has been said about opium
applies equally in the case of tobacco cultivation.

The customs, being under Belgian control, are
the best administered department of the revenue,
but they are in no way above criticism. Leaving
aside the question of the tariff, both the staffs
at the frontier posts and the guard upon the
frontier are inadequate in numbers, and the
Belgian staff is insufficient to properly control the
service. Many officials maintain a scale of ex-
penditure out of proportion to their salaries, which
not unnaturally causes suspicion of smuggling if
not worse. A sinister light was thrown upon the
doings at some posts by the answer of a Euro-
pean, to whom I happened to remark that I
imagined that he seldom got an opportunity of
picking up good carpets at such an out-of-the-way
place. " Not at all," was the reply, " it is often
possible to buy from customs officials."

Another defect exists in the immunity from
duty on their property enjoyed by certain Euro-
peans, which it must be admitted is in some
cases abused, articles being imported and used
for trading purposes, as in India in former times.
The internal staff of inspectors is totally inade-
quate, and it is quite in accord with Persian
methods that separate staffs of inspectors are
maintained by the customs and excise depart-
ments, and in addition by the department of in-

152 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

direct taxes, each inspector concerning himself
with offences against his own department alone.
A consolidation in this respect would lead to greater
efficiency, and also render it possible to pay the
officials concerned upon a higher scale.

When we come to consider the other indirect
taxes the same characteristics are apparent in all
— namely, inefficient and costly methods of collec-
tion coupled with utterly inadequate control. In-
deed, in some cases, one is almost tempted to
believe that the creation of officials rather than
the increase of revenue was the object aimed at
when the taxes were instituted. A few examples
will suffice to indicate the nature of these taxes.

There is, for instance, a tax upon trades, but,
like the Maliat, it is based upon statistics which
are completely out of date. The collection is
made from the trade guilds, the sum due from
each guild being apportioned by the headman of
the guild amongst its members. Apart from the
occasion which this provides for the display of
partiality upon the part of this official, the ap-
portionment of the tax amongst the various guilds
is grossly unjust. No allowance is made for the
fact that industries increase and decrease, and
that others come into existence. The result of this
is that out of some eighty-four guilds in Teheran,
only thirty odd pay any tax, while amongst those
which escape are such wealthy bodies as bankers.
In addition, no traders outside the guilds are
liable to taxation.

Just as inequitable in its incidence is the Mosta-
gelat, which is 5 per cent of the rent of all houses
which are let. Since all those who are in a posi-
tion to live in their own houses escape, the tax
falls upon those who are compelled to let their
property. The combined effect of these two taxes
is that there are many wealthy men, merchants

FINANCE 153

in particular, who are practically immune from
taxation, which is transferred to the shoulders of
those less able to support the burden. In this
case the remedy would appear to obviously lie
in the abolition of the present taxes, and the
institution of a system of rates and trade
licences.

Amongst other taxes in vogue, in towns specially,
are those upon auctions, brick-kilns, animals slaugh-
tered for food, and goods and vehicles entering
towns, but these and the other forms of taxation
vary so greatly in different localities that a detailed
statement is impossible in the space available.
What is perhaps the most remarkable of all may,
however, be mentioned — namely, a tax on lotteries.
These being prohibited by the Koran as a form of
gambling, the tax was declared illegal by the
Majlis ; but this in no way acted as a deterrent to
the officials concerned, who continue to collect the
tax whenever they can find any one who can be
induced to pay. Being somewhat curious as to
how a tax which had been expressly vetoed by
the legislature could be enforced, I inquired from
the responsible official what method he adopted,
to be met with the frank admission that he was
powerless in the matter. The only conclusion was
that the tax was only demanded from Armenians,
Jews, and other infidels, who concerned themselves
in such matters, and were content to purchase
immunity for their operations. In any case, it
scarcely appeared worth the trouble, as the gross
revenue collected was somewhere in the neigh-
bourhood of a hundred pounds. For the rest, it
need only be said that no attempt is made to
account for such items as police fines and similar
minor revenues, which are collected by individuals
and departments which do not admit the claims
of the Treasury to be concerned in the matter.

154 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

For example, the Ministry of Commerce receives
and retains all revenues derived from mines.

One other source of revenue calls for mention —
namely, the royalty paid by the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, amounting under the concession to 16
per cent of the gross profits on its operations. As
the concession covers the whole of Persia, with
the exception of the five northern provinces, this
royalty is one of the most important items, and a
growing one, moreover, in the Persian revenue.
For the current year it should amount to some-
where in the neighbourhood of six hundred thou-
sand pounds, a vital sum to a bankrupt adminis-
tration, to which it has the additional value of
being the only pledgeable asset of considerable
value which remains unencumbered. It is true
that by hypothecating the royalty in return for
a loan the country will be deprived of one of the
few sources of revenue upon which the central
Government can count, but to those whose motto
is carpe diem this is a matter of small account.

As to what the revenue amounts to at the present
time it is useless to hazard an opinion. In former
times sufficient was derived from the provinces to
defray the expenses of the central Government,
but to-day the position is reversed, and in the
large majority of cases the central Government is
compelled to subsidise the provinces, only one or
two of which contribute trifling sums to the
Treasury. The consequence is that the Govern-
ment is compelled to subsist upon loans, seeing
that the monthly deficit is anywhere from five
hundred thousand to a million tomans. This is
a condition which obviously cannot continue for
long without occasioning a crisis, or, perhaps it
would be more correct to say, could not continue
in any European country, since such countries as
Persia and Turkey do not apparently experience

FINANCE 155

any inconvenience from being in a condition of
bankruptcy. Were any attempts being made to
improve matters, there might be some justifica-
tion for financing the Government during the
period of transition, but under present circum-
stances those who supply Persia with credits
which are in the main misapplied, can only be
considered as assisting to accelerate her rake's
progress, and the almost inevitable consequences
thereof.

Under such circumstances any financial adviser
who is not invested with practically despotic
powers must certainly fail, as both Mr Schuster
and Mr Armitage-Smith found by experience.
The Persian is delighted to have an adviser, par-
ticularly if he is able to arrange credits for him,
but he objects most strongly to that adviser inter-
fering in administration or attempting to effect
reforms. So long as he is content to draw his
salary and look on, he may remain for an un-
limited period, since Persians are loath to dismiss
European officials ; but so soon as he attempts
to effect any practical effort to carry reform be-
yond the stage of proposals, opposition will imme-
diately be experienced.

So far as the mission sent out under the Anglo-
Persian Agreement is concerned, a very brief
reference will suffice. In the circumstances suc-
cess was already out of the question when the
Financial Adviser arrived in Teheran at the end
of April 1920, for although the fact was not yet
realised in England, the Agreement was in a semi-
moribund state, while the Enzeli episode, which
occurred within a month, finally disposed of any
hopes of its being ultimately confirmed. In this
situation successful reform was not to be hoped
for, and although many proposals were put for-
ward by Mr Armitage-Smith, results were almost

156 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

nil. The only practical results were that on his
recommendation a reform in the opium excise was
effected, and that he brought to a successful con-
clusion certain negotiations with the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company, relating to the royalty payable,
which were conducted in London. Like the other
British Advisers, the Financial Mission were sus-
pended on the fall of Vossugh-ed-Douleh, and in
the end of August Mr Armitage-Smith left for
London on the mission just mentioned, not return-
ing to Teheran until the following May, while I
remained to occupy the sinecure of directing the
activities of a suspended mission. The only sub-
sequent Government which availed itself of our
services was that of Seyd Zia-ed-Din, of which it
may be said that, although their intentions were
excellent, their knowledge was rudimentary, with
the consequence that work under them resolved
itself into lodging caveats against every proposal
upon which advice was asked. With their fall all
genuine attempts at reform disappeared, and
henceforth the paramount question was what
money the Financial Adviser, who had just re-
turned, could procure for the Government. The
farce came to an end on the 1st of September,
when, the Bolshevist Minister demanding the dis-
missal of the Financial Adviser and his staff, and
the Majlis, under the leadership of Prince Firouz,
having shown itself violently opposed to all British
Advisers, while the Foreign Office had lost interest
in the matter, the Persian Government terminated
the contracts and dismissed the mission.

As I have said, subsequent missions may assay
the same task, but unless invested with powers
which no Persian Government on the present
model will willingly concede, they will share in
the failure which their two predecessors experi-
enced, after occupying a sinecure for a more or less

FINANCE 157

brief period. Reform is possible, but will never
be willingly submitted to by the class at present
in power.

The Persian external debt is of interest in that
much the greater part is due to the British Treasury
for advances made during the war.

At the outbreak of war the Persian National
Debt consisted of three loans due to Russian, and
two to British creditors. The former were two
rouble loans for twenty-two and a half million,
contracted in 1900, in connection with Muzeffer-ed-
Din Shah's first journey to Europe, and ten millions
additional, which was negotiated two years later
for his second journey; and of a kran loan for
sixty million krans representing indebtedness to
the Russian Bank, which was consolidated in 1910.
There was also an advance made by the Russian
Government of the equivalent of £200,000, which
was repayable in three annual instalments. These
are all of academic interest, as is the Russian share
of joint advances made in conjunction with Great
Britain, which amounted to £409,000, since they
have been repudiated by the present Russian
Government by the treaty concluded this year.
Whether, once British influence has been elimin-
ated, a pretext will be found to revive these claims
remains to be seen. There is nevertheless a certain
irony in the fact that Britain paid the Russian
share of the joint advances, debiting Russia with
that amount in London, so that a bad debt has
been obtained ; whereas, had the whole advance
been made by Britain, there would at least have
been some claim to repayment, which might ulti-
mately have proved to be not entirely valueless.

The British pre-war loans consisted of two loans,
or rather the outstanding balances thereof, of
£314,281, 16s. 4d. concluded in 1910, and £1,250,000
which was issued in 1911 (the service of these has

158 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

been maintained up to date and appears to be
well secured), and British advances amounting to
£490,000 made during 1912 to 1914 inclusive. The
principal security for all three is the customs
revenue of Fars and the Gulf ports. The advances
were intended to be repayable out of the proceeds
of any large loan negotiated. Interest has been
paid to date at 7 per cent, but no instalments
towards repayment have been made, although
these should have been begun in 1915 at the rate
of quarter of a million tomans each half-year.
Up to this point the finance was sound in that
the security was sufficient if not ample, but with
the war the Foreign Office became the financial
representative of the lenders, and of their opera-
tions the best that can be said is that they may
have been dictated by political necessity, but that
regarded from a purely financial point of view
they were both speculative and remarkable.

The first war advances were the British share of
the moratorium advances, already referred to in
connection with Russia, which amounted in all
to £409,000. The terms of these are somewhat
curious. That the service of the advances should
be suspended during the war was natural under
the circumstances, but that the Imperial Bank of
Persia should be authorised to arrange the terms
of repayment after the conclusion of the war may,
without being unduly hypercritical, be described
as a somewhat casual method of doing business.
Since it is not stated what is contemplated by the
conclusion of the war, it is uncertain whether these
advances can, in the absence of the conclusion of
peace with Turkey, be regarded as due.

The next two items are comparatively small in
amount, consisting of Krs. 3,939,000, made for the
restoration of order in Fars during the years 1916
to 1919, and Krs. 1,465,190 in 1916, which have

FINANCE 159

not as yet been even acknowledged by the Persian
Government.

We now come to the largest item of all, the
advances made monthly in aid of the general
expenses of government. These began with sums
of Krs. 2,500,000 in August and September 1918,
and were thereafter continued at the rate of
Krs. 3,500,000 monthly until October 1920, so
that they amount in all to Krs. 92,500,000. Like
the moratorium advances, these were to be ad-
justed by the Imperial Bank of Persia when the
time came to consider terms of repayment, and
were secured upon the southern customs. No
interest has so far been either paid or agreed upon,
but assuming that 7 per cent is the rate ulti-
mately fixed, the interest to February 1922 amounts
to about Krs. 15,500,000. The most unsatisfactory
part of this loan is that repayment is to be made
in krans. Seeing that for many years before the
war the kran exchange had stood in the neighbour-
hood of fifty-five to the pound, while during the
period of the advances it was between thirty and
twenty and even higher, the Foreign Office took
all the obvious risks of the exchange, with the
result that were repayment to be made at the
present time, when the kran stands at fifty-two
approximately, 60 per cent of principal and in-
terest would be lost.

In a practically similar position are the advances
for the upkeep of the Cossack Division, which
have been referred to in a previous chapter. These
now amount to Krs. 40,000,000 odd, and assuming
that, as in the previous case, interest is charged
at 7 per cent, the arrears to date are about
Krs. 8,400,000.

The remaining advance, consisting of the £131,000
to account of the two million loan under the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, I have already discussed, and

160 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

propose to ignore for present purposes, since it is
difficult to believe that payment will in the circum-
stances be seriously pressed for.

The larger advances detailed above depend for
their final adjustment upon the view taken by the
Imperial Bank of Persia of its duties under the
terms of the letters by which the advances were
arranged, and it may well be that the Persian
Government will dispute their responsibility for
certain items. It is also uncertain what rate of
interest will be determined upon. I will, however,
assume for the moment that the rate fixed is
7 per cent, since this is the rate proposed in the
Anglo-Persian Agreement, and upon that assump-
tion I will endeavour to ascertain whether the
security pledged is sufficient to meet the interest
and an adequate sinking fund upon the amounts
involved.

For practical purposes the British Government
security for the advances which it has made are
the southern customs. In two cases additional
security is given — in the case of the pre-war ad-
vances, the spirit and opium revenues of the
south, and in the case of the Fars advance it is
stated that repayment shall be made out of the
revenues of Fars. The spirit excise has now ceased
to exist, while in the present financial situation
the value of the other two items is, at the best,
problematical. On the other hand, no security
is named for the Bushire loan, nor, so far as I am
aware, for the Cossack advances. The British
Government desired to debit these against the
loan under the Anglo-Persian Agreement, but the
Persian Government refused to concur in this
proposal.

It was provided by the Anglo-Persian Agreement
that the Persian Government should give as addi-
tional security all customs revenues at its disposal,

FINANCE 161

which, had the Agreement been confirmed, would
have increased the security by the amount of the
northern customs, which, previously pledged in
security for the Russian loans, were released when
these were cancelled by the Bolshevist Govern-
ment. Since the Agreement has been denounced
this additional security must be held to have
lapsed. In 1920 the Kermanshah customs, which
had hitherto been included in the northern cus-
toms, were included in the southern customs for
purposes of administration, but for the purposes
of the security of loans made prior to this time
they must be excluded from a conservative esti-
mate. We are accordingly compelled to look for
repayment of capital and interest to the southern
customs as they existed at the time the advances
were made.

The net customs revenue in recent years has been
as follows : —

Southern Northern T f i

Customs. Customs.

Average three years Krs' Krs' Krs<

to 20th March 1914 8,400,000 31,400,000 39,800,000
Year to 20th March

1918 . . . 14,400,000 4,800,000 19,200,000
Year to 20th March

1919 . . . 18,800,000 6,700,000 25,500,000

After 1919 a comparison is impossible, on account
of the regrouping which took place respecting the
Kermanshah customs.

From the above it appears that the sum avail-
able in the three years to 1914 averaged, taking
the kran at fifty to the pound, £168,000, while in
1918 it was £376,000.

Let us take next the loans and advances for
which these sums are the security, again fixing
the kran at fifty to the pound. The two pre-war
loans which are privately held amount at the

L

162 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

present time to approximately £1,300,000. The
sterling advances made by the British Government
may, with arrears of interest, be put at £1,050,000,
and the kran advances, after allowing for interest
and the loss of about 60 per cent through the
exchange, at £3,240,000. This gives a total debt
. of £5,590,000, against which there was available
in the three years to 1914 £168,000 to meet interest
and sinking fund, and in 1918 £376,000. We
cannot, however, safely consider the latter figure
as being in any sense an indication of the revenue
which may be anticipated in future years, since
it is manifest from the figures quoted that the
southern customs are at the present time inflated
by artificial conditions, and that when the northern
routes are reopened, upon the restoration of order
in the Caucasus and Russia, a large decrease must
clearly be anticipated. At the same time it must
be remembered that under the new tariff higher
duties are imposed.

Taking, then, the figures for 1914 and the two
previous years, we have £168,000 to meet the
interest and sinking fund upon £5,590,000. From
the point of view of the British Government's
advances the actual position is much worse, since
the two privately held loans are a prior security,
and require for their service £98,000. This leaves
£70,000 available to meet the interest and sinking
fund upon the British Government's advances of
£4,290,000, whereas the interest alone at 7 per
cent would amount to over £300,000. The position
will be slightly improved after the completion of
the repayment of the first private loan in 1928,
but the additional sum available will only be
£29,000. Thus the deficiency on the 1914 figures
will amount to over £230,000, leaving altogether
out of account the question of repayment. If we
take the 1918 figures the position is somewhat

FINANCE 163

better, since there will be available, after providing
for the underlying loans, £278,000 to meet interest
charges of £300,000. Thus there would still be a
deficit, even were it probable that the 1918 stand-
ard would be maintained, which, apart altogether
from an ultimate trade adjustment, would appear
to be more than doubtful when the growing ad-
verse balance of trade is remembered. The ques-
tion of paying for imports has already become a
serious matter, and unless further lenders can very
shortly be found, it is hardly too much to antici-
pate something in the nature of a trade deadlock.

Such is finance as conducted by the Foreign
Office. It may be pleaded that political necessities
justified the expenditure, although this may be
questioned, but in any event political necessities
do not constitute a reason for not taking such
security as is available. In the case of Persia
ample security was obtainable, which was immune
from the risks to which the customs revenues are
exposed, and which was, moreover, readily realis-
able. This consisted of the annual royalty due
from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. From the
point of view of the Foreign Office, in its attempt
to control Persia, this would have had the addi-
tional advantage that when the royalty had been
pledged, Persia would have been without security
to offer to other lenders. It would be interesting
to know why the Foreign Office omitted to safe-
guard the interests of the Treasury when such
action would have been in accordance with the
policy which it was pursuing. Was it because
such questions as finance are below its notice ?

It must be admitted that the Joint Anglo-
Persian Committee which revised the customs
tariff came to an understanding that were an
acceptable measure of currency reform not intro-
duced within two years, the position should be

164 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

considered. In addition, it was agreed that should
the value of the kran in terms of gold so diminish
that the customs revenue was likely to be in-
sufficient to guarantee the external loans, the
Persian Government should, if requested by the
British Government, increase all specific rates of
duty by such a uniform percentage as to meet the
case. Apart from the doubt whether an increase
dictated by such reasons might not defeat its own
end, this would scarcely appear to justify the
taking of a potential security when a sound one
was available.

165

CHAPTER VII.

THE ARMY.

BEFORE proceeding to deal with the history of
events subsequent to the signing of the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, it will be advantageous to
briefly describe the constitution and condition of
the Persian Army at that time.

The Persian military system may be described
as a modified form of conscription based upon the
area of cultivated land. This is divided into units
corresponding to what is considered to be the
amount of land which can be tilled by one plough,
and for each such area the village to which the
land appertains is liable to provide a soldier. In
addition, the liability extends to a monetary con-
tribution, one portion of which is applied towards
the expenses of the recruit's family and paid direct
to them, while the remainder is paid to the Govern-
ment in order to provide a fund for the support
and pay of the soldier. There is no limit to the
length of service, but this hardship is modified by
the fact that for long periods the soldier may be
so in name alone.

The chief objection to this system as at present
in force is the injustice of its incidence. Like the
Maliat, it is based upon an antiquated survey,
which took place in 1842, and owing to changes of
population an even greater hardship is caused than
in the case of the land tax, for where it is clear

166 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

that the village cannot spare the number of re-
cruits, there is an unusually favourable oppor-
tunity for extortion on the part of the official
concerned. The son of one of the more prosperous
villagers will be pitched upon, and, faced with the
loss of both son and labour, the father mulcted
in a considerable sum, as much as a hundred
tomans being at times demanded.

The total force so recruited is in theory sup-
posed to amount to about 86,000, but in practice
nothing approaching this number is actually called
out for service, however many may be threatened
by the recruiting officers for personal reasons. The
country is divided into certain districts or "fouj,"
each of which is liable to provide the equiva-
lent of a regiment. Some of these are embodied
for service, while the remainder remain liable for
service. From time to time changes are effected,
one body being temporarily disbanded, while an-
other is embodied to act in its stead. Setting aside
certain special corps, to which I shall refer pres-
ently, the number of men called out annually
depends in a great degree upon the whim of the
local governor. During 1920 something under ten
thousand were called out for the Nizam or regular
army. It by no means follows that, because ten
thousand were called out, anything like that
number were serving, or indeed expected to serve,
either by the civil or military officials concerned.
Like every one else in Persia, officers of the army
are not overpaid, and, also like every one else,
they endeavour to augment their incomes in what-
ever way presents itself. In the case of senior
officers there is no great difficulty in the matter,
since the colonel can usually retain the majors'
pay for his own use with impunity, the majors in
turn compensating themselves at the expense of
the captains, while the latter, in their turn, penalise

THE ARMY 167

their company officers. For the junior officers the
matter is not so simple. It is always possible to
keep back a portion of the men's pay upon one
excuse or another, or when pay is in arrear to
advance the man a small portion of the sum due
in exchange for the whole amount when received.
Much trouble is saved, as well as a larger remunera-
tion received, when there are no men to pay ; and
so it comes about that the — to Europeans— sur-
prising situation arises in which officers are to be
found conniving at the desertion of their own men.
The situation is still further simplified if an entire
regiment can, by arrangement with the governor,
be quietly disbanded ; but as this is at times
liable to lead to awkward inquiries, a simpler
method is to demand additional subsidies for opera-
tions necessary to local safety, which operations
do not, for one reason or another, take place. In
such circumstances the command of a regiment
may prove a very remunerative appointment, and
at least one wealthy man has been pointed out
to me as owing his fortune to his father having
held such a position.

It need hardly be said that a force administered
in such a manner is absolutely worthless, even for
maintaining local order, as is instanced by the case
of the Isfahan robbers, which I have already
mentioned. Its arms are of every kind and de-
scription, while uniform, rations, and pay are in
the main problematical, the latter at the best
being usually months in arrear.

Outside the Nizam, the army consisted of three
special corps, two of them of foreign formation
and training — the Cossack Division and the South
Persian Rifles. Of the three, the Cossack Division
alone survives at the present time. Originally
formed in 1879 as a weak brigade intended nomi-
nally to act as a bodyguard to the Shah, it has

168 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

gradually expanded to its present strength. At
the end of the war it was about eight thousand
strong, and to-day it probably numbers fourteen
or fifteen thousand, although its commander claims
a much higher figure, which he is bent upon in-
creasing. As in the days of Xerxes, the Persian
pins his faith in numbers, regardless of the fact
that, according to modern ideas, such trifles as
transport and medical service are desirable ad-
juncts for an army. The brigade was formed upon
the Cossack model, and a number of Russian
officers and N.C.O.'s being in charge, was prac-
tically under Russian control. It need hardly be
said that in efficiency it was far superior to the
regular army, although no secret was made of the
fact that this was not raised unduly lest future
events should at any time place it in opposition
to Russia. Throughout its existence the corps has
been regarded as specially attached to the person
of the Shah. It was the Cossack Brigade which
in 1908 blew the constitution out of existence,
and which a year later made a last stand for
Mohamed Ali. Although it has not of late acted
in his defence, the present Shah regards it as the
chief guarantee, if not for the safety of the State,
at any rate for that of his own person.

The Russian personnel were dismissed on the
demand of the local British representatives in
November 1920, after the Division had for a second
time demonstrated its capacity to execute a long-
distance retreat in record-breaking time. Since
the proposal to replace the Russians by British
officers, which was made by Seyd Zia-ed-Din, was
immediately dropped after his fall, and the officers
appointed dismissed, the efficiency of the Division
has naturally suffered. While the younger officers
show keenness, and, like the men, are capable of
improvement, they lack both training and experi-

THE ARMY

169

ence, while the senior officers, who under the
Russians occupied what were practically honorary
positions, are only an incubus for the greater part.
The men are very largely drawn from the Turki-
speaking portion of the population, and, were it
not for the enormous percentage of venereal dis-
ease, might be considered useful material.

The Division is organised in otryads, which are
mixed formations of cavalry, infantry, and artil-
lery, formed upon territorial lines. There is no
fixed establishment, the strength of the otryads
ranging from a company, a weak squadron, and
a few machine-guns, to a battalion, a cavalry
regiment, and some batteries. This organisation
possesses almost every possible disadvantage. Each
otryad possesses its own staff, which necessitates
a large waste of personnel upon unnecessary work,
the greater part of the mounted troops in some of
the smaller formations being employed on orderly
and other duties, while the organisation is over-
burdened with superfluous senior officers. In addi-
tion, the units of each arm are in many cases too
small for practical work, and reorganisation into
bodies of a useful size is essential to genuine
efficiency. The division possesses no transport of
its own, civilian transport being impressed or hired
as occasion arises, more often the former. As is
only natural under the circumstances, the civilians
in charge of the second line transport take the
first opportunity of removing themselves to a place
of safety whenever there is a likelihood of hos-
tilities. The position is even worse as regards
first-line transport, which is non-existent, with
the result that the troops in the fighting line,
being compelled to disperse in search of provisions
from time to time, are in no better position than
the bandits and irregulars to whom they are
opposed. Fortunately their Bolshevist opponents

170 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

are of much the same order. Their fighting value
is shown by a brush which some two hundred of
them had with rebels in the summer of 1921,
when, after firing twenty-four thousand rounds
and sustaining three slight casualties, a retreat
was considered advisable. In justice it must be
admitted that there are cynics who explain the
affair on the ground that the rebels were ready to
pay a handsome price for ammunition. Incident-
ally, the efficiency of the medical service is illus-
trated by the fact that all three casualties died of
tetanus. Later in the year this episode was fol-
lowed by a victory, when a number of prisoners
were captured, including Russian personnel and
nurses. The latter were, of course, declared by
the Russian Minister to belong to the various
Caucasian republics, but the fact of their presence
illustrates the value to be attached to Bolshevist
promises.

The second special corps consisted of a body
known as the Central Brigade, which was a unit
of the regular army specially organised for duty
in the capital. This has since been absorbed into
the Cossack Division. Its total strength amounted
to about two thousand of all ranks, divided into
a cavalry regiment, a regiment of artillery, and
three battalions of infantry. The artillery pos-
sessed in theory ten field and five mountain guns ;
the latter actually had been lost, while the greater
part of the former were useless through lack of
buffer springs, a defect shared by almost all the
forty-eight 75's which the Persian Army possesses.
Moreover, there was only enough equipment to
turn out four guns, or two guns with ammunition
waggons. The training was on a par with the
equipment, as the experience of a British officer,
who inspected one of these batteries, shows. After
the first gun-crew had gone through their drill,

THE ARMY 171

energetic attempts were made to induce him to
leave the ground for at least a brief interval.
Other inspections were suggested, and an anxiety
evinced lest he should suffer from prolonged ex-
posure to the sun. His suspicions being aroused
by the solicitude shown for his health, he per-
sisted in continuing the inspection, to be rewarded
by the discovery that the first gun-team alone had
been taught the necessary evolutions, and that it
was customary at inspections for this team to
perform at each gun in turn. Another experience
of the same officer cast a lurid light upon the
quality of the personnel. Happening to be present
upon one occasion when the men were being paid,
he was surprised to see two small children present
themselves. On inquiring what they wanted, they
replied that they had come for their pay. When
he said that he was afraid that they did not pay
little boys, the colonel explained that it was quite
all ught, as they were his sons ; and when it was
pointed out that this did not make any difference,
complained that he really did not know what
things were coming to when a colonel could not
pay his own sons.

The third special corps was the South Persian
Rifles, which was raised by the British Govern-
ment during the war to maintain order in the
south. This force, amounting to about six thou-
sand men, under British officers and British and
Indian N.C.O.'s, consisted of two brigades based
upon Shiraz and Kerman, although its activities
extended as far north as Isfahan. Under British
instruction this force proved itself capable of deal-
ing with the forces of disorder in an absolutely
efficient manner, and showed what could be made
of the Persian as a soldier if properly trained
and led.

In the course of last summer it was proposed

172 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

that the Persian Government should take over this
force to avoid its being disbanded. At one time
they appeared disposed to agree to this, subject
to the dismissal of the British officers, and their
replacement by officers of some small country.
The ostensible reason given was that, were the
British officers retained, Russia would demand the
re-employment of Russian officers in the north —
but it may be suspected that it was only a part
of the general anti-British movement. At the
same time it must be admitted that the mainte-
nance of special corps under officers of different
nationalities is fatal to any attempt to introduce
reform upon uniform lines. The proposed trans-
ference of the corps having finally been refused
by the Persian Government, it is in course of dis-
bandment, if indeed this has not already been
completed. This can only be regarded as a mis-
fortune from every point of view, since the in-
crease of disorder in the south is certain to ensue,
both because of the removal of the only force
capable of maintaining order, and because it is
to be feared that many of the men will have to
have recourse to robbery for a livelihood, alienated
as many of them are from their tribes through
their service in a British force.

A further quasi-military body existed in the
gendarmerie, which, composed of all arms, and
organised upon a military basis by Swedish offi-
cers, is nevertheless concerned mainly with police
duties, and until very recently was responsible to
the Minister of the Interior and not to the Minister
of War. Further, its efficiency had been seriously
affected by the fact that the large majority of the
Swedish officers, having been active in the interests
of Germany, had thought it advisable to make a
hurried departure from Persia upon the failure of
Germany's efforts in Persia.

THE ARMY 173

Thus there were in Persia British-trained troops
in the south, Russian-trained troops in the north,
and Swedish-trained gendarmes scattered through-
out the country, in addition to Swedish-trained
police in the towns of Teheran, Meshed, Kazvin,
and Resht. For the rest, there are native-trained
police and gendarmes throughout the country, who
are under the native governors. All that need be
said of these is that they are as often a source
of danger to the peacably inclined as to evil-
doers.

The Persian War Office is precisely what would
be inferred from the condition of the forces over
which it presides. Like the Ministry of Finance,
its paper constitution is admirable, the duties of
all officials being fully defined. What these consist
of may be gathered from the fact that one of the
duties specially assigned to the Minister is "to
appoint deserving persons to suitable posts."
There the matter may be left.

The Persian arsenal is probably unique, and of
its kind without a compeer. It will be sufficient
to describe the visit paid by the Military Com-
mission which sat under the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment to give a clear idea of the nature of its activi-
ties. The visitors were conducted through long
ranges of empty rooms, where there was no vestige
of either munitions or work. At length they
reached a room which contained promise of better
things in the shape of numbers of large packing-
cases. It was explained that these cases con-
tained machinery, but the hopes of an improved
standard which this occasioned were quickly
damped by the information that, although they
had been there since shortly after the Franco-
Prussian War, no one had hitherto seen fit to
unpack them. Somewhat discouraged, but still
determined, the visitors pursued their investiga-

174 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

tions, and were at length rewarded by reaching a
department where there was every sign of activity.
The answer to an inquiry as to the nature of the
manufactures which called for so much energy was
" Fireworks."

175

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, AND THE
ENZELI LANDING.

THE passes and connecting valleys, which are
to-day traversed by the road from Baghdad to
Kazvin, may justly be considered as constituting
one of the historic routes of the world. The length
from railhead at Qaraitu to Kazvin is three hun-
dred and seventy miles, divided by the towns of
Kermanshah and Hamadan into three sections of
a hundred and ten, a hundred and twenty, and a
hundred and forty miles. One of the three main
passes is situated in each sector — the Aveh Pass
between Kazvin and Hamadan, the Asahabad Pass
between Hamadan and Kermanshah, and the
Takh - i - Girreh Pass between Kermanshah and
Qaraitu. The latter may be regarded as the door-
step of Persia, since, rising over three thousand
feet in a distance of four and a half miles, it carries
the road from the foothills to the plateau. There
are other minor passes, but these three constitute
the serious obstacles of the route.

In all ages this route has been followed by the
nomadic hordes in the course of their migrations
from the plateaux of Central Asia to the fertile
plains of Mesopotamia and the regions of Western
Asia and beyond ; while, conversely, it has fur-
nished access to Persia for the armies of the great
monarchies of Mesopotamia on their invasions of

176 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the east. In former times, as to-day, it consti-
tuted the most convenient route for commerce
between Middle and Hither Asia, and for the con-
stant administrative communication which was
necessary when the countries to the east and west
of the mountains owed allegiance to the same
monarch. It must be kept in view that this has
been the more normal condition, and hence it is
that at different periods the vicinity of the road
has been found suitable for the establishment of
centres of government from which both territories
could be conveniently administered.

At the present time there are, it is true, but few
traces of the glories of the past, but these few are
sufficient to indicate the wealth and power of the
monarchs whose palaces were situated in the
vicinity, and to justify the expectation that were
the excavations undertaken, meantime rendered
impossible by the French monopoly already re-
ferred to, much of interest might be brought to
light.

Within a few miles of railhead the road passes
the ruins of Kasr-i-Shirin, which consist chiefly of
the remains of the city walls, which run for miles
along the road. These are constructed of massive
blocks, a foot square by three or more in length.
The Belgian Customs officer at the frontier post,
who, being of a practical turn of mind, was using
the walls as a quarry, informed me that the founda-
tions were over five metres in depth. At some of
the gateways the pavement is still visible, and, I
understand, more interesting remains may be seen
at more remote points. I had, however, no oppor-
tunity of examining these. The ruins are believed
to be Sassanian, and to take their name from the
queen of one of the later monarchs who reigned
during the early part of the seventh century A.D.

It may be well to mention here that the greater

Pilgrims at Kangavar.

The Citadel, Kasr-i-Shirin.

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 177

part of the monuments of antiquity which have
survived in Persia are associated with one or other
of the two great native dynasties. These were the
Achsemenians, who reigned from the time of Cyrus
the Great until their overthrow by Alexander the
Great, and the Sassanians, who held the throne
from 226 A.D. until the conquest of the country
by the Moslem Arabs in the middle of the seventh
century. The most famous monuments — such as
Persepolis — must be placed to the credit of the
former dynasty, but the latter endeavoured to
emulate wherever possible, and in so far as their
resources permitted, the achievements of their
illustrious predecessors.

On the Takh-i-Girreh Pass is a small chamber
built of massive blocks, the arch from which the
pass takes its name, but I have not heard any
date assigned to this.

Far the finest Sassanian remains in Northern
Persia are found at Takh-i-Bastan, within a few
miles of Kermanshah. Here, on the site of a
former palace, various relics are to be seen, the
most famous of which are two arches cut in the
face of the cliff and covered with carvings, of which
the best record the hunting feats of the sovereign
at whose order they were made.

The Sassanian carvings, however high their
artistic merit, are in inception and situation but
trivial memorials when compared with the famous
carvings and trilingual inscriptions of Darius, the
son of Hystaspes, the Achsemenian. Some twenty
miles to the east of Kermanshah, the valley
through which the road passes narrows sharply,
the ridge which forms the north wall of the valley
terminating in a great spur, about fifteen hundred
feet high, which projects to the south. Since this
approaches close to the river, the road must have
in all ages passed close below its base, and con-

M

178 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

sequently no one travelling towards Persia could
fail to observe any inscriptions upon its face. This
was the spot chosen by the great king to bear the
inscription which should record for future genera-
tions the triumphs of his arms. It is almost im-
possible to conceive of a site better fitted for the
purpose in view.

At a height of between two and three hundred
feet above the road a large space had been smoothed
upon the face of the rock, the cracks being filled
with lead in order to present a smooth surface for
the craftsmen. Here may still be seen the figures
of the king and his attendants, with before him
the rival mpnarchs over whom he triumphed.
Below, a long inscription sets forth in three lan-
guages the victories by which he established him-
self on the throne of his ancestors. The language
of the inscription is upon a par with the site
chosen, and it would be hard to surpass the haughty
tone of the great king's words beginning, " I am
Darius the king, the king of kings, the king of
Persia, the great king of the provinces, the son of
Hystaspes, the grandson of Arsames, the Achse-
menian." Similar titles are used by the Shah at
the present time, but the greatness survives in the
words alone. These inscriptions played an im-
portant part in the decipherment of the cuneiform
inscriptions, and it was not until this had been
accomplished that the monument was assigned to
its true author. Prior to this date the wildest
attributions were made. Even in last century the
captive kings were regarded as the ten tribes of
Israel, while the whole group has been described
as Christ and the Apostles, and one traveller has
even considered that Darius was a portrait of
Esther.

But if the Bisitun inscription of Darius stands
alone in dignity of conception, and is to-day the

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 179

most outstanding memorial of the Achsemenians
in Northern Persia, it, at the time of its execution,
served in addition to warn the traveller that he
was approaching the summer capital of a monarch
whose sway extended from Egypt to the frontiers
of India, and who, with justice, claimed the title
of king of kings — a title which to-day evokes
bathos rather than reverence. A hundred miles
farther east Hamadan is reached, which is gener-
ally believed to have been the Ecbatana of ancient
times. Hitherto, in the absence of serious excava-
tion, nothing has been discovered locally to con-
firm this hypothesis, the only remains which have
been brought to light, or at any rate those which
have been reported, which is by no means the
same thing, consisting of some pillars and a stone
lion. In addition, two stone tablets (as a matter
of fact there are three, although the third is not
inscribed), which Lord Curzon mentions as lying
among the foothills of Mount Elvand, may, I
think, be regarded as among the antiquities of
Hamadan. The place where these are situated is
locally known as Ganjnamah, which may be trans-
lated as " the record of a treasure," from the
belief that they in common with all other cuneiform
inscriptions contain the secret of hidden wealth
could they only be read.

A sharp walk, at times approaching a scramble,
up a narrow valley strewn with large boulders
leads in an hour and three-quarters to the entrance
of a side gorge. Upon most of these boulders were
neat piles of pebbles, which, my guide explained,
it was customary to place there in memory of a
great battle of which the valley had been the
scene. Further inquiry only served to extract the
information that it had all happened very, very
long ago, so that I did not feel that I was much
the wiser for his explanation. A short way from its

180 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

mouth the gorge is almost closed by a rock which
only leaves room for a small stream to pass, and
upon this the inscriptions in question are carved.
The two tablets, which are each about seven feet
by four, are placed side by side, the one being
about a foot lower than the other, and contain an
inscription in three parallel columns, which, Lord
Curzon states, is a narration of the titles of Darius
and his son Xerxes, together with an invocation
to Ormuzd. That there have been at one time
some metal attachments is indicated by six deep
holes which surround each tablet. The third
tablet, which has never been utilised, lies round
the angle of the rock, and is not visible from
below. The inscriptions are as clear-cut as on the
day when they were engraved. I must confess
that to me the most surprising thing about them
was their situation. Just as in the case of the
Bisitun inscription, it is difficult to imagine a site
better suited to ensure the widest publicity for
the fame of the monarch whose deeds are recorded,
so in the present instance it is difficult to under-
stand the motive which led to the choice of this
isolated gorge for such a purpose unless the in-
scription had some local significance. At no time
can the gorge have led anywhere except possibly
to the top of the mountains, and this the time at
my disposal did not enable me to ascertain. It
is, of course, possible that there was a fire altar
upon the summit in Achaemenian times, but I
could hear of nothing except the tomb of a saint.
In all the circumstances the fact that such a site
was chosen may perhaps be regarded as indirect
evidence that Ecbatana was in the near vicinity,
since isolated inscriptions are more likely to be
found close to the capital than in more remote
districts.

Hamadan is also credited with possessing the

•a

o

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 181

tomb of Esther and Mordecai, although if modern
critics are to be believed this must take rank with
that of Juliet at Verona. The building does not,
it is true, differ from any other saint's tomb, and
whatever may be the antiquity of the remains
which they contain, the coffins themselves, judg-
ing from the sharpness of the wood-carving, are
comparatively modern work. The only thing, in-
deed, about the tomb which gives any impression
of age is the door. This, with the accompanying
door-post, consists of a single block of stone, so
corroded with age that it is impossible to say
whether in its original condition it has been carved
or not. The only thing certain is that it is vastly
older than the tomb with which it is now incor-
porated.

At Kangavar, between Kermanshah and Hama-
dan, are the remains of a temple of Anahita. These
consist only of portions of some pillars incor-
porated in a modern building. So far as I am
aware, the remains which I have mentioned are
the only relics of classical times in the immediate
vicinity of the route, although there is every
reason to believe that a serious investigation would
bring others to light ; but when we traversed the
road in May 1920 the circumstances were hardly
conducive to a study of antiquities.

Since the signing of the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment in August 1919, the military situation had
materially altered. The British force had been
withdrawn from the Caucasus, with damaging
results to British prestige. The East Persia force
was engaged in preparations to evacuate Meshed
and Eastern Persia. The Caspian flotilla had been
handed over to General Deniken, and, upon his
defeat, had been interned at Enzeli. There was a
proposal on foot to man it with British ratings,
at any rate partially ; but as these were despatched

182 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

through the Caucasus, it is hardly surprising that
they did not arrive, with the consequence that
the British Navy was represented in Persia by a
commodore minus a fleet. The South Persia Rifles
and the Kazvin force still remained, it is true,
but the departure of the latter was already under
discussion, although not as yet treated very seri-
ously.

The situation in the country between railhead
and Kazvin was somewhat anomalous. The British
force was theoretically operating in the territory
of a friendly Power, but it was difficult for the
passing observer to understand in what way their
position differed from that of an army in occupa-
tion of hostile territory. Garrisons and rest-posts
had been established at regular intervals, the road
was under the care of British officers, and repre-
sentatives of the Provost-Marshal were to be found
at all the chief points, who, according to their own
accounts, exercised considerable control over the
local population. Such conditions were, of course,
essential in the circumstances to ensure the safety
of the force, but it was obvious that the situation
was one which called for the exercise of the greatest
possible tact upon the part of all concerned — and
it must reluctantly be admitted that, although
this was displayed by the great majority, there
were regrettable instances where the reverse was
the case, and that many of the temporary officers
employed could not be regarded as suited in this
respect for their employment.

One instance will serve to illustrate the kind
of conduct which I have in mind. A group of
Persians of the better class was gathered by a
bridge close to the entrance to Hamadan, some on
horseback and some on foot. As we approached
an Air Force tender dashed through, scattering
men and horses in all directions. Later in the rest-

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 183

camp mess we heard the officers concerned dis-
cussing the episode, which they appeared to con-
sider a wholesome lesson to the Persians to get
out of their way. It was upon this occasion that
we began to wonder whether the British were
quite as popular in Persia as we had been led to
understand.

The force at Kazvin was then, in May 1920,
the only body of British troops in Persia so far
as defence against Bolshevist aggression was con-
cerned. It consisted of the Guides cavalry, one
British and three Indian battalions, a field bat-
tery, a mountain battery, three or four aeroplanes,
of by no means the latest type, and corresponding
establishments from other services. When the
troops necessary to maintain the line of com-
munications had been deducted, and allowance
made for weak battalions, I doubt whether the
force ever possessed a fighting strength of two
thousand five hundred even including outlying
detachments, although at least one member of
the Cabinet calculated on a number some hun-
dreds per cent greater. That the position was
thoroughly unsatisfactory was fully appreciated
by the responsible officers upon the spot, and
representations had been made to this effect ;
but, acting apparently upon the principle that no
error can be made if no instructions are given,
those in authority had tactfully avoided giving
any more definite orders than that the force should
act strictly upon the defensive.

The potentialities of the position will be readily
appreciated. While sufficient to hold in check any
minor raids, the numbers available were utterly
insufficient to oppose a serious Bolshevist move-
ment. Under such conditions it is apparent that
circumstances might easily arise which would neces-
sitate a retreat, with disastrous results to British

184 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

military prestige, as actually occurred. Moreover,
the transport was not by any means such as could
be regarded as satisfactory. The drivers were
mostly Indians, and the results of their efforts
were in evidence in the large numbers of damaged
cars — those at Kermanshah alone could be counted
by scores ; while the greater part of the transport
officers were temporary, and many not over-skilled
in either engineering or the language of the men
whom they commanded. Further, in its desire to
placate the skilled trade unions, the Government
had shown such zeal in demobilisation that all
British mechanics having been released, the only
men available to execute repairs were some score
of Russians who had been brought from Baku
shortly before the evacuation. To expect absolute
loyalty from such men in a serious crisis would
have been trying them somewhat high. Thus the
situation generally was full of disquieting possi-
bilities, although it was only on closer acquaint-
ance that we learned of these.

It was under such circumstances that we left
railhead upon the 23rd of May. Everything, how-
ever, was peaceful, so far as country under military
occupation and with an ever-present potentiality
of trouble can be considered so, nor was there any
rumour of disorder. This was a condition which
continued for a very brief period, for that same
evening we were met with alarms of war.

A summer camp for the troops in Mesopotamia
had been established at Kerind, midway between
railhead and Kermanshah, and another, complete
with golf course and every other convenience, a
few miles away for General Headquarters. The
latter was rendered famous, or rather notorious,
by a parody entitled " Half a lak squandered,"
which has since, I understand, been made public
in the pages of ' Truth.' It was at Kerind that we

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 185

spent the night, and there we found the mess full
of rumours that the Bolshevists had occupied
Resht. No one knew exactly what had happened,
but from the fact that the Berkshires and the
Yorks and Lanes were being hurried up to rein-
force the troops at Kazvin, half of each battalion
in motor lorries, it was evident that there was
something in the reports.

At Kermanshah, which we reached the next
evening, the bazar rumours were to the effect
that our troops were back in Resht, and that the
Bolshevist commander had graciously intimated
that he had no desire to fire upon them. Beyond
this, of what had exactly happened nothing was
known, nor were the two half-battalions which
arrived the next evening any better informed.
Indeed, their knowledge of the situation was even
less than ours, for they had been despatched with-
out a single map amongst them, and were con-
sequently somewhat vague as to where they were
going. Fortunately, we were able to remedy this
to the extent of a loan.

During the next two days we learned nothing
further of the situation, and, even at Hamadan,
all the additional information was that General
Champain, who was in command at Kazvin, had
had an interview with the Bolshevist commander.
In contrast to the general tension which was in
the air, the population of the villages along the
road were busy erecting triumphal arches to greet
the Shah, who was due to pass on his return from
Europe within the next few days. The Persian
triumphal arch, although primitive, is by no means
ineffective. A rough framework is erected which
is covered with the carpets and decorated with
the lamps, pictures, and other possessions of the
inhabitants. The result can be quite striking.

It was evident that Hamadan was intended to

186 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

be the British advanced base for the road, and
accommodation between it and Kazvin showed a
marked deterioration, although, from the solid
construction of the rest-houses, it was obvious
that we had entered the former Russian sphere.

It was not until we were within a day's run of
Kazvin that we were able to obtain a definite
statement as to what had actually occurred. We
then met an officer who had been at Enzeli at the
time of the attack, and, although his narrative
was not altogether complete, it was sufficiently
so to give us a clear idea of the position which we
would find. In a country such as Persia, where
the only newspapers which exist are printed in
the native scrip, and where Renter's news is sub-
jected to diplomatic censorship, it is necessary to
rely in the main upon personal narratives in arriv-
ing at a clear understanding of events. Subject
to this qualification, I believe, after frequent con-
versations with those more or less directly con-
cerned, that what follows is a substantially correct
account of what occurred.

Enzeli, which is the chief Persian port upon the
Caspian, lies at the extremity of the eastern of
two narrow peninsulas, which enclose a large salt-
water lagoon, while Resht, then a prosperous town,
is situated slightly to the east of the point where
the peninsula joins the mainland. From Resht
the road runs south, first through jungle, and
afterwards by the pass of Manjil, where it passes
the mountains to Kazvin over a hundred miles
away. Kazvin forms the junction where the road
from Resht to Baghdad crosses that from Teheran
to Tabriz. The British force was based upon
Kazvin, which was the eastern boundary of its
operations, with outlying detachments thrown out
as far as Resht and Enzeli to the north, and to
beyond Zinjan in the direction of Tabriz.

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 187

Such was the situation when, some new 4-inch
and 5-inch guns having been installed at Enzeli,
some senior officers, including, I believe, the general,
went down to see them tested. This took place
upon the 18th of May with satisfactory results,
but upon the morning of the 19th, general disgust
was aroused by the lack of consideration for the
morning slumbers of others displayed by the
gunners, for firing recommenced at a very early
hour. This feeling was not of long duration, for
the arrival of sundry shells soon made it evident
that those who were thus manifesting their activi-
ties must be sought for elsewhere. It was then
discovered that a flotilla was in the offing, and
since the General felt himself debarred by his
orders from replying, a motor boat was sent out
to endeavour to get in touch with the raiders.
This was fired upon, but escaped without being hit.

The position being manifestly untenable, a re-
treat to the mainland was decided upon, and the
small garrison, consisting of about a company of
Gurkhas, began to retire along the peninsula.
Before they reached the mainland, it became clear
that the Bolshevist plans had been well laid, for
they found an enemy force in position across the
peninsula in then* rear, a strong body having been
landed under cover of night. A skirmish ensued
between the Gurkhas and the enemy, which re-
sulted in one being killed upon either side before
orders to parley were issued. The promptitude
with which negotiations were entered upon, coupled
with the reluctance to return the Bolshevist fire,
leave the impression that the orders to avoid
injuring the Bolshevists must have been some-
what stringent, an impression which subsequent
events during the remainder of the Kazvin force's
existence only tended to strengthen. Whether this
was due to a reluctance to incense the Bolshevists

188 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

with whom the Cabinet was coquetting, or whether
it was desired to avoid casualty lists at any costs,
I do not know, but our policy in Mesopotamia
scarcely lends support to the latter motive.

Negotiations were accordingly opened, and a
meeting was arranged between the commanders.
The Bolshevist disclaimed any desire to make war
upon either Britain or Persia, stating that he had
merely come for the fleet and the remains of
General Deniken's army. To the objection that
these were interned in neutral territory, and were
accordingly immune from attack, he replied that
the rules of war did not apply, since there was no
war, the refugees being rebels who had been in-
terned after creating local disturbances. General
Champain refused to surrender the refugees, and
eventually this point was dropped, and after
hostages had been given for the return of the
breech-blocks of the ships' guns, which had been
taken inland, the British troops were permitted
to depart, and retired to Resht, a retreat which
was very shortly afterwards continued to Manjil.

The whole Bolshevist scheme was evidently
carefully thought out, and was perfectly executed.
In addition to the attacking ships and the landing
party, which was very strong, two other forces
were, I was informed, moving from the direction
of Tiflis ; and although I have not obtained con-
firmation of this, I believe it to be correct. Except
for bombarding Enzeli without warning, and for a
reported forced levy, two somewhat serious ex-
ceptions, the Bolshevist behaviour would appear
to have been unexceptionable — a somewhat rare
occurrence.

The whole episode can in its effects only be re-
garded as deplorable. The control of the Caspian
passed to the enemy, almost without a hope of re-
covery, while British military prestige received such

RAILHEAD TO TEHERAN, ETC. 189

a set-back that I do not believe that any Persian
Minister could thereafter have secured the confirma-
tion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. So obvious
was this that no attempt to do so was made, even
by the Ministers who had negotiated it. The details
of the affair give rise to various unpleasant specula-
tions. Why, when what occurred had been fore-
seen, was the British force permitted to remain
in a position which could only lead to disaster,
greater or less ; why was Enzeli, a clearly unten-
able position, occupied ; and why were no prepara-
tions made either to block the entrance to the
harbour or to destroy the ships ? For an answer
to all these questions we must refer to the higher
powers, with whom, in view of the warnings which
they had received, the entire blame must rest.

The remainder of our journey to Teheran proved
somewhat tame after the crisis in which we had
been indirectly involved, the only inconvenience
being occasioned by the necessity of leaving the
road clear for the Shah and his retinue and bag-
gage. One incident may be mentioned, which
served to indicate that we had passed from the
zone of British military discipline to that of a
more primitive regime. We were having tea at a
wayside rest-house, which rejoiced in the title of
the Grand Hotel de France, when a Cossack came
up to the window of the room next to that in which
we were, saluted, and reported to some one within.
Evidently the communication was displeasing to
its recipient, for the door flew open, and a stout
individual shot down the steps and soundly boxed
the ears of the messenger.

190

CHAPTER IX.

TO THE FALL OP MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET.

TEHERAN, the modern capital of Persia, only
attained to its present position with the acces-
sion of the Kajar dynasty in the closing years
of the eighteenth century, prior to which event
it was a place of no importance. It is, it is true,
situated close to the site of the ancient Rei, but
after the final destruction of the latter by Genghiz
Khan early in the thirteenth century, there was
not any place of importance in the neighbourhood.
In the East the national life and traditions do
not centre round one town to the same degree
as in Europe, and a change of dynasty, or at times
of monarch, is not unusually the prelude to a
change of capital, so that at one time or another
most towns of any importance have been tem-
porarily the national centre, to say nothing of
those which are to-day little more than a name.
Much the same condition, I believe, existed in
India. Thus Delhi was at no time the capital
of the whole country. From time to time there
have been several Delhis, and the new capital,
situated some five miles from the city, is a con-
tinuation in name alone, and for a large part
of the population even the name can have no
associations. Thus the creation of the new Delhi
has chiefly resulted in the duplication at enormous
expense of the administrative buildings which

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 191

were already in existence at Calcutta, and in
assuring that the Government, spending part of
the year at Simla and the remainder at Delhi,
will be immune from contact with the outside
world, as represented by the trading community,
and free to evolve its policies without the active
intrusion of unacceptable opinions. Whether this
is desirable is another question.

With the accession of the Kajars, then, the
turn of Teheran to be the national centre arrived.
The choice would appear to have been dictated
partly by the fact that the Kajar strength lay in
the north, and partly by the fact that there also
lay the chief national danger, consisting of the
Russian menace. Apart from the scarcity of
water, the site had much to recommend it. The
town lies at a height of about four thousand feet,
and some nine miles from the foot of the Elburz
Mountains, which, rising at this point to thirteen
thousand feet, and only traversed by a few by
no means easy passes, offer effectual protection
from both hostile movements and wintry breezes
from the north. A subsidiary range of hills run-
ning in a semicircle protects in a lesser degree
towards the east. In addition, the main road
from east to west passes the town.

Although Teheran became the seat of govern-
ment a century and a quarter ago, it was only
during the reign of Nasr-ed-Din Shah that it
attained to any considerable size. He being
desirous of modernising his capital upon European
lines, erected a circumvalation very similar to
that at Paris. It is impossible to beHeve that the
mound and ditch, which extend over eleven miles,
can ever have been seriously intended to serve
any useful purpose, and the whole costly erection
can only be regarded as the outcome of a despot's
whim. The town is exactly what might be ex-

192 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

pected from its history. The older portion is in
the main a typical oriental city of narrow and
tortuous lanes, intersected here and there by
more modern boulevards, while the houses situ-
ated in the new area stand for the most part in
their own grounds. The space within the circum-
valation is moreover greatly in excess of the
population's requirements, and since in addition
there is not sufficient water for the whole area,
there are large stony tracts within the town which
differ in no respect from the surrounding desert.
The prospect of most of these being used for
either building or cultivation is remote. Conse-
quently while the older area is very congested,
the modern has the unfinished aspect which it is
usual to associate with most American towns.

Many of the larger streets are bordered by
trees, but the roads themselves are beyond descrip-
tion to such a degree that speed regulations for
motors are entirely unnecessary. A further trouble
for the unwary is formed by the openings of the
water channels which run under the streets in
places; for, although these are in theory closed,
in practice they are usually open, so that the
streets, being generally unlighted, the wayfarer
may at any moment find himself up to his knees
in a hole, with the chance of a broken leg. When
I add that the authorities do not condescend to
attempt the removal of snow, which lies for
months, it will be appreciated that Teheran cannot
be regarded as an ideal place for the nocturnal
stroller.

Of buildings of any architectural merit the town
is utterly destitute. Such decoration as is at-
tempted upon the more pretentious public build-
ings consists in the main of tile-work, the crude
colours of which instance the appalling degree to
which the art has degenerated. Some of the private

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 193

houses present, it is true, an attractive aspect
when seen amongst their trees, but the construc-
tion is poor, and the chief effects are obtained with
paint, and pillars consisting of plastered posts,
which give a somewhat Italian effect. The Shah's
palace is situated in the centre of the town, with
the principal bazars to the south ; while the
legations, and the quarter frequented by for-
eigners, are hi the extreme north. Owing to the
houses in the outer area being for the most part
surrounded by gardens, the whole city from a
little distance presents the appearance of a wood
rather than a town.

In the beginning of June 1920 the political
situation could not by the wildest stretch of the
imagination be regarded as settled. The Shah
had only returned from Europe upon the 2nd of
June. The Cabinet, which was already tottering
to its fall, after enjoying the sweets of office for
the, in Persia, unpardonably long period of two
years, had received its deathblow from the Enzeli
episode. The Sadr Azam, having no desire in the
circumstances to embark upon an active policy,
was, officially at least, unwell. The Majlis, which
was to confirm the Anglo-Persian Agreement,
showed no signs of meeting, although many de-
puties were already elected and in Teheran. Sir
Percy Cox, the British Minister who had negotiated
the Agreement, was only awaiting the arrival of
his successor, Mr H. C. Norman, to start for Meso-
potamia. Lastly, no one had the slightest idea
what was going to happen.

It is true that the Bolshevists had protested
vehemently that they had no intention of inter-
fering in Persia, but no one had any particular
faith in Bolshevist promises, which is hardly to
be wondered at, and a movement in the direction
of Teheran was always possible. Under the cir-

„ N

194 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

cumstances it was scarcely surprising that rumour
was busy, and in the matter of rumours Teheran
is fully qualified to h&d its own with any town
upon the face of the globe. Were it not that a
very brief experience proves that Teheran rumours
are even more groundless than those of other
places, and that only one in hundreds materialises,
Teheran would be the reverse of a soothing abode.
As it is, save for those who are naturally timid,
the reports of coups d'etat, revolutions, and other
convulsions serve in some degree to take the place
of the daily press.

At the time the most popular report was that
the Russian officers who were with the Cossack
Division contemplated a coup d'etat. Exactly
what they expected to gain thereby was not
entirely a point of agreement, but the most general
belief was that they would endeavour to make
their peace with the Bolshevists by handing over
the capital to them. Needless to say, nothing
of the kind was ever attempted, nor do I believe
that it was ever considered. Others were of opinion
that an arrangement might be come to between
Colonel Storroselski, the Cossack commander, and
Kuchek 4^5arf. The latter, taking advantage of
the Bolshevist landing, had declared an inde-
pendent republic in Ghilan; but when, after a
brush with a detachment of Cossacks a few days
later, he returned his prisoners naked, this theory
lost its popularity. Another rumour, which at
this time gained considerable credence in the
bazars, serves to show what incredible reports
find acceptance amongst the Teheranis, it being
reported that at a reception immediately after his
arrival, Mr Norman had made a speech in which
he explained that his predecessor had been sent
home in disgrace. The fact that Sir Percy Cox
had just been appointed High Commissioner for

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 195

Mesopotamia did not appear to offer any diffi-
culty to the rumour-mongers.

The political situation came to a head upon
the 24th, when it was announced that the Sadr
Azam's resignation had been accepted by the
Shah* His demission of office was immediately
followed by his hurried departure for Baghdad
en route for Europe. The new Sadr Azam, whose
appointment was not announced until ten days
later, was Mushir-ed-Douleh, a moderate poli-
tician of great wealth, with a reputation for
honesty, and for not having made any serious
mistakes during his political career. As his avoid-
ance of error was commonly attributed to the fact
that he invariably resigned whenever faced with
a situation which called for a serious decision, it
may be doubted whether this was as great a
recommendation as appeared at first sight. It
must be confessed that the circumstances under
which he vacated office three months later were
such as to support this opinion.

The new Council was very much what might
be expected under the circumstances. The policy
announced included the holding of new elections,
on the ground that those recently held had been
conducted in a corrupt manner, and the con-
sideration of the Anglo-Persian Agreement by the
newly-elected Majlis. Meantime the Agreement
was to be regarded as being in suspense, and all
advisers appointed thereunder were to be sus-
pended from the exercise of their functions. I
must admit that, like many others, I never attached
the smallest value to the Government's profes-
sions of a desire to bring the matter to a head.
If indeed such intentions were ever entertained,
nothing whatever was done to give effect to
them. The Cossacks were sent against the Bol-
shevists in Ghilan, a reform in the opium ad-

196 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ministration was given effect to on the advice
of the Financial Adviser, and a new road was, I
believe, made to the Sadr Azam's country resi-
dence ; but I cannot recollect any other action
upon the Government's part which calls for
mention.

The Government's career may not unfairly be
described as an exhibition of how to mark time
and avoid decisions. That a group so devoid of
initiative should have been in control at this
time was little short of calamitous for the country.
The subsidies which the British Government still
continued to pay were finally to terminate three
months later ; while, although the date of evacua-
tion had not been definitely announced, it had
been made clear that the Kazvin force would be
withdrawn in the not distant future. In these
circumstances it was vital that both the reform
of the financial system and the reorganisation of
the army should be actively proceeded with.
The Council, however, resolutely refused to face
the situation, or to make any serious attempt to
put Persia into a position either to defend or
finance herself. If the truth were known, I sus-
pect that it would be revealed that the Council
were so obsessed with the belief that Persia was
of importance to Britain, that they considered
that all the warnings which they received that
both troops and money would be withdrawn were
merely part of a scheme to compel them to pro-
ceed with the confirmation of the Agreement,
and that, when they realised that this was not
the case, and that the warnings were seriously
meant, it was too late to make the necessary
Deforms effective in the time available.
y Upon the 7th of July an additional cause of
excitement for the panic-mongers was provided
by the report that the Bolshevist troops were

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 197

moving along the coast, while at the same time
reports of trouble upon the railway in Mesopo-
tamia arrived, this being the beginning of the
outbreak which was shortly to close the most
direct road to the outer world for several months.
The conduct of a body of gendarmerie which had
come in contact withl Bolshevists near Balfrash
had also been such that jt was evident that no
reliance could be placed upon this corps should
a situation arise which necessitated serious fighting.
By the middle of the month the situation had
so far developed that Colonel Storroselski had
been appointed commander - in - chief, and was
actively preparing to move against the Bolshe-
vists. It required no great foresight to realise
that were he to be successful he would for all
practical purposes be dictator, since the only
troops worth the name were under his orders
—a situation which developed under the Sirdar
Sipah a year later. It was also becoming evident
that the Government were anxious, so far as they
dared, to dispense with British assistance. The
treatment meted out to British officers was in
at least one case such as could only be construed
as being due to a desire to induce them to resign,
while I do not think that it is too much to say
that had money been obtainable from other sources
the financial mission would have had but a brief
life. In addition, the anti-British feeling was
being activelyTiostered by certain Legations. For
some reason which it is difficult to fathom, it was
the policy of France, or at least of certain French
diplomatic officials, to do all within their power
to render England's position as difficult as pos-
sible. Since French interests in the country are
almost entirely confined to her archaeological in-
terests and the protection of certain professors
and doctors, it is difficult to understand the motives

198 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

which actuated such a policy. As to the activity of
the propaganda there could be no question, even
French Freemasonry being dragged into service.

In the end of July an episode occurred which did
more than any foreign intrigue could possibly
achieve to injure the British position, and which,
indeed, according to my Persian friends, had an
even more disastrous effect than the Enzeli episode
upon British prestige amongst their countrymen.
On the 28th news arrived that the Bolshevists had
begun to shell Manjil, and that it would in all
probability be found necessary to evacuate the
position, since the orders under which the British
troops were operating seemed to preclude the
clearing of the hills, which was essential if the
position was to be maintained. Seeing that the
Manjil position was the last before the open plain,
the possibilities which such a retirement opened
up were sufficient to impart a certain excitement
to the position, since, were the Bolshevists con-
templating a serious advance, the difficulty of
offering a successful opposition was very greatly
increased.

From the personal point of view an additional
uncertainty was caused by the fact that, when
the news arrived, we were in the act of starting
on a fortnight's shooting and fishing expedition
in the mountains, so that we departed knowing
that, if we got any news during the ensuing period,
it would in all probability consist of an imperative
recall to take part in the evacuation of Teheran.
Actually it was not until ten days later that we
learned that the contemplated retirement had
been found necessary, and that the British troops
had had to abandon the key position.

The incident, although the fact was not ascer-
tained until long afterwards, furnished an interest-
ing, although disastrous, example of the mis-

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 199

understandings which may arise in mountain
warfare when accurate observation is impossible;
for, had a counter-attack been possible, it would
have been found that the evacuation was abso-
lutely unnecessary, the enemy having assumed
the initiative in retreat. What actually happened
was that the Bolshevists had got a gun into a
position from which it was possible to shell the
British lines, and had begun to do so. It was
this which had led to the retirement. Before
this actually occurred one of the British guns,
in endeavouring to return the enemy's fire, had,
although it was impossible at the time to discover
the fact, dropped a shell close to the enemy gun,
and they, alarmed by this, had immediately
retired. Thus the danger had ceased to exist
before the retreat took place, and had an advance
instead been undertaken, it would in all pro-
bability have been unopposed.

The position in Mesopotamia had now become
very bad, and the inevitable consequences of en-
deavouring to hold the country with an utterly
inadequate garrison were being reaped. The posi-
tion was, however, at last being faced by the
Government, and large reinforcements were being
despatched from India, so that, provided the posi-
tion could be maintained until their arrival, im-
provement was to be looked for. The situation
was bad enough as it was. At the beginning a
majority of the political officers throughout the
country had been killed, while serious military
set-backs had been experienced. One battalion
had been virtually annihilated, and several posts
were besieged by the enemy, and in a very critical
position.

The position of the British troops in Persia was
not one which could be contemplated with equan-
imity in the event of a further set-back in Meso-

200 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

potamia. Already the railway had been cut, and
railhead isolated from Baghdad for a fortnight,
and were such a position to develop again for any
time, the Kazvin force might well find itself de-
prived of supplies in the face of hostile forces.
For the individual the worst to be anticipated was
a somewhat uncomfortable journey to Isfahan,
where the South Persian Rifles would be met, but
for the troops a retreat under such circumstances
could be little less than a disaster.

In Persia the position was assuming one of these
quasi-farcical phases from which it there seems
impossible to escape for any lengthy period. The
Bolshevists were in the vicinity of Resht and some
distance south upon the Kazvin road, but what
they consisted of was by no means clear. While
ever ready to reap any advantages gained by their
troops in Persia, they were equally ready to soothe
the feelings of the British Cabinet by repudiating
these same troops when their actions gave rise to
possible difficulties in trade negotiations. Upon
such occasions the Bolshevists in Persia were repre-\
sented as being subjects of the Republic of Azer- }
baijan, or independent adventurers ; and, although
it is difficult to think that any one really believed
that the Moscow Government was unable to control /
them, the explanation was sufficient to salve Mr
Lloyd George's conscience to the degree of allow-
ing him to continue his flirtations with Lenin.
Thus it was impossible at any given time to say
whether the Bolshevists based on Enzeli were sup-
posed to be Soviet troops or otherwise. In the
jungle, between Resht and Manjil, Kuchek Khan
was established, but his position was equally un-
certain, for, although in favour of a republic, he
was even more emphatically against any foreign
mterferenceJnJEersia. ^Tojine south of Manjil lay
the ^British troops, debarred from an offensive, but

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 201

prepared to offer resistance to any active Bol-
shevist aggression.

A new element was now introduced into this
situation, for Colonel Storroselski, having disposed
of the hostile forces in Mazanderan, moved to
Kazvin, preparatory to an advance against Resht.
For the next two months the state of affairs was
for the most part a struggle between the Bolshevist
elements and the Cossacks, the British holding
the ring, and acting as a rallying base for the
Cossacks, when, after their meteoric advances,
they executed even more meteoric retirements.
The latter, although disadvantageous, had at least
the advantage of diminishing in some degree the
unfavourable criticism of the British, which had
grown rapidly after the first Cossack successes.

The initial Cossack successes were rapid in the
extreme. By the 24th of August it was announced
that they had reoccupied Resht and were moving
on Enzeli ; but the reaction was even speedier, for,
four days later, word arrived that they had sus-
tained a serious repulse, and were in full retreat,
with a loss of seven hundred casualties. What
had happened was exactly what might have been
expected in view of the tactics employed, and
evinced an utter lack of grasp of the elementary
principles which underlie sea power. After occupy-
ing Resht, the Cossacks had advanced upon Enzeli,
which, as has already been mentioned, lies at the
end of a narrow peninsula. The enemy fleet from
the sea, and their gunboats from the lagoon,
opened a flanking artillery fire, with the result
that a precipitate flight immediately ensued. This
continued until the protection of the British lines
was reached, the casualties being in the first in-
stance placed at the number of those who had
failed to reach that haven. Subsequent returns
reduced the original seven hundred to a tenth,

202 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

and even less. One officer, who, having been the
reverse of backward in the retreat, and was as a
result threatened with a court-martial, was re-
ported to have urged as a defence that no troops
could be expected to stand in the face of artillery
fire. I do not think that that court-martial ever
took place, but it would have been interesting to
learn the court's views on the question.

To turn for a moment from the military side of
the situation, the dismissal of General Westdahl,
the Swedish chief of police, which took place at
this time, furnished a typical instance of official
methods. The new Government, burning to pay
off old scores, dismissed two police officers, who,
under the former Government, had been respon-
sible for the arrest of some of its partisans, and
did not trouble to intimate the dismissal to the
commanding officer. The General's retort was
prompt, consisting in a curt intimation that the
officers had been reinstated. The result was his
own dismissal, to which he replied that since he
held his commission from the Shah and the Majlis,
the Minister was powerless to dismiss him. Too
late the latter realised his false step, and the con-
sequence was that, until the fall of the Govern-
ment, Teheran was diverted by the spectacle of
a high official leading a peaceful life in mufti,
while the Minister sought for a course which would
both save his face and adequately compensate the
insulted General.

The British missions meantime were in a state
of suspended animation. The majority of the
military officers had left the country, and when it
became evident that this state of affairs must
continue for several months to come, the Financial
Adviser was despatched on a mission to London
with his secretary, while two other members of
the mission departed on leave, I being left with

_

I

&

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 203

the four remaining members in case any unex-
pected developments should occur. The two ad-
visers to the Ministry of Public Works also re-
mained. As events turned out, we who stayed
had much the most interesting experience, since
the only genuine desire for reform was evinced
by the Government of Seyd Zia, which fell imme-
diately after the return of the Financial Adviser.

By the latter half of September the situation
had so far improved that the road to Baghdad
was open, while the Cossacks were back in Resht.

In the beginning of October General Ironside
took over the command at Kazvin from General
Champain, while the force was at the same time
strengthened by the arrival of four badly-wanted
modern aeroplanes. The position in Mesopotamia
had now greatly improved with the increase of
the army to four divisions. Samawa and Kufa
had been relieved, and Kerbala had surrendered.

In the end of the month the question of the
employment of Russian officers with the Cossack
Division was brought to a head by their sudden
evacuation of Resht, scarcely a shot being fired.
General Ironside immediately proceeded to Tehe-
ran, and, since time did not permit of a reference
to the Foreign Office, a demand for the dismissal
of the Russians was made by the British Minister
upon the Sadr Azam. The latter proved true to
his reputation, and rather than face the decision,
which involved the question of the employment
of British officers, promptly resigned. The Shah,
however, agreed to the supercession of the Rus-
sians.

In view of the above, the following question and
answer (recorded in Hansard 1920, Vol. 134, p.
1519) are of interest as illustrating the Govern-
ment's dislike for a straightforward reply : —

" Mr Waterston asked the Under-Secretary for

RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

'oreign Affairs whether the recent Government
Crisis in Persia arose as a result of the British
Minister's intervention on questions connected
with the Persian Army."

/ Mr Harmsworth : " The recent Cabinet crisis in
Persia arose from the unwillingness of the former
Persian Cabinet to carry out the decision of the
Shah to dismiss the Russian officers in command
of the Persian Cossack Division."

If the above implies anything, it is that the ac-
tion of the British Minister had nothing to do with
the Cabinet's resignation, whereas it was the real
cause. Could implicatio falsi be carried further ?

The matter did not altogether terminate here,
for there was very considerable panic as a result
of the Cossack retreat, while it was still an open
question whether the Russians might not give
trouble. The extremists freely circulated a report
that the Cossack retreat was the result of a British
trick. On the 29th Colonel Storroselski returned
to Teheran. Some hundreds of Cossacks endeav-
oured to do likewise, but were rounded up by
General Ironside, with the Guides and an armoured
car. The next two days were by no means devoid
of excitement, for rumours were freely circulated
that the Russian officers intended to resist their
dismissal. On the 30th Colonel Storroselski had
an audience with the Shah, the new Sadr Azam,
the Siphadar Azam, being also present, and re-
ceived his dismissal. The same day he left for
Kazvin, but the next morning the Sadr Azam was
informed that he had doubled back during the
night and was in one of the barracks. This report
proved to be groundless, and the only further event
of interest was the anti-British demonstration, of
which I have spoken in connection with bast, and
the most remarkable feature of which was that
no attempt was made to interfere with the British.

MUSHIR-ED-DOULEH'S CABINET 205

So ended, after half a century, the Russian con-
nection with the Cossack Division, and it is a
somewhat curious coincidence that at the same
time the British subsidy for iu. support was ter-
minated. It is true that this had been decided
upoiT prior to the dismissal of the Russians, but
it was hoped that in the changed circumstances
under which British officers were very closely
associated with the control of the division, some
extension at least might have been granted. This
was not, however, the view of the Foreign Office,
which, if well-informed reports are to be credited,
was not best pleased at what had occurred. Ac-
cording to these it would be exaggeration to say
that Lord Curzon's first replies to the report of
what had happened damned with faint praise.
Whether this was due to fear of the possible con-
sequences, whether resentment was felt at the
men on the spot acting upon their own initiative
in an emergency, or whether the dismissal of the
Russians was displeasing to those in authority, it
is impossible to say. Whatever the cause of its
displeasure, the Cabinet did not hesitate to publicly
approve once it was clear that no untoward con-
sequences would follow.

(

\ 206

CHAPTER X.

SIPHADAE- AZAM'S CABINETS.

IN certain respects the Council which was formed
by the Siphadar followed the policy of their pre-
decessors, particularly in their refusal to consider
the Agreement as operative, pending its considera-
tion by the Majlis, and to utilise the services of
the advisers and their staffs pending such considera-
tion. Their policy differed from that of Mushir-
ed-Douleh in so far that attempts were made to
assemble a Majlis and bring the matter to an issue.
At the same time, they appear to have cherished
the belief that at the last moment the British
Government would relent, if not on the question
of continuing the subsidy, at any rate on that of
allowing the troops to remain at Kazvin beyond
the early spring, which was now fixed for their
departure.

At the very outset the Siphadar nearly resigned
upon the refusal of the Foreign Office to continue
the subsidy for a further period, but was persuaded
to remain in office. His period of office was far
from being a peaceful one, for, particularly towards
the end of the four months during which he re-
tained power, reconstructions of the Council were
frequently either occurring or imminent. As a
large landlord in Ghilan he was very vitally con-
cerned with the doings of the Bolshevists in that
province, and although not in every respect an

SIPHADAR AZAM'S CABINETS 207

ideal Sadr Azam, he was a man who was popular
and generally respected. The worst that I ever
heard said of him was that he paid himself while
in office the somewhat excessive allowance of three
thousand tomans a month as a refugee, in addition
to his official salaries, for he held two portfolios,
being Minister of the Interior as well as President of
the Council. The opinion generally held of him
cannot be better illustrated than by the fact that,
when after his Government had been overthrown,
and a general arrest of those suspected of pecula-
tion was being effected, he was given full assurances
of immunity if he left his refuge in the British
Legation. To avoid misapprehension, it may be
well to mention that he was not the same Siphadar
who has already been referred to as having been
commander-in-chief alternately on both sides dur-
ing, and after, the siege of Tabriz.

The position of the Kazvin force had consider-
ably improved at this time, General Ironside hav-
ing asked for and obtained a free hand in dealing
with the Bolshevists. It was not long before the
results of this policy showed how ill-advised had
been the previous attitude of pacivity. As early
as the end of October a reconnoitring party of the
126th Infantry had a brush with the enemy, in
which, with a loss of two wounded, they inflicted
over forty casualties upon their opponents, and
very shortly the chief difficulty with which our
troops had to contend was to find the enemy.
Before the end of the month the advance which
General Ironside had undertaken had so far pro-
gressed that his advanced guards were approach-
ing Resht, and upon the 1st of November the news
arrived that the town had been captured by an
isolated party of Cossacks, in conjunction with
some of Kuchek Khan's Jangalis.

Although the question of replacing the Russians

208 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

with British officers was still unsettled, some
British officers were now attached to the Cossack
Division in an undefined capacity, and the division
was acting in close conjunction with the British
troops under General Ironside's direction. On the
18th, in connection with an attempted offensive,
three aeroplanes bombed Enzeli, obtaining direct
hits upon stores. The offensive itself came to
nothing, since the enemy could not be found. No
attempt was made to occupy Enzeli itself, since,
so long as the enemy retained control of the sea.
the position must have been untenable. A

The feeling against the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment was meantime on the increase, and in the
beginning of the month a deputation of merchants
had had an audience from the Shah, at which they
submitted representations against its ratification.

At the end of November the Siphadar made an
attempt to deal with the situation, and, in the
absence of a quorum necessary for the opening of
the Majlis, an assembly of Ministers, ex-Ministers,
and deputies was convened to consider the ques-
tion of ratification. They, however, declined to
commit themselves, and the only decision arrived
at was to hurry on the assembly of the Majlis.
The decision may in some degree have been in-
fluenced by the report that most favourable peace
terms had been offered by the Bolshevists, and, in
view of the approaching British evacuation, it was
not to be expected that any expression of opinion
likely to incense the Moscow Government should
have been risked. An additional deterrent was a
terrorist committee which had been formed by
the anti-British extremists. Whether anything
would have been gained had the Majlis been in-
duced to assemble at this time is very doubtful,
since, as one official in close touch with the situa-
tion told me, the deputies would in all probability

SIPHADAR AZAM'S CABINETS 209

decline to accept the onus of dealing with the situa-
tion, and would take the line that the matter was
one for the decision of the Council.

The situation now took a marked turn for the
worse. A reorganisation of the Council had been
mooted, under which Seyd Zia-ed-Din and others
of the younger group of politicians would take
office, but they had been sufficiently alive to the
dangers of the situation to decline to join the
Government unless there was a reasonable chance
of saving the situation. For this they considered
that a force of not less than fifteen thousand men
was necessary, and that to enable this to be ade-
quately equipped, and other necessary expenditure
to be met, a loan of two and a half million tomans
was essential. The Foreign Office was now ex-
periencing a change of heart in the matter of
expenditure, and while it had been ready enough
to subsidise troops controlled by foreign officers,
declined to consider the matter favourably when
there was a prospect of British officers occupying
a similar position. The proposed reconstruction
accordingly fell through, and, in the absence of
new blood, the Council continued to follow its
laissez-faire policy, and to trust that something
might happen to prevent the Bolshevist invasion,
which all anticipated upon the departure of the
British troops.

By the beginning of January it had become
evident that nothing was to be hoped from the
Government in the way of the organisation of a
force to replace the British upon their departure,
without assistance from the British Government,
and that the latter was determined not to render
any help. It was now generally known that the
evacuation would take place so soon as the con-
dition of the passes permitted, and active prepara-
tions for a fighting retreat were under way, the

o

210 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

troops having been told off for their respective
duties. The probability that the enemy would
follow up the retirement was increased by the fact
that the strength and quality of the opposition
in the direction of Resht was steadily increasing,
two additional brigades having recently arrived
from Azerbaijan.

To the Shah the position appeared so serious
that he proposed to leave the country, unless the
seat of Government was immediately transferred
to Shiraz. As a result of the representations which
were made by deputations, he was ultimately
induced to reconsider his attitude, and consented
to remain, for the time being at any rate.

Such being the situation, it became essential
that arrangements should be made for the evacua-
tion of the European colony, but this was not
altogether easy since certain Legations insisted on
considering the Foreign Office's action in advising
evacuation as a British device to secure the re-
moval of rivals. Instructions were, however, re-
ceived that all British women and children, and
also all dispensable men, should be evacuated at
the earliest possible date. A meeting of the heads
of the principal British undertakings in Teheran
was accordingly convened at the Legation upon
the 6th of January, at which this decision was
intimated. It was somewhat surprising to discover
upon this occasion that the decision had not been
anticipated by all present. The results of the
meeting were, however, immediately manifested,
for the principal commercial firm dismissed its
European employees forthwith.

The report of the contemplated evacuation
tended both to increase the general feeling of ner-
vousness, and to add to the unpopularity of the
British. The latter was considerably increased by
the policy, or lack thereof, adopted by the Imperial

SIPHADAR AZAM'S CABINETS 211

Bank of Persia at this time. Upon one day cheques
were only received to such an extent as was neces-
sary to liquidate overdrafts, while upon another
no difficulty was made in crediting customers'
accounts ; silver was taken at the bank to-day,
while to-morrow notes only were received, and to
such an extent was this carried that notes actually
commanded a premium of about 3 per cent over
coin. I cannot recollect a case of this occurring
elsewhere. In addition, the sale of European
credits was severely restricted in the case of Euro-
peans, while they were absolutely refused to Per-
sians. That, in the circumstances, the utmost
caution should be observed in this respect was only
natural, but the discrimination which was observed
against the inhabitants of the country cannot be
regarded as being in the bank's own interests, un-
less it contemplated abandoning its concession
and evacuating the country bag and baggage. So
far was this discrimination carried that even small
remittances were refused to those who had de-
pendants in Europe.

There was an incentive to this policy apart from
the general situation, for the native press had been
making violent attacks upon the bank officials,
accusing them of manipulating the exchange to
the disadvantage of the Persians. So far as I
was able to observe, the sole result was to foster
a wish for a rival institution, and, should such be
established at a future date, it should prove a
very formidable competitor, since it will be assured
of very general support, which even the monopoly
of note issue enjoyed by the present institution
may not be sufficient to counterbalance.

Although full preparations had been made to
feed and house the refugees during the contem-
plated evacuation, a serious hitch now occurred
over the question of finance, for a number of

212 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

British subjects were not in a position to meet
the very considerable expenses of the journey.
The matter was referred to the Foreign Office,
with a request that the expenses of those who
were not in a position to pay should be met by
the British Government. This only produced a
reply to the effect that payment might be made
upon arrival, which was not particularly help-
ful to people who found themselves deprived of
their means of livelihood, and without resources.
Whether this attitude would have been modified
at the last moment it is impossible to say, for as
it turned out, the contemplated evacuation never
took place. Indeed, the ladies evinced the utmost
reluctance to leave, some flatly refusing to do so.
In the end, I do not think that more than three or
four British were evacuated.

Meanwhile the Government was having a some-
what difficult time, for, in addition to the troubles,
actual and prospective, which have been men-
tioned, the negotiations with the Bolshevists were
by no means going smoothly, opposition being ex-
perienced from a section of the mullahs. Matters
came to a head on the 19th, when the Siphadar
resigned. An interval of four days ensued, during
which various political leaders were approached
with a view to forming a Government, but in the
circumstances none of these were prepared to
undertake the task, and in the end the Siphadar
agreed to resume office and reconstruct his
Cabinet.

The position upon Persia's western frontier was
very uncertain, and it was most difficult to obtain
accurate information. Regarding Mesopotamia,
there was strong ground for believing that the
British Government were contemplating the evacu-
ation of the whole country, with the exception of
the Basra hinterland, although in the end this

SIPHADAR AZAM'S CABINETS 213

benefit was denied to the taxpayer. In the Cau-
casus the Shahseven tribe were reported to have
occupied Lencoran, and to be moving upon Baku,
while anti-Bolshevist risings were understood to
have occurred at numerous points. The ninth
and tenth Bolshevist armies were also stated to
have been moved to the Polish front, but there
was reason to believe that the greater number had
returned to their homes.

This was all to the good, in that there was less
prospect of Bolshevist aggression if they were
occupied elsewhere ; but it was counterbalanced
by the fact that, after a successful outpost affair
in Ghilan at the end of January, in which our
troops, without sustaining any casualties, inflicted
twenty-one casualties and captured twenty-nine
prisoners out of a total enemy strength of sixty-
five, it was discovered that the prisoners were
Russians. It was also believed that fighting had
occurred between the Bolshevists and Turks, while
the revival of religion in Russia was reported to
be making rapid strides. It was difficult to know
what value to attach to these various reports, for
it was practically impossible in most cases to obtain
either confirmation or the reverse.

The chief events during the earlier part of
February were the formation of successive Govern-
ments by the Siphadar, and their prompt resigna-
tions. The new Cabinet had taken office upon the
3rd of February, but since it wished to drop the
Agreement, and refused to convene the Majlis,
it proved unacceptable to the Shah, and upon the
6th it resigned. The following day the Siphadar
undertook to carry on with his old Cabinet, but
two days later he again resigned. The same day
a manifesto signed by forty deputies was issued
against the Agreement. After this the Siphadar
gave up his efforts for a time, but by the 16th he

214 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

had again formed a Government. This was not
expected to last long, and upon the evening of
the 20th of February the situation could not be
described as anything but desperate were it not
that in Persia the unexpected always happens.

215

CHAPTER XL
THE COUP D'ETAT.

ON the morning of the 21st of February my
awakening was of a somewhat unduly exciting
nature. I was roused at a very early hour by an
extremely agitated servant, who, having gained
possession of my automatic, was gesticulating with
a tremulous hand in which the weapon was clutched
in an endeavour to attract my attention. Now
it is one thing to have a loaded pistol in one's
room, and quite another to find the muzzle thereof
in a line with one's head, especially when in the
possession of an individual as to whose knowledge
of firearms you have no assurance. In such cir-
cumstances I must confess that the one thing
which occurred to me was the desirability of
separating servant and pistol at the earliest pos-
sible moment, regardless of the cause of their
conjunction. This having been accomplished with-
out damage to either of us, I endeavoured to
ascertain the cause of my retainer's alarm. My
knowledge of Persian being distinctly limited, and
the servant's speech never over clear, the task
proved by no means easy, and I did not succeed
in getting beyond the fact that, on account of
something which had frightened him, he wished
to take the pistol to his room, which was beside
the front door and across the courtyard. I could
at the moment think of nothing more alarming

216 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

than an attempted burglary, and as it was now
daylight, and the servant's physique would not
have disgraced a prize-fighter, I saw no reason
for entrusting him with firearms. Accordingly,
having ordered him out, I returned to my inter-
rupted slumbers. When I next awoke all was
quiet — in fact, the general silence was that of a
Scottish Sabbath. But this was nothing particu-
larly surprising in the locality, and I thought no
more of the matter until in the middle of the
morning one of my assistants arrived to report
that a revolution had taken place during the
night. The unexpected had happened with a
vengeance.

Coups d'etat are not such common events that
it is possible to regard with equanimity the fact
that one has slept through one, particularly when
artillery fire has occurred within a mile. My first
feeling was accordingly one of regret that I had
not shown greater interest in the ferash's alarm ;
but, as all was now over, there was nothing to be
done. I found out subsequently that I had been
by no means alone in missing the excitements of
the night. The only facts which were clear at
the moment were that a body of Cossacks had
marched in from Kazvin late the previous evening,
and were now in possession of the town, and that
Seyd Zia, who was mentioned in the preceding
chapter, was at the head of the movement.

Seyd Zia-ed-Din el-Tabatabai is a somewhat
remarkable individual. At the period when he
became, for a time, the actual ruler of Persia,
he was in the early thirties ; a slender man of
medium height, with a pale and rather narrow face,
good features, and a black pointed beard. His
expression had about it much of the mystic and
dreamer, but he had in addition a very practical
side to his character. On account of his descent,

THE COUP D'ETAT

217

he always wore the ecclesiastical turban, which
in Persia serves to distinguish the religious from
the layman, who wears a kola. Although he had
upon one occasion headed a mission to Baku, it
was chiefly as a writer that he was an influence in
politics, since, in addition to being the owner of
the ' Radd,' after the semi-official ' Iran ' the prin-
cipal newspaper in Teheran, he was reputed to be
the best writer of modern prose.

His worst qualities were probably his obstinacy,
and, I believe, an over- valuation of his own know-
ledge, to both of which I can speak from experi-
ence during his period of office. In that they led
him to ignore the opinions of others, and show
little regard for their wishes, these contributed in
no small degree to his fall. In fairness it must
be remembered that his Government was very
much a one man affair, and that, had he possessed
a competent and informed body of assistants,
many of the errors which he committed might have
been avoided. As it was, he lacked an intimate
with the necessary knowledge and experience to
supply the complement to his own defects. His
right-hand man was an Armenian named Epekian,
the editor of the ' Radd,' who, although always
intensely busy, never seemed to bring anything to
a conclusion.

Personally I never knew Seyd Zia intimately,
although we had been members of the same camp-
ing party the previous summer. Our official rela-
tions, which invariably consisted in my throwing
cold water upon his projects, did not conduce to
a closer acquaintance. Generally, in appearance,
manner, and expression he gave me a curious feel-
ing that he might well have served as a model for
a black-haired Christ.

To dogmatise regarding the origin of move-
ments such as the one under discussion is always

218 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

difficult, and this particular plot, which resulted
in making a poetically-inclined newspaper owner
the virtual ruler of Persia for three months, like
others of its kind, appears to have originated by
chance rather than design. One thing, I believe,
may be affirmed with absolute certainty — namely,
that the movement was not engineered either by
or with the knowledge of the British Legation.
Such a statement may appear to be superfluous,
but since, after the fall of Seyd Zia, a declaration
was published by Prince Firouz and his anti-
British associates in which it was definitely as-
serted that the coup was organised by the British
Minister, a passing notice would not appear to
be altogether out of place, although the jaundiced
spite and lack of veracity of this group hardly
merit attention. It is somewhat ironical that a
few months before Prince Firouz had been feted
in London, and that he was considered as so
devoted to British interests that a G.C.M.G. had
been conferred upon him. A short period of im-
prisonment, for which he chose to consider the
British responsible, had, however, been sufficient
to convert him into a violent Anglophobe, and to
drive him into an unnatural alliance with the
Bolshevist Minister. From that time he became
the leader of the anti-British party in Persia, his
chief incentive for adopting this attitude being,
it was believed, a desire to dissociate himself from
the policy of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, now
that Britain was no longer willing to play the part
of milch-cow. In spite of his Anglophobia, it may
be observed that his sons are being educated at
a leading public school in England.

To return to the genesis of the coup d'etat,
this, so far as I have been able to ascertain, was
the result of the conjunction of two separate move-
ments. Seyd Zia had beyond question been for

THE COUP D'ETAT

219

some considerable time of the opinion that the
only hope for the country lay in some such action,
since it appeared to be certain that nothing was
to be hoped from the regular political hacks who
succeeded each other in office. This opinion natu-
rally led to the consideration of whether he and
his friends could not undertake the necessary
effort. The great difficulty in adopting such a
course was the absence of an instrument suffici-
ently powerful for the purpose in view, since the
average Persian is notoriously averse to violence.
He was driven, accordingly, to consider whether a
sufficient body of men could be recruited amongst
the Armenian and Caucasian inhabitants of the
capital, but, so far as I am aware, no action in
this direction had been undertaken when proposals
were received from another group.

Since the dismissal of the Russian officers, the
main body of the Cossack Division had been located
in the vicinity of Kazvin. This was under the
command of Persian officers, but certain British
officers, who had during the previous year been
engaged by the Persian Government to organise
a gendarmerie in Azerbaijan (a project which
political developments had rendered impossible of
fulfilment), had been attached to the division in a
quasi-advisory capacity. This had been arranged at
the time when, after the departure of the Russians,
the British commander had, on account of the
Government's neglect, been obliged to look after
the feeding and clothing of the men. It was the
presence of these officers which furnished the
ground for the accusation just mentioned, that
the British Minister was privy to the plot.

When it became clear that the departure of the
British troops was imminent, and that the Govern-
ment did not propose to make any effort to oppose
a Bolshevist advance, the officers of the division

220 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

met to consider the position of themselves and the
men under their charge. It was agreed that if no
resistance was to be offered to an invasion, the
only course was to allow the men to disperse and
return to their homes. To some of the bolder
spirits this appeared to be a somewhat ignominious
course, since they felt that the division repre-
sented the only hope of Persia. Foremost amongst
these were two young gendarmerie officers, Masud
Khan, afterwards Minister for War, and Kasim
Khan, who became Military Governor of Teheran.
They had both been trained in Europe, and at
the time were serving upon the staff of the divi-
sion. The latter in particular struck me as being
possessed of much greater hardihood and resolu-
tion than the average Persian officer.

Since the departure of the Russians, a con-
siderable change had taken place in the moral of
the division. Formerly the Persian officers had
occupied positions which, in the case of the seniors,
were little better than sinecures, the practical
command being in the hands of the Russian officers
and N.C.O.'s. When left to themselves, there
seems to have been a genuine effort towards im-
provement, so far as lay in their power. In these
circumstances the bolder spirits succeeded in secur-
ing the acceptance of the policy which they advo-
cated, the support of the men being secured by
the representation that the Shah was in urgent
need of their help.

The next point was to secure a civilian to act
as head of the Government, once they had brought
their schemes to a successful conclusion and secured
control of the Government. Seyd Zia's name was
mooted, presumably brought forward by Kasim
Khan, who had served under him on his mission
to Baku, and it was decided to approach him with
a view to concerting a course of action. He having

THE COUP D'ETAT

221

consented to join his fortunes with those of the
Cossacks, it became necessary to decide imme-
diately upon a plan, since the time available before
the departure of the British was becoming very
brief, and here fortune favoured the conspirators.

It was customary for a portion of the Cossack
Division to be stationed at Teheran, and in Feb-
ruary 1921 a detachment about seven hundred
strong was in quarters there. The effect of town
life upon their discipline, never of the best, had
been somewhat unfortunate, and it was decided
that the detachment in question should be replaced
by a new contingent, drawn from the main body
of the division. What finally brought the matter
to a head was the action of an officer, who, having
been refused the appointment of staff officer to
the commander, for which he had asked, showed
his resentment by a personal assault upon his
chief. Orders were accordingly issued for a con-
tingent to proceed from Kazvin to Teheran, and,
upon the receipt of these, the conspirators deter-
mined to avail themselves of the opportunity to
move a much larger force to the capital. It was
decided to divide the available troops into two
bodies, one of which should march to Teheran,
while the other was held in readiness to support
it should occasion arise. At the last moment a
hitch occurred, for the Council changed its plans,
so far as it can be considered to have had any,
and cancelled the proposed move. Then — and here
we meet with a fact which has never been ex-
plained— a telegram was received ordering the new
detachment to proceed as originally proposed. The
authorship of the telegram has never been ad-
mitted, but the promptitude with which it was
Dieted upon furnishes a clue to the source from
which it emanated.

The force which had been detailed to march

222 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

upon Teheran, and which totalled about two
thousand five hundred of all arms, moved off at
once. This force had been placed under the com-
mand of Raza Khan, one of the senior officers of
the Division. In spite of great educational limita-
tions, he was a man of very considerable military
ability, as he subsequently proved, while in appear-
ance and manner he possessed all the qualities
calculated to win the confidence of the men under
his command. He also possessed a considerable
aptitude for intrigue, which had been proved some
years before, when, after the revolution in Russia,
the officers of the Division had removed Colonel
Clerge, the then commander. The initiative and
organisation of the plot had rested with the Rus-
sian officers under Colonel Storroselski, but to
Raza Khan had been entrusted the task of win-
ning over the Persian officers, and he it was who
at the crisis had marched the troops from their
billets to the Cossack Headquarters.

Since that time he had exercised a very great
influence in the Division, although by no means
the senior officer, and when the conspirators looked
round for a man to lead the striking force, his
record clearly indicated him for the task.

In Teheran meantime everything favoured the
plotters, for the state of the public moral had
reached a very low ebb, while the Government
was virtually in a state of anarchy, the Siphadar's
Cabinets following one another with lightning-like
rapidity. Masud Khan had proceeded to Teheran
to be with Seyd Zia at the critical moment. So
far as I am aware, these two and Epekian, his
Armenian editor, were the only persons in Teheran
who were in the plot, and it says much for their
courage that during these days the two journalists
quietly continued to pursue their literary avoca-
tions, and that at the very moment when the march

THE COUP D'ETAT 223

upon Teheran began, the future Sadr Azam was
reading modern poetry to a circle of British inti-
mates.

The Council would appear to have remained in
a state of absolute ignorance of the contemplated
coup until the 19th, when, the news having been
received that a considerable body of Cossacks was
marching upon the capital, Sirdar Homayoun, the
commander of the Division, was despatched to
order them to return to Kazvin, the Government
having in the circumstances no wish for large
bodies of troops in the city. The Sirdar encoun-
tered the advance-guard some twenty-five miles
to the west of Teheran, where the road crosses
the gorge of the river Keridj, and having issued
his orders, proceeded to the village beyond the
bridge to pass the night. During the night he
was awakened by the sound of men and guns
moving in the direction of Teheran, and realised
that his orders were being set at defiance. Appre-
ciating that he was helpless, he remained in his
billet till daylight, when, the last of the troops
having departed, he had his car dragged down the
river to a point where it was fordable, and drove
back to Teheran by a road which runs farther to
the south.

To fully appreciate the state of panic into which
the Shah and the Ministers were thrown by his
news, it is necessary to remember that the only
fact which was known was that Cossacks were
marching upon the city in defiance of the Govern-
ment's express orders, but as to their intentions
nothing was known, and the chance that they
might contemplate action in favour of the Bol-
shevists was always possible. It was this lack of
information which led to the subsequent bloodshed,
such as it was. One of the Ministers was imme-
diately deputed to meet the insurgents and ascer-

224 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

tain their intentions. He was accompanied by
the Shah's secretary and two members of the staff
of the British Legation — the latter, I assume, on
account of the fact that the British troops were
the only force fit to deal with the Cossacks were
any violence proposed towards Europeans. The
party found the Cossack headquarters at a village
some dozen miles outside the town. Here Seyd
Zia appeared for the first time, having doffed the
ecclesiastical turban in favour of the civil kola,
thus symbolising his intention of undertaking civil
office.

The delegates were well received, Seyd Zia tak-
ing the leading part, and explaining the objects of
the movement. Shortly stated, these amounted to
an intention to remove from power those who,
declining to consider the national interests, were
engaged upon securing personal advantage alone.
The Cossacks' position was that, after the removal
of the Russian officers, they might have starved,
so far as the Government was concerned, and would
have done so had not the British intervened and
undertaken the care of the men. They also stated
that, having first-hand knowledge of the Bol-
shevists and of what their rule really implied, they
had come to dissipate any delusions which the
people of Teheran might entertain upon this point.
The Cossacks' loyalty to the Shah and their friend-
ship for the British were emphasised. Every at-
tention was shown to the delegates, but they were
informed that it was necessary that they should
remain until the advance had reached the city.

I may here say that the conduct of the troops,
both while on the march and after they had occu-
pied Teheran, was most orderly in every respect,
whilst almost surprising consideration was shown
for Europeans. For example, the advance-guard
when some miles from Teheran encountered a party

THE COUP D'ETAT 225

of Europeans upon a motor excursion, but instead of
detaining them, merely asked them to give their
word of honour not to mention what they had
seen until the next day. One is inclined to doubt
whether in Europe those engaged upon a similar
enterprise would display the same consideration
for persons who were in a position to furnish the
threatened authorities with information regarding
their movements.

Meantime in Teheran the Government were
occupied with such measures of defence as lay
within their power. The Central Brigade, with
such of its guns as worked, and could be moved,
was ordered to oppose the Cossacks at the Kazvin
Gate, by which they were expected to enter the
town, and a Swedish Colonel of Gendarmerie was
ordered to take over the command. He did indeed
succeed in reaching the gate, but by the time of
his arrival his command had ceased to exist, for,
upon the appearance of the Cossack advance-guard,
the defending troops had gone over to them in a
body.

The first act of the troops was to send detach-
ments to the ten principal police offices of the city
and arrest the police. At the headquarters alone
was any resistance offered, and here occurred the
only bloodshed of the night. The whole thing
was indeed due to a misunderstanding, partly on
account of a lack of definite orders, and partly
owing to the absence of any clear information as
to the intentions of the Cossacks. As a result two
policemen were killed, and three and one Cossack *
wounded. The Swedish Major in command had a
narrow escape — one room was wrecked by a shell,
and in his enthusiasm one hero discharged the
time-gun. That was all, and the fighting was over
in ten minutes. An agreement was then come
to with the Swedish General in command of the

226 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

police, to the effect that he undertook to apply
to the Shah on the following morning for permis-
sion to co-operate with the Cossacks, and mean-
time gave his parole not to interfere with the
actions of the new regime. Very early next morn-
ing he obtained an audience with the Shah, whom
he found ready for flight. He was, however,
induced to reconsider his decision, and also to
grant the desired authority, and from that moment
the police co-operated with the Cossacks, and the
most absolute order was maintained. The only
occasion thereafter when I heard firing was when
some Europeans were sufficiently ill-advised to
ignore an order to halt. Fortunately for them the
marksmanship of the patrol left much to be desired.
By the following morning perfect quiet reigned
throughout the town. All vehicles had disap-
peared from the streets, having, as possible means
of escape, been impounded pending the contem-
plated arrests. All persons were forbidden to leave
the town, and strong guards were posted at the
gates, at various points throughout the town, and
also at the Legations. The object of the latter
was to check any attempts to take bast upon the
part of those whose arrest might be intended. In
the main they were successful, although certain
persons succeeded in reaching the American Lega-
tion, while the Siphadar walked unobserved into
the British. He was not, as it happened, included
in the list of persons who were wanted by the new
Government either because they were dangerous
or because they were believed to have robbed the
country to an undue extent ; and, the new Govern-
ment having guaranteed his immunity from arrest,
he was induced to leave his refuge during the course
of the day. From the beginning the streets had
been patrolled by groups of Cossacks, and as the
day wore on these were reinforced by police and

THE COUP D'ETAT 227

gendarmes, for example is infectious, and the sight
of the Cossack bayonets inspired all those who
were possessed of these impressive instruments to
produce them. Thus by the afternoon Teheran
looked exactly what it was, a town in military
occupation.

During the two following days large numbers of
arrests were effected, the new authorities showing
themselves sufficiently catholic in their tastes to
include amongst those whom they placed under
lock and key both members of the old princely
regime and Bolshevist agitators. Amongst the
former the Firman Firma and Prince Firouz were
conspicuous. A certain piquancy indeed attached
to the arrest of the latter by the fact that he had
only returned from Europe a few days before,
and that there is the very strongest reason to
believe that, when passing through Kermanshah,
he had plotted a coup of his own with his former
colleague, Sarem-ed-Douleh, who was then gover-
nor of that town. Their scheme was that Firouz
should proceed to Teheran, and, if he considered
the time ripe for overthrowing the Government,
should summon his fellow-plotter, who, on the
plea of a visit to the dentist, should thereupon
leave his post and proceed to the capital. Unfor-
tunately for them the plans of the rival plotters
were somewhat more advanced, with the con-
sequence that, instead of dictator, Firouz found
himself in jail. The general public, apart from
those who fell under the suspicion of the new
authorities, was but little inconvenienced by the
change of rulers, the only interference with the
ordinary routine of life, after the first few days,
being the establishment of an eight o'clock curfew.
But, provided that the main thoroughfares were
avoided, it was fairly safe to anticipate that one
would not be molested, and personally I never

228 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

experienced any difficulty in going where I
wished.

It had originally been intended to deal with
those of the prisoners who belonged to the former
governing class by way of an inquiry, in order to
ascertain the extent of their defalcations; but it
very quickly became evident that such an inquiry
might, in some cases at least, result in revelations
which, if made public, would cause a public outcry
which could only be satisfied by bringing the
prisoners before a court-martial. As many of those
under arrest were proteges of the British Govern-
ment, which had already begun to interfere on
their behalf, this would have brought about an
awkward situation for the new Government, which
was strongly Anglophile. Thus, as a result of its
lurid past, the Foreign Office was at the very
beginning thrown into a position of potential
opposition to the only government in Persia which
showed a desire for genuine reform, and whose
success must have been of the greatest benefit to
Britain.

In these circumstances it was decided not to
bring the prisoners to trial, but to demand from
each a sum which was believed to correspond to
the amount of his defalcations. Since the relation
of the prisoners to the British Legation precluded
the resort to extreme measures in the case of those
who proved recalcitrant, it will be readily under-
stood that the Government success in making them
disgorge was but small, although at times it was
believed that large sums were almost within their
jp. Upon one such occasion information was
dd that six chests of money and jewels belonging
to the Firman Firma were hidden in the house of
a relation. These were immediately seized, and
a son of the Firman Firma who was not under
arrest was summoned to be present when they

THE COUP D'ETAT 229

were opened. His feelings must have been some-
what unenviable, since, being unaware of the
contents of the chests, they might for all he knew
contain a considerable portion of the family wealth.
When the first was opened, a layer of sacking
was revealed. As this was followed by others, the
excitement increased with their number. Finally
the last was removed, only to reveal old account-
books and nothing else. The contents of the other
chests were similar, and it is hardly surprising that
it was much more difficult to ascertain the final
denoument than the earlier stages of the episode.

Both from the point of view of the new Govern-
ment, and in the interests of genuine reform in
Persia, it must be regarded as regrettable that
some of the worst cases were not brought to trial,
and, in the event of the charges being brought
home, dealt with so drastically as to form a whole-
some deterrent to future would-be embezzlers. So
long as those who exploit the State for their own
benefit can rely upon foreign protection in the
event of their being brought to book, it is hopeless
to expect that any genuine attempt at reform will
meet with success. Personally, I am inclined to
go further, and to believe that until the present
class of politicians is absolutely rooted out, there
is little hope of improvement in the standard of
Persian national morality. Violence in politics is
at all times to be deprecated, but there are occa-
sions, as in pre-revolutionary France, when a
privileged and self-seeking class is so firmly en-
trenched that there is no other way of dislodging
them in the national interest, and of such would
appear to be the present condition of Persia.

Considering that they were not prepared to
proceed to extremes in the face of the British
Legation's protests, the policy of arrests followed
by the reformers, or at any rate the indefinite

230 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

detention in prison of those arrested, must be
regarded as a cardinal error of policy. The only
result of following this course was to secure for
the new regime the inveterate hostility of the most
powerful men in the country, and to assure their
active opposition so soon as they secured their
liberty. The choice was certainly a difficult one,
but unless prepared to proceed to extremes, it
would probably have been wiser to avoid a policy
of wholesale incarceration, while, if this was con-
sidered essential, it would assuredly have been
wiser to remove the prisoners to some distant
place of detention instead of keeping them in and
about the capital, where they formed a centre of
intrigue.

231

CHAPTER XII.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN.

WITHIN a week of the coup a new Cabinet was
formed, with Seyd Zia as Sadr Azam. The remain-
ing Ministers included two senior officials of the
Ministry of Finance, Mirza Eissa Khan and Mudir-
el-Mulk, who were appointed Minister of Finance
and Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively, both
somewhat contrary to their own wishes, I suspect ;
Major Masud Khan, who became Minister for
War ; Movaquar-ed-Douleh, an elderly ex-governor
of Bushire, to whom was assigned the portfolio
of Public Works, and who died in harness ; and
certain other individuals without experience of
administration. Of the Cabinet as a whole, it
can only be said that it was unfortunate that its
experience and knowledge did not equal its zeal
and good intentions. At the same time, Raza
Khan was appointed commander-in-chief, with
the title of Sirdar Sipah, and Kasim Khan became
Military Governor of Teheran.

From the beginning the Government contained
elements of weakness which ultimately led to its
fall. It consisted, with the exception of the two
ex-officials, entirely of amateurs, with the conse-
quence that it was peculiarly liable to commit
errors in administration. This liability was in-
creased, both by the fact that the Ministries had
all been closed pending their reorganisation, and

232 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

that from the start the new Government was,
upon the civil side, a one-man affair. Nothing
was too small for the Prime Minister's attention.
On military tactics, financial problems, and social
and official reform alike he held decided views,
and his opinion once formed, it was difficult in
the extreme to induce him to reconsider his atti-
tude. His religious upbringing also had its in-
fluence, and was probably responsible for many
items in his programme of proposed reforms.
Had he had the benefit of strong and well-informed
assistance, the ultimate fate of the new Govern-
ment might have been very different. As it was,
he had a free hand in civil affairs, and although
differences of opinion soon developed between the
civil and military sides of the Government, the
Sirdar Sipah at first concerned himself only with
military matters. In addition, the new Council
had to reckon from the start with the hostility
of the Shah, and although this was at first passive,
he only awaited the beginning of disputes amongst
the reformers to take an active part in affairs.
His hostility was only increased by the somewhat
domineering attitude adopted towards him by the
Sadr Azam, and which was bitterly resented upon
his part. A suspicion also arose, based upon the
fact that, while reducing the Shah's civil list,
the Sadr Azam increased that of the Valiahd,
that he contemplated the dethronement of the
Shah in favour of his brother. This I believe to be
incorrect, since, so far from endeavouring to pre-
judice the Shah with his people, he insisted upon
his showing himself more frequently in public
than had been his practice, and although this
caused His Majesty no small perturbation, it
undoubtedly added to his popularity.

At the same time that the formation of the
Council was announced, a proclamation was issued

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 233

outlining their policy. The chief points of this
were the denunciation of the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment, which, as I have endeavoured to show, was
already dead for all practical purposes, and only
existed as a ground for suspicion against Britain ;
the increase of the Army ; and the distribution of
the Crown lands amongst the peasants. Various
measures of social reform were also included.
Of the proposed reforms it may be said that they
showed the same characteristics as the others
which followed them during the next three months.
Courage and honesty of purpose were never lack-
ing, but experience was, and consequently reforms
were announced, and entered upon, without any
appreciation of the difficulties involved, and these,
as experience showed, were in some cases wellnigh
insurmountable.

Although it was proposed to denounce the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, the Council's policy closely
approached that defined in the Agreement. It
will be remembered that the four main points
of the Agreement, apart from a loan, were the
revision of the Customs tariff, the loan by the
British Government of military and financial
advisers, and assistance in railway construction.
The Customs revision had already been carried
through and put into operation ; the financial
mission already existed, and although the adviser
himself was absent, those of his staff who were
in Persia were already functioning, while applica-
tion was now made for military advisers ; lastly,
the Council were entirely in favour of railway
development. It was, it is true, proposed to offer
adviserships in other departments to America,
France, and Belgium, but with British Missions
in the Ministries of War and Finance the avowed
aim of the Agreement would have been achieved.
In fact, Seyd Zia was freely accused of putting

234 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

the Agreement into operation while nominally
denouncing it. This point did not appear to*
have occurred to the British Government, or if
it did, it by no means suited their policy that the
Agreement should be revived, for the reception
of the new Government's advances evinced both
a sulky and a vacillating attitude.

In connection with the increase of the Army,
which if carried out along sound lines had much
to commend it, it was proposed to employ British
officers as instructors, and to endeavour to pur-
chase British munitions, particularly from the
Kazvin Force, whose departure was imminent.
Application was accordingly made to the Foreign
Office for the loan of officers and an opportunity
to purchase the munitions. The reply was clear
beyond question, and unfriendly to a degree.
So far as possible all munitions would be removed,
and the remainder would be destroyed, while no
officers could be lent. Fortunately, before the
Council could apply to another nation for assist-
ance, some one in Whitehall must have changed
his mind, for a second message was received to
the effect that no action should be taken upon
the first. This was followed by a third, in which
the sale of munitions was agreed to, and also,
upon certain conditions which had always been
contemplated by the Persian Government, the
loan of the officers desired.

Whether the episode was the result of a moment
of pique upon the part of the Foreign Secretary
at the denunciation of the Agreement, followed
by speedy reconsideration ; whether the War Office
was responsible for the first cable, and the Foreign
Office for the later ones; or whether the first
represented Lord Curzon's policy and the others
that of the Cabinet, will probably never be known.
Fortunately, Seyd Zia had a sense of humour,

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 235

but the incident did not add to the prestige of the
British Foreign Office. The eventual outcome of
this negotiation was that a considerable quantity
of stores was taken over, but as this was done
without any conditions as to payment or the
engagement of British officers, the latter were
never really effectively employed. A very few
were, it is true, attached for a short time to the
Cossack Division, but their contracts were ter-
minated shortly after the fall of Seyd Zia's Council.
The opposition to the employment of British
officers was partly due to jealousy of outside
interference on the part of the Sirdar Sipah, and
partly to opposition to the proposal amongst the
officers of the Division. These, since the dismissal
of the Russian officers, had enjoyed a new inde-
pendence, and had no desire to come again under
foreign control. According to a Persian friend,
the Cossacks, when they heard of the coming
of a new foreign mission, their experience being
confined to Russian methods, could only conceive
of the British acting as the Russians had done.
They also believed that the former, being more
intelligent, would be more difficult to deal with,
and would never relax their grip. The men, who
were for the most part volunteers, began to desert,
and in the circumstances the officers, or a great
proportion of them, met and swore on the Koran
never to serve under British officers. Thus in
the end the only result of the proposed army
reform was an increase, very largely on paper,
in the numbers of the Cossack Division. The
Sirdar Sipah claimed that they were increased
to thirty thousand, but it is very doubtful whether
during Seyd Zia's regime they ever numbered
more than twelve thousand, while, on account
of disease, three-quarters of these might be ruled
out so far as serious fighting was concerned.

236 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Further, such trifles as first and second-line trans-
port and medical services were disregarded, and
no attempt was made to improve the otryad
organisation, the defects of which have been
already referred to. Verily the fallacy of numbers
would appear to have survived the days of Xerxes.

The proposal to distribute the Crown lands
amongst the peasants was admirable in prin-
ciple, in so far as it proposed to establish a class
of peasant proprietors, and to improve the lot
of the peasantry, but the problems involved were, if
not insoluble, at any rate of such a nature as only
to be satisfactorily solved after long and expert
study. Consequently the proclamation of the
Government's intention, before full consideration
of the difficulties, or the evolution of a definite
plan, only served to raise hopes which must be
doomed to disappointment.

To show the complexity of the question, it
will be sufficient to indicate only a few of the
difficulties involved. In some areas the peasantry
are in excess of the land available for distribution,
while in others the reverse is the case. In the
former circumstances the distribution was certain
to cause discontent amongst those who did not
share in the apportionment, while in the latter
it was essential to induce immigration from out-
side districts, were the output to be maintained
at the former standard. Again, many of the
Crown lands had been admittedly given to favour-
ites of former sovereigns, or had been illegally
encroached upon by local magnates, but not
infrequently they had subsequently changed hands
for a full price, and were in the possession of
bona fide purchasers, whose ejection could only
be regarded as the grossest injustice.

Further, the financial aspect of the problem
was one which presented many complications.

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 237

Were taxation to be continued upon the ceded
lands at the same rate as previously, the gift
would be without advantage to the recipients,
while, upon the other hand, the state could not
afford the loss of revenue which would ensue
were the donated lands to be placed upon the
same basis for taxation as lands which had pre-
viously been in private ownership. The establish-
ment of the new proprietors upon a sound financial
basis was one which did not present an obvious
solution. The state was in no condition to under-
take fresh financial obligations, being reduced
to a hand-to-mouth existence, based mainly on
loans. Apart altogether from the ordinary ex-
penses of maintenance, there was the problem
of the kanats, which, upon occasion, call for
the expenditure of large sums, and these must
be immediately forthcoming if the irrigation of
the land is to be continued. There were other
difficulties involved, such as the incidence of the
military tax, and the question as to whether
land which had been alienated and allowed to go
out of cultivation had reverted to the Crown ;
but the above furnish a sufficient idea of the
problems which drove the officials faced with
their solution to such a degree of desperation as
to declare them to be insoluble without the aid
of outside experts. The Government proposed
to employ American agricultural experts — a de-
cision which, whatever its political advantages,
can scarcely be regarded as the best possible,
considering how diametrically the small irrigated
cultivation of Persia differs from the mass pro-
duction of the United States, and how Americans
must perforce be without experience of the financial
problems involved.

The light-hearted way in which the agricultural
problem was entered upon was typical of the

238 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

manner in which reform was undertaken in all
directions. In my own sphere three examples will
suffice. I was one morning summoned to the
Ministry of Finance to be informed that the
Prime Minister had decided to issue twenty millions
of Treasury Notes, and was requested to make
the necessary arrangements for giving effect to
this decision. An inquiry into the nature of the
cover which it was intended to provide for the
contemplated issue elicited the fact that this
aspect of the question had not occurred to the
Council, and it was not without the utmost diffi-
culty that they were brought to realise that they
could not with impunity set the printing press
in motion at will.

Upon another occasion I was asked whether
there was any objection to the bank increasing
its note issue. I replied that I saw no reason
against this, but that the advantage to the Govern-
ment of such a procedure did not seem obvious,
since they had announced their intention of dis-
pensing with foreign loans. The reply was to the
effect that the new notes might be handed over
to the Treasury, and a suggestion that this was the
same thing as a loan, since the bank must, under
the terms of its concession, provide cover for all
additional notes issued, was disposed of with a
statement that this was really quite unnecessary,
since all the notes in the country would certainly
not be presented at the same moment. This
scheme was also abandoned.

After this the Prime Minister took matters
into his own hands, and announced that he had
solved the financial difficulty. On inquiring the
nature of his proposed remedy, I was informed
that he intended to melt down a large number
of old brass guns which were in the town, and
convert them into a brass coinage to rank pari

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 239

passu with the silver issue. My objections, based
upon such grounds as Gresham's Law, were
brushed aside with the reply that a Turk had
done the same a century before, and that there was
consequently no reason why he should not follow
a similar course of action. In the end I induced
him to suspend action pending the arrival of the
Financial Adviser, but I felt certain that he re-
garded my arguments and objections as frivolous
and beside the point. I was not again called
into consultation.

Meanwhile no time had been lost in initiating
the consideration of administrative reform, and
two days after the coup I had been requested to
take part in the proposed reform of the Civil
Service. The proposed reforms certainly showed
no lack of courage. Shortly put, the proposals
of Seyd Zia were to throw the whole Civil Service
into the melting-pot, reduce staffs largely, and
cut in half the salaries of such officials as sur-
vived the purge. Pending a decision, all Govern-
ment offices were closed, a proceeding which did
not appear to interfere with the national life to
any appreciable degree.

The reform of the Ministry of Finance was first
undertaken. A somewhat amorphous committee,
consisting of various Persian officials, the Belgian
Director-General of Customs, and myself, without
a chairman to keep the discussion to the point
under consideration, sat and discussed anything
and everything which occurred to those present,
whether it had any direct bearing upon the sub-
ject which we were supposed to be considering or
not. The commissioners could not be accused
of any lack of zeal, for their sittings frequently
lasted from early morning till late in the evening.
I must confess that personally I abandoned these
gatherings after a very few experiments, and

240 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

contented myself with bombarding the commis-
sion with memoranda the gist of which was that
their proposals were fundamentally unsound and
should be suppressed. Truth to tell, I do not
believe that much attention was paid to my re-
presentations, or to the schemes for a Civil Service,
national audit, &c., which were from time to time
demanded.

I imagine that much the same might be said
about most of the schemes which were evolved
at this time. For instance, a pet hobby of the
Prime Minister's was a municipality for Teheran
upon modern lines, and a commission was estab-
lished to evolve a scheme. It succeeded in produc-
ing a plan for a town council, which, if I remember
rightly, was to consist of two hundred members,
chiefly, I believe, because one of the members of
the commission who had once been in London
believed this to be the number of the London
County Council. A budget was also prepared,
the chief features of which were that the taxes
proposed were mainly the most economically un-
sound imaginable, and that, so far as I could
ascertain, they were unlikely to produce much in
excess of half the amount budgeted for. The lead-
ing spirit in this affair was the ex-editor Epekian.
There were also other Armenians upon this com-
mission, and their conduct formed an interesting
indication of what might be expected from them
when in authority, and as to the cause of their
unpopularity. All spoke Persian fluently, but upon
every possible occasion the conversation was car-
ried on in Armenian to the exclusion of their
Persian colleagues. The luckless Epekian was
indeed before the end equally unpopular with
Persians and Armenians, for later the task of
seizing the stocks of wines and spirits upon which
many of his compatriots relied for a living was

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 241

deputed to him, with the result that he very
narrowly escaped being mobbed.

Prohibition of alcohol was one of the first
measures of the new Council, but this must have
proceeded rather from policy than conviction,
since the Seyd and several members of his Council
were by no means averse to the pleasures of the
table. The report, however, that opium also had
been prohibited, and that the entire staff of
the opium office, some four hundred strong, had
been dismissed, was incorrect. A pious aspira-
tion was indeed expressed that, at some future time,
such prohibition might become possible, but for
the moment financial considerations were para-
mount, and the revenue derived from opium was
essential. As to the four hundred, they were, it
is true, dismissed, but so far from being the en-
tire staff of the office, they only represented the
unnecessary surplus, which should never have
been there, and had only obtained their positions
through influence.

Prohibition, then, had its origin partly in the
fear that if they had access to unlimited supplies
of liquor the Cossacks might get out of hand,
and partly in the fact that wine is prohibited by
the Koran, and must, in my opinion, be regarded
as part of an attempt to foster a national and
religious sentiment as a counterblast to Bolshevism.
This would explain several measures which in
themselves were trivial, and which at first sight
appeared only calculated to irritate and incon-
venience one class or another of the population.
Persian women were, or were about to be, for-
bidden to take service in European households ;
Persian subjects were compelled to take down all
notices and advertisements over their shops which
were not written in Persian ; all shops, whether
owned by Persians or Christians, were ordered to

Q

242 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

close on holidays — a large portion of the year ;
and preference in the public services was given to
married men. This last caused an undue amount
of alarm, for it was at first reported that in future
a prerequisite to employment in the service of the
Government was to be the possession of at least
three wives.

Externally the policy of the Government aimed
at being on friendly terms with all nations, and
tied to none. With respect to advisers, an attempt
was made to return to the policy beloved of Per-
sian and Turk, of employing nationals of different
countries in different branches of the Government
service. The object of this policy is to play off
one nation against another, so that unpalatable
measures may be avoided by the opposition of
one nation to that which is acceptable to another.
It was proposed to retain the British advisers in
the Ministry of Finance, and to obtain others for
the Army. The Swedes were to remain in charge
of the police and gendarmerie, the Belgians in
control of the customs and posts, and the French
at the Ministry of Justice. In addition, America
was to be asked to supply agricultural experts ;
and Belgium, engineers. Except for the employ-
ment of some British officers who were no sooner
engaged than they were dismissed, nothing came
of these proposals.

The new Government was generally well re-
ceived throughout the country, the only province
where there was any opposition being Fars, but
this did not lead to open violence and was presently
overcome. The nationalists of Tabriz found them-
selves in a somewhat difficult position, for, while
the new regime stood for everything which their
programme represented, the fact that it was on
terms of close friendship with the British was in
their eyes an objection of the first magnitude. In

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 243

two other provinces, Khorasan and Kermanshah,
it was considered necessary to arrest the governors.
In the former case the measure was in the main
precautionary, since the governor, Qavam-es-Sal-
teneh, who was the next Prime Minister, was
suspected of plotting against the Government.
The arrest was entrusted to Colonel Mahomed Taki
Khan, the chief of the Khorasan Gendarmerie,
and was cleverly effected, the entire Government
being gathered in as they returned from an even-
ing drive without any bloodshed being necessary.
This arrest was the cause of subsequent difficulties
after Qavam-es-Salteneh had succeeded to office,
for Mahomed Taki Khan, not unwisely perhaps,
being apprehensive of vengeance, declined to ac-
knowledge the new Government, with the con-
sequence that hostilities became necessary. In
the second case the governor concerned was Sarem-
ed-Douleh, a man of much sterner stuff, and, the
arrest not being over-well arranged, was only
carried out after some sharp fighting, in which
fifteen persons were killed. In this case, as has
been already mentioned, the Government had good
grounds for regarding Sarem-ed-Douleh with sus-
picion, despite his professions of loyalty.

The financial situation, always critical, threat-
ened at the outset to become desperate for the new
administration through the action of the bank,
which proposed to terminate the working arrange-
ment which had existed with previous Govern-
ments, and to confiscate the Government credits
in London against overdrafts in Teheran, which
were regulated by a standing arrangement. Al-
though this was, strictly speaking, justified in the
interests of the shareholders, if the situation was
regarded as so desperate that there was a chance
that it would be necessary to evacuate the country
and cease to carry on business, it, like similar

244 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

outbreaks of caution upon other occasions, was
unfortunate, in that it gave rise to an impression
that the policy was dictated by partiality, and also
fostered the feeling that, in the interests of Persia,
a competing institution should, if possible, be
encouraged. Moreover, it was not altogether clear
what benefit would accrue to the shareholders by
driving a desperate Government to extremes when
so large an amount of the bank's assets was at the
mercy of that Government.

The difficulties of the Government were greatly
increased by the imminence of the departure of
the British troops, since, were the Bolshevists con-
templating a serious attack, there was not time
to organise an adequate force to deal with the
situation. Personal appeals from the Shah and
the Prime Minister that the evacuation might be
delayed until the autumn met with a flat refusal
from London, and it became clear that Persia
must stand or fall by her own efforts. The posi-
tion was complicated by the uncertainty which
existed as to what was occurring in Georgia and
Armenia. On the one hand, Tiflis was reported
to have fallen, but on the other it was believed
that the anti-Bolshevist forces were making head
in Armenia, and a warning had been received that
in the event of the Bolshevist forces being driven
out of Armenia, they would in all probability retire
upon Tabriz. The forces locally available in such
an event had been weakened by a disastrous in-
cursion which the local commander had, against
advice, made into the Kurdish mountains. Thus
the available troops might be required either in
the vicinity of Resht or in the extreme north-
west ; while, to send an adequate force to either
place must deprive the Government of much of
the military support to which it owed its being.
The uncertainty as to the Bolshevist intentions

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 245

was heightened by the interception of a telegram
from the Azerbaijan commander at Enzeli to Tiflis,
in which it was stated that his men's discipline was
bad, that he could not send them to the front,
and that with them an offensive was impossible.
While this was highly satisfactory as to the quality
of the opposition which was to be anticipated,
everything so far as regarded the enemy's plans
depended upon whether the information was vol-
unteered or whether it was sent in reply to an
inquiry, since, in the latter contingency, an offen-
sive might be anticipated.

The most critical position was that in the direc-
tion of Resht, and it accordingly became necessary
to run risks in the other cases. Consequently, in
the first days of April, Cossacks from Kazvin
marched to take over the British positions at
Manjil, while the Hamadan Otryad, one of the
best in the Division, left Teheran for Kazvin, to
support them if necessary. A few days later an
intimation was received that the Bolshevist troops
would leave twenty-four hours after the British,
which would have been reassuring were it not for
a habit of the Moscow Government of repudiating
the force at Enzeli when convenient, while at the
same time taking advantage of their successes. By
the 17th the Cossacks had taken over all the
British positions, and ten days later the British
rearguard left Kazvin, so that from that time
everything depended upon the fighting value of
the Cossacks as against that of the Bolshevists.
Whatever the individual standard may have been,
the organisation was such that it is difficult to
imagine worse. There was no first-line transport,
so that the men in the front line had to leave
their posts in search of food and ammunition,
while the second line, being civilian, was prone to
disappear at critical moments. Thus the troops

246 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

possessed in this respect few advantages over
irregulars, but some consolation was derived from
the fact that there was reason for believing that
the enemy were in little if any better case.

At this time a new element was introduced into
the situation by the arrival on the 24th of April
of the Bolshevist Minister, a Monsieur Rothstein, \
who had been for many years a prominent member
of the staff of the ' Manchester Guardian,' a some-
what interesting association. He immediately
showed that he did not regard his position as a
sinecure, for by the 1st of May I found that he
was showing an unpleasant interest in the financial
mission, while the same day at his first reception
he delivered a violent propagandist speech. The
Bolshevist conception of a Minister's duties cannot
be regarded as conforming to the accepted diplo-
matic standard, and from the beginning Monsieur
Rothstein, a man of very marked ability and
strength of character, set himself to conduct an
active propaganda. For example, the Legation
gardens were thrown open to all and sundry
every Friday, while a close alliance was developed
with the gutter press, which gave prominence to
every imaginable anti-British assertion. Upon one
occasion when one of the Bolshevist chauffeurs had
run down and killed one of the bank's mounted
messengers (the fourth casualty which stood to the
credit of the Bolshevik Legation), it was announced
that the car belonged to the British Minister. For
funds reliance was placed upon Persian silver
which was coined in Moscow from some old dies
which had remained in Russian possession.

The Bolshevist regime has now been sufficiently
long in existence to enable us to form some idea
of the methods which it follows in its endeavours
to subvert other Governments. The process may,
I believe, be, divided into four stages. During the

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 247

first every effort is directed, by appealing to senti-
ments of humanity and personal interest, to secure
under the guise of a trade representative the
establishment of a permanent agent in the country
against which designs are entertained. This man-
oeuvre would seem to be sufficiently obvious to
deceive no one save those who are wilfully blind.
During the second stage the established trade
agent pursues actively a propaganda directed to
the double purpose of alienating the working classes
against their Government, and of creating a public
sentiment in favour of the resumption of diplo-
matic relations. Money is freely provided to
finance revolutionary speakers and newspapers,
and subversive literature is subsidised. This would
appear to be the position reached in Great Britain
to-day.

In the third stage, a diplomatic representative
having been installed and an ex-territorial base
secured, where revolutionary meetings may be
conducted and propaganda openly carried on with-
out fear of police interference, the campaign enters
upon a more advanced stage. Funds are liberally
advanced to revolutionary bodies, and, if possible,
they are supplied with arms. Given that the
country concerned is a small one, little secret need
be made of what is intended, and in any event the
leading conspirators can shelter under diplomatic
immunity. Persia is at the present time in this
position. Lastly comes the armed rising, to which
all that has gone before is but the prelude. It is
not necessary that the revolutionary forces should
be possessed of such strength as to render success
probable. All that is required is that they should
have such momentary success as will furnish a
pretext that the Soviet troops, who are in readi-
ness, have been invited to come to the assistance
of the oppressed population of the country who

248 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

are struggling against their oppressors. This was
what happened in Armenia, where a body of
revolutionary exiles was equipped in Russian terri-
tory, and, when it had gained a momentary suc-
cess, invited the Soviet army to come to its assist-
ance.

The initial popularity of the reforming Govern-
ment was not maintained for long, very largely
owing to the unsoundness of the new municipal
taxes, which, in addition to being economically
unsound, were to a great extent imposed upon
the necessities of life, and consequently were gene-
rally felt. A contributory cause was furnished by
the vexatious restrictions already referred to. While
this unpopularity continued until after a change of
Government had taken place, there was a very
general revulsion of feeling, except amongst the
upper classes, when, under the succeeding Govern-
ment, the forces of corruption were again uncon-
trolled.

In spite of all its errors and the difficulties with
which it was faced, it is very probable that the
Government, learning from experience, might have
established itself firmly, and given effect to the
reforms for which it stood, had it not been for
internal dissensions between the military and civil
elements, or, to be more exact, between Seyd Zia
and the Sirdar Sipah, for these were the two men
who really counted. As has been mentioned, the
Shah had been from the beginning violently op-
posed to the new Government, and this opposition
had been increased by the alterations in the civil
list to which reference has been made, and by the
Prime Minister's attitude towards the Shah, which
the latter considered to be lacking in proper
respect. This antipathy was fully shared by the
Court party, and accordingly every endeavour was
made to sow dissension in the reforming ranks,

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 249

and, since Seyd Zia did not furnish promising
material for intrigue, every effort was directed
towards winning over the Sirdar Sipah.

The first crisis occurred towards the end of
April, but this was got over by the 25th, upon an
arrangement being arrived at that Sirdar Sipah
should be permitted to become Minister for War,
in addition to continuing to act as commander-in-
chief, the former Minister, Masud Khan, con-
tinuing to act in an advisory capacity. But the
truce was of brief duration, and meantime the
Cabinet was weakened by the death of one Minister,
and the necessity of another leaving for Europe
on account of the state of his health. The Shah
had also again become nervous, and was desirous
of leaving the country.

Matters again came to a head upon the 6th of
May, when the Prime Minister offered to resign.
The reactionaries were not yet ready to act, and
again an agreement was arrived at, the price of
peace upon this occasion being that the gendar-
merie— after the Cossacks the most important force
in Persia — should be transferred from the Ministry
of the Interior to the Ministry of War. Thus
Sirdar Sipah gained control of both forces, and
from this time the Government, and indeed the
succeeding Government also, existed upon his
pleasure. The British troops being out of the way,
the time became ripe for a change.

By the 21st matters came finally to a head, the
pretext being the question of the employment of
British officers. For reasons which have been
already stated, Sirdar Sipah was determined that
these should not be given executive control, and
without this their position would have been an
entirely false one. He was also somewhat nervous,
and ready to credit any reports. For example,
he on one occasion complained of twenty odd

250 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

officers being sent to Kazvin without his knowledge.
On inquiry these were reduced to one, who had
been already engaged. His nervousness was added
to by an unfortunate misunderstanding which
resulted in a British officer, who was to advise
at the War Office, presenting himself in the uni-
form of the Cossack Division. As Seyd Zia was
regarded as the friend of the British, this sus-
picion only tended to strengthen the Sirdar Sipah's
resolution to be rid of the Prime Minister, and it
seems clear that he believed that one or other must
go. By the 24th the end was certain, and upon
that day many of the prisoners were permitted
to go to their own houses. The Prime Minister
had realised that the position was hopeless, and
early the following morning he left for Baghdad
accompanied by Epekian and one or two others.
Orders were sent to stop him at Kazvin, but on
consideration the victor was induced to withdraw
these. The Shah, unless my information is astray,
was for much more drastic action, and wished
that all those who had been associated with the
late Government should be dealt with as though
they were guilty of high treason. Actually, how-
ever, the matter ended with some arrests and dis-
missals from office.

Thus terminated an honest and self-sacrificing
attempt to save Persia from bankruptcy, and to
preserve her from foreign invasion. The causes
of its failure were many. Although personal ambi-
tion may have played some part in influencing
those who participated, we must do them the
justice of admitting that they risked their lives
in the attempt, and that they did so, as I know
from personal intercourse with them, with their
eyes open. Seyd Zia was in many ways not suited
for the role he undertook, his obstinacy leading
him to ignore the advice of those whose experience

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 251

might have enabled him to avoid many of the errors
into which he fell. In the words of one of his
countrymen, he was too satisfied with himself, his
ability, and his knowledge, and never owned to
or recognised his faults. But justification for this
attitude may be found in the lack of men with
the requisite knowledge and ability amongst his
active supporters. The aristocratic and official
classes were in the main opposed to him, and,
outside these, educated men are not easy to find in
Persia.

In addition to the unpopularity which he in-
curred through hasty and unwise measures, his
manner and actions were not such as to conduce
to personal popularity, although I believe that
what might have been taken for arrogance of
manner was in fact due rather to innate reserve.
However this may be, it cannot be denied that his
aloof attitude tended to alienate popular sym-
pathy, and that, had he frankly avowed that but
for the national crisis and the fact that he had
been chosen by the army as the man best fitted
to deal with a desperate situation, he would not
have felt justified in assuming the responsibilities
which he had undertaken, he would have secured
a body of support which he always lacked. So
far from adopting this attitude, his behaviour was
too much that of a dictator with whom alone rests
the success of the cause for which he stands. To
be perfectly frank, I believe that throughout he
failed to appreciate his true paint (Tappui —
namely, the army, and as a consequence made no
attempt to conciliate — no easy task for a man of
his type — king, courtiers, army, ecclesiastics, or
people, the result being that when the crisis came
he found himself practically alone.

A contributory factor to the fall of Seyd Zia's
Government was the attitude taken up throughout

252 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

by the Foreign Office. With the denunciation of
the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Lord Curzon's in-
terest in the country seemed to terminate. That
the new Government was heart and soul pro-
British, and, indeed, incurred considerable odium
on this account, and was anxious to carry out in
the spirit, if not in the letter, the policy of the
Agreement, counted for nothing ; the word alone
had merit, with the consequence that the support
extended was at all times grudging and half-
hearted. There were moments when strong British
support would have been sufficient to turn the
scale, but at such times it was lacking. Indirectly
also the chances of the reformers were weakened
by the protection extended to the reactionaries.
Had it been possible to make a well-deserved
example of some of these, the result might have
been different, but since British support had been
extended to the corrupt aristocracy, such a course
was impossible for the pro-British democrats.

Such was the end of a somewhat interesting
experiment in oriental politics. It required no
small degree of courage for a group of men, who
were admittedly amateurs in the art of govern-
ment, to attempt to undertake the government of
their country in a moment of crisis. That they
committed many errors it would be futile to deny,
but these were in the main due to inexperience,
and when the time comes when the history of the
attempt can be written with full information, I
believe that it will be universally admitted that
upon the civil side those responsible were actuated
by motives of patriotism and self-sacrifice. By
civil side it must be understood that I intend the
party headed by Seyd Zia, whether civilians or
soldiers, like Masud Khan and Kasim Khan.

Possibly the greatest compliment which it was
possible to pay was rendered to Seyd Zia by the

GOVERNMENT OF SEYD ZIA-ED-DIN 253

governor of a province which shall be nameless,
who, after abstaining from attempts at peculation
during his rule, applied for a large sum on the
usual frivolous excuse of necessary road guards
upon the very day that the news of Seyd Zia's
fall was reported.

254

CHAPTER XIII.

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH AND REACTION.

THE chief indirect consequence of the acts and fall
of the Zia Cabinet was that Great Britain was
left practically friendless in Persia, and with not
one but four sets of enemies.

The party of the nobility, the leaders of which
had been amongst the prisoners, were extremely
bitter with regard to their imprisonment, and
vented their spite against the British in every
possible way, considering that the British Lega-
tion should have rescued them from the clutches
of the late Government, and ignoring the fact
that had it not been for the action of the Legation
they might have found themselves in a vastly
worse case, and possibly in another world. The
degree to which they displayed their hatred varied
with the individuals. Sarem-ed-Douleh contented
himself with a mild intrigue with Rothstein, Sirdar
Sipah, and Prince Firouz, than whom it would be
difficult to imagine a more incongruous quartette.
The Persian princes appeared to be under the
impression that they could play with the Bolshevist
with impunity, but it was not possible to avoid
feeling that the reverse was more likely to be the
ultimate outcome if the alliance continued.

In practice I do not believe that it was of long
duration, for Sirdar Sipah, after being guilty of
gross discourtesy towards the British officers, found

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 255

that the Jew turned a deaf ear to his appeals for
funds. Becoming alarmed at the prospect of being
alienated from British and Bolshevists at the same
moment, he made somewhat later friendly ad-
vances to the British Legation. Sarem-ed-Douleh
also, after giving vent to his feelings, departed to
the family estates in the south. Firouz, however,
gave full rein to his spite, actuated possibly in
some degree by the fact that for the moment there
was nothing more to be got out of the British, and
for the next three months Britain had no more
inveterate enemy in Persia. Curiously enough,
just before I left Persia in the following September,
there were distinct signs that he and his family
were thinking things over, and tentative advances
towards the British Legation were beginning.

Our second group of enemies consisted of the
supporters of the late Government, for, by a
strange irony, they also believed that they had
been betrayed by the British. Such was the
result of the policy followed by Lord Curzon, that
both the party of corruption, which he had sup-
ported, and the party of legitimate reform, which
had looked towards England for at least moral
support in their struggle for freedom, had been
driven into adopting an attitude of hostility. In
addition to these two groups, there were also the
regular democratic party, which was habitually
opposed to Britain, and the extremists who en-
joyed the Bolshevist support.

After the departure of Seyd Zia there followed
several days of uncertainty as to who was to be
his successor. Many names were freely canvassed,
and at one time it appeared probable that the
choice would fall upon Mushavim-ul-Mamaulik,
whose treatment in Paris by the Foreign Office has
already been mentioned. Had this proved true,
it would have been impossible to conceive of a

256 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

choice which could have been worse for the in-
terests of Britain, but fortunately the final decision
rested not upon him, but upon Qavam-es-Salteneh,
the Governor of Khorasan who had been arrested
by the late administration. He is a brother of the
Vossugh-ed-Douleh, who was Prime Minister at
the time of the signature of the Anglo -Persian
Agreement. His Cabinet was not announced until
the 4th of June, and calls for no comment beyond
the fact that Sirdar Sipah remained at the Ministry
of War, and that the Prime Minister introduced
his brother into the Ministry of Finance.

As though actuated by an impish malignity, the
Foreign Office chose this moment, when the new
Government was looking everywhere for funds,
to press for the repayment of the £131,000 which
had been paid over to the signatories of the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, failing apparently to appreciate
that from henceforth all available funds were
destined to be placed at the disposal of Raza
Khan.

As has been mentioned, the Shah's suspicions
had been aroused by the fact that while his own
civil list had been reduced, that of his brother had
been increased. A further cause for estrangement
between the brothers had arisen in the fact that
the Valiahd had in the beginning of May married
a cousin who had refused the Shah, he not having
accepted her conditions. It was not therefore in
all probability a pure coincidence that at this time
the Valiahd and his bride left Persia upon a lengthy
foreign tour.

The only occasion upon which I personally met
the Valiahd was when I was presented to him under
somewhat quaint circumstances. It is customary
for the Prime Minister to hold a diplomatic recep-
tion upon the day following the Persian New Year.
Learning that we were expected to attend, I and

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 257

my companions presented ourselves at the palace
at the appointed time, where we were received
with such extraordinary deference as to lead us
to believe that we were mistaken for the staff of
a Legation. Explanations, however, seemed un-
necessary, and we accordingly followed our con-
ductors and were in due course ushered into a
room adjacent to the throne -room. Failing to
observe the Prime Minister amongst those present,
I assumed that he had not yet arrived, and turned
to converse with a friend, only to receive a vigor-
ous nudge, and to hear the anxious voice of the
Foreign Minister adjuring me to take some notice
of the Valiahd. Realising that things were not
as we believed them to be, I was under his guid-
ance presented to a young man who was sitting
upon a sofa in the corner of the room.

Looking back on the episode one could not help
feeling that his identity might have been suspected
from the fact that the American Minister shared
the sofa, while the Belgian Minister sat beside it ;
but I must confess that I was somewhat misled by
the attitude of the former, who, with one leg tucked
under him, was, with a countenance wrapped in
meditation, engaged in the national occupation of
chewing gum. In my ignorance of democratic
customs, I had not hitherto associated this delicacy
with the imminent presence of royalty.

During the remainder of the reception we were
consoled to observe that as the members of the
various Legations arrived, they almost, without
exception, fell into our error.

I heard of His Royal Highness later in the course
of my voyage home, he having been a passenger on
a previous trip. He had not been forgotten. His
desire to dine at midnight had made a distinct
impression, while his appreciation of comfort, which
resulted in placing a liberal supply of pillows in

R

258 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

his bath, will ever live in the memory of those
concerned.

What might be expected from the new Cabinet
was indicated by the release of the Amir Afshar,
a notorious chief of North- West Persia, who had
been captured under the late Government. Of
him it is sufficient to say that his government had
been such that he had the reputation of having
made more Bolshevists than every one else in
Persia.

It very early became evident that there was no
intention of employing the British officers who had
been engaged, and there is reason to believe that
had another milch-cow been immediately forth-
coming the financial mission would have also been
dismissed. It was known that the party headed
by the Firman Firma and Prince Firouz aimed
at this as a mode of venting their spleen against
the British Legation ; but the Government, being
of opinion that there was still something to be got
from British capitalists, delayed adopting this
policy meantime. The Financial Adviser did not
impinge upon what the Sirdar Sipah regarded as
his own preserves, and therefore otid not incur his
immediate displeasure like the military officers.
There were prevalent rumours at this time that
the Shah was endeavouring to free himself from
the old man of the sea who had established himself
in an unduly secure position, but whether these
were correct or not the position was not in any
way affected. Meantime it was decided to suspend
the financial mission from its functions on the old
plea that the approval of the Majlis was necessary
for their employment. Profuse promises as to
good intentions were made now as later, but in
almost every case the matter ended with the
promise.

For what it is worth, I mention a complaint

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 259

made to us by the doyen of the Majlis, from whom
we received a call about this time. His grievance
was that the Legation for some years had ignored
the deputies, and had had dealings only with the
professional politicians, and had thus failed to get
adequately in touch with the national feeling.
Upon another occasion a very similar criticism
was made to me, the chief difference being that
upon the latter occasion the criticism was directed
against all the Legations, and was to the effect
that formerly Persians of standing, whether politi-
cians or not, had found it possible to obtain access
to the representatives of foreign powers, but that
to-day this was no longer the case.

The British Government in the middle of June,
while the question of employing British officers
in Northern Persia had not yet been finally decided,
seized the opportunity of raising the question of
the future of the South Persian Rifles. Hitherto
the expense of these had been borne by the home
and Indian Governments, and, although previous
discussions on the subject had taken place, noth-
ing had been decided. As it was, the result of
raising the matter at the moment was to prejudice
the slight chances of achieving anything in the
north. The sentiment of Sirdar Sipah and the
Cossacks at this time was evidenced by the be-
haviour of a Cossack officer, who, on being refused
payment of a cheque on divisional funds which
was not in order, threatened to return with his
men and take the required money by force. Need-
less to say, this did not tend to reassure the bank
officials, which in all probability was the object
in view.

On the 22nd of June the long-awaited Majlis
was at last opened, a quorum of deputies hav-
ing been found who were willing to meet,
although their attendance could not be described

260 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

as other than scanty. The most striking thing
about them was the very large proportion of
ecclesiastics, these forming from a third to a half
of those present.

The Majlis was opened by the Shah in person,
and I must admit that his State equipage was
striking. The horses and their furnishings were
reminiscent of Cinderella, while the coach itself
aroused memories of our old friend the growler.
The speech from the throne only occupied about
ten minutes, and was practically inaudible. The
proceedings then terminated, and the assembly
proceeded, with no great zeal, to consider the
credentials of the members, a process which occu-
pied them for the ensuing couple of months.

At times the sittings were uproarious, and upon
one occasion it was necessary to telephone for the
assistance of the police to restore order. Amongst
others, Prince Firouz's election was challenged, and,
ironically enough, the whipping-boy in the ensuing
debate was Great Britain. The leader of the
attack based his argument chiefly upon Firouz's
relations with Britain, his motive being, I was
informed, that he himself had been somewhat
closely associated with Germany during the war,
and wished to pose as one who believed in Persia
for the Persians. Firouz, who also wished to be
done with the past, outvied his assailant in abuse
of his former friends, and at one time the debate
became distinctly lively. For a time it appeared
that Firouz would be unseated, but a timely
adjournment taking place, he was in the end
triumphantly elected. The price of the Majlis
was thereafter commonly reported to be ten thou-
sand tomans.

In the end the only deputy who was unseated
was one of the few whose election was beyond
question. He had been guilty of a much more

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 261

heinous crime than election irregularities, in that
he had held office under Seyd Zia. When the
decision was announced, he relieved his feelings
by telling the deputies a few home truths. How-
ever justified such a course may have been, it
resulted in his sojourning in the police station
for a considerable period.

About this time, the weather being fine, a cer-
tain amount of what can only be described as
comic-opera warfare took place in the mountains.
The Bolshevists were believed for the moment to
have left Enzeli, but some of Kuchek Khan's
bands were reported to be on the move. By the
24th the news was so far public that I received a
visit from an alarmed Persian, who informed me
that two thousand rebels were in the mountains
to the north-west of Teheran, that they had anni-
hilated a force of five hundred Cossacks, and that
they were coming to Teheran to kill the Shah and
the nobility. My suggestion that the news would
prove a useful tonic did not appear to soothe
him, but the startling character of his information
was somewhat detracted from by another arrival,
who reduced the Cossack casualties to twenty-
five, and declared that the country between the
scene of the engagement and Teheran was abso-
lutely impassable. I am not sure that number
one was altogether satisfied at having his fears
dissipated by such a refutation of his news. Such
is the form that current gossip takes in Teheran.

Upon the following day it became possible to
ascertain definitely what had so far occurred.
Kuchek Khan was apparently in the jungle to
the west of Resht, conferring with delegates from
the Government. To the north of Resht were two
hundred and fifty of his men with two guns, which
they had got from the Bolshevists. The latter
appeared to have made by no means a bad bar-

262 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

gain, since there was strong reason for believing
that only one gun worked. The party to the
north-west of Teheran amounted to about twelve
hundred men, and were under the command of
a worthy by name Saat-ed-Douleh. He was a
son of that Siphadar who, at the time of the siege
of Tabriz, had distinguished himself by command-
ing both sides in turn, and who in his old age,
under the title of Sipah Salar (which may be trans-
lated commander of armies, a title which, in view
of the event just mentioned, was quite appro-
priate), was one of the leading dignitaries at the
Court. According to one account, Saat-ed-Douleh's
skirmishing was a purely family affair, the Sipah
Salar having divided his estates amongst his three
sons. The impartiality of the division was attested
by the fact that all three were equally dissatisfied,
and to this dissatisfaction they gave vent upon
occasion by harrying each other's domains. This
detachment were believed to be followers of Saat-
ed-Douleh rather than Jangals proper, although
working in conjunction with these.

For the rest the outstanding fact was that both
sides — for Sirdar Sipah was taking a hand — had
at the beginning violated every rule of strategy.
Saat-ed-Douleh had opened operations by sending
out three parties, one of four hundred to a point
north-west of Teheran, a second of three hundred
to the north-east, and a third some hundred strong
to a point midway between the others. His aim
was apparently to outflank Teheran in one or other
direction. Sirdar Sipah, not to be outdone, had
also sent out three detachments — two hundred to
the north-east, one hundred to the north-west, and
seven hundred straight north. Thus the moun-
tains were filled with isolated parties, and some
excellent opportunities for skirmishing practice
were provided.

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 263

In addition to the detachments mentioned above,
there were two thousand Cossacks with guns in
the vicinity of Manjil, and there was no apparent
reason against these occupying Resht, except
that this would have been a rather too drastic
action for the class of warfare which was usual
in the circumstances, since it would be prejudicial
to a future alliance between Kuchek Khan and the
Sirdar Sipah, should political developments at any
time render such a realignment advisable in their
mutual interests.

A few days later a sharp engagement was fought
between two hundred Cossacks and a party of
the rebels in the mountains towards the north-
west. The Cossacks, as already mentioned, finally
retired after firing twenty-four thousand rounds
and sustaining three casualties. Cynics were not
indeed absent who declared that the market price
of ammunition was at the moment high in rebel
circles.

There had been reasons for believing, despite
Bolshevist denials, that the operations in Mazan-
deran were upon the rebel side being directed by
a small Russian staff, but in the middle of July
a new development occurred which gave an even
more Gilbertian turn to affairs. This was a new
Russian landing at Enzeli, the avowed purpose of
which was to recover from Kuchek Khan the arms
and guns with which the Bolshevists had been
supplying him during the four previous years.
Needless to say, the Jangali leader had not the
smallest intention of facilitating their ends.

The immediate result was a quasi reshuffle of
parties. Kuchek Khan continued in alliance with
Saat-ed-Douleh, but in addition proposed to the
Government that they should join forces against
the Russians. Saat-ed-Douleh took another line,
for, having nothing to apprehend from the new-

264 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

comers, he proceeded to co-operate with them.
Thus the situation was now that each of the allies
was acting in co-operation with the enemies of the
other. The next development was that the Bol-
shevist Minister assured Sirdar Sipah that the
new Enzeli landing had been made by Azerbaijan
troops ; that it was quite unauthorised, and that
they would be recalled. In view of what had gone
before, it hardly occasioned surprise when Saat-
ed-Douleh was, a couple of weeks later, reported to
have scored a success on behalf of the Government.

In the middle of August the fighting took a more
practical turn, the Cossacks defeating a rebel force
with a loss of two thousand prisoners according to
first reports. The interest of this lay for the most
part in the fact that Russian personnel and nurses
were found with the rebels. As a result of this vic-
tory the country to the east of Resht was cleared of
rebels to within thirty miles of that town. It was
announced that if the negotiations with Kuchek
Khan came to nothing, he would be the next
objective. This produced an immediate protest
from the Bolshevist Legation, the reason for which
was that Kuchek Khan had sold to the Bolshevists
the entire Ghilan rice crop at a price which was
only equal to about 15 per cent of what was usual.
I am unaware whether this sale was given effect
to, but if it was, it can only have resulted in
transferring some of the Russian shortage to Persia.
Since returning to England I observe that Kuchek
Khan is reported to have been put to flight and
killed by the Cossacks, but one is tempted to
wonder whether that Persian Robin Hood's career
has been actually brought to a conclusion.

Meanwhile, to return to more peaceable matters,
the Government was by no means free from
domestic worries. The Majlis, as already men-
tioned, showed no great alacrity in beginning the

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 265

task of examining the members' credentials. The
President was believed to be loth to make a
start, upon the ground that he considered that
practically all had been illegally elected. Popular
feeling also, after a very brief experience of the
methods of the old regime, which, like the Bour-
bons, had learned nothing, was, with the exception
of the upper classes, swinging round in favour of
the late Government. There was, in addition, the
ever-present question of funds, for the demands
of Sirdar Sipah were daily becoming more exacting.
Prior to the Zia Cabinet the Cossacks had cost
a hundred and sixty thousand tomans a month,
out of which there was unquestionably a con-
siderable diversion of funds to purposes other than
were intended. One officer, who had a close per-
sonal knowledge of the internal affairs of the
Division, declared that a hundred and ten thousand
would be ample. The Gendarmerie had cost a
somewhat smaller sum, so that the two together
had a monthly budget of something under three
hundred and twenty thousand a month. When,
after the coup d'etat, the policy of increasing the
number of the Cossacks was adopted, it naturally
followed that the monthly cost had increased, but
at the end of Zia's rule the total was still in the
vicinity of three hundred and fifty thousand. After
the change of Government a rapid increase began,
which progressed in geometrical ratio as Sirdar
Sipah came to more fully appreciate his power.
The Cabinet made feeble efforts from time to time
to curb his rake's progress, but they knew their
master, and always submitted to his demands in
the end. The consequence was that by August
his monthly demand amounted to a million. The
fact that this was over four times the civil budget
will give some idea of what such a sum means to a
bankrupt country like Persia. It is true that the

266 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

numbers had increased to some extent, but it is
certain that they amounted to nothing approach-
ing the figure which was reported, and, even had
this been correct, the cost had risen at a rate
utterly out of proportion to the numerical increase.
Sirdar Sipah's own position was not altogether
a happy one. It is true that at the moment he
was supreme in the Cossack Division, but, as has
been said, he was not the senior officer of the
Division at the time of the coup, and his rise to
power had not been looked upon with unqualified
favour by his seniors and contemporaries. Con-
sequently he had to be ever upon his guard for
disaffection within his stronghold, since, were
he to lose the Shah's favour at any time, his
power would be but short-lived. Threatenings
of trouble in the Division appear to have been
the reason of a flying visit which he paid to
Kazvin at the end of June, this being of so
hurried a nature that he had returned before his
absence was generally known. The Gendarmerie
were, in addition, showing that they could by no
means be disregarded. Those in Kurdistan were
quite out of hand, while in Khorasan the colonel
in command had adopted an attitude which was
shortly to call for the greatest possible efforts upon
the part of the Government. In addition, Sirdar
Sipah, after, as stated, alienating British sympathy
by his attitude towards the British officers, had
succeeded in so conducting his relations with
Rothstein that, after being refused even a small
sum of money, he had begun to be seriously
alarmed at the prospect of having antagonised
the rival Legations simultaneously. So great had
this apprehension become that by the middle of
July he had so far revised his attitude that he was
adopting a distinctly more friendly attitude to-
wards the British, even offering to support the

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 267

officers' claims to compensation for their dismissal.
His alarms were by no meank soothed by the news
of the Russian landing, which was received at
that time.

The news from Russia now began to assume
a serious character, since, in addition to famine,
typhus and cholera were reported to be rampant.
The latter alone was stated to be responsible for
four hundred deaths a day in Baku, and a hundred
and fifty in Astrakhan, but the epidemic was
general throughout South Russia. As the voyage
from Baku to Enzeli is a short one, and there was
considerable intercourse, it was not improbable
that the epidemic would spread to Persia, the
Government of which might be trusted not to
introduce any adequate precautionary measures.
For the moment, however, we were much more
interested with an outbreak of typhus in the
Russian Legation, a very near neighbour, an in-
terest which was by no means abated by the dis-
covery that our servants had seen fit to get our
water from the Legation well. The effects of the
Russian famine were also being accentuated by a
very general shortage of salt in the interior.

In the Caucasus meantime there were signs that
the supporters of the Pan-Turanian movement
were preparing to become active. Nuri Pasha
had arrived at Baku, and Enver was expected
shortly, although the presence of eighty thousand
Soviet troops in the Caucasus was for the moment
serving as a deterrent to other than cautious
action. In Armenia both the Turks and Bol-
shevists seemed to be taking a hand, while in
Georgia the Bolshevist influence was confined in
the main to the towns. Even in these only a very
modified form of Bolshevism prevailed, for except
in the case of large undertakings nationalisation
had not been attempted. The Bolshevist reports

268 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

also indicated that risings were taking place at
Odessa, Kharkof, and Saratof ; while the descrip-
tion of life in Moscow which was brought by a
recent visitor to the Bolshevist capital can only
be described as appalling. Not only was famine
general, and the quality of such food as there
was, save for the Jewish despots and their sup-
porters, indescribable, but in addition the sanitary
arrangements had absolutely broken down, while
the shortage of fuel was so great that many houses
had been demolished for the sake of the timber
utilised in their construction.

Altogether the condition of Russia seemed to
be going from bad to worse. Persia's interest in
Russian conditions was very vital, since, in addi-
tion to the chance of disease spreading over the
frontier, there was always the possibility that the
troops in the Caucasus might be driven by famine
to make an incursion in search of provisions, and
that, with this end in view, the Moscow Govern-
ment would seek for a cause of quarrel. Whether
this was ever seriously contemplated it is impos-
sible to say, but the attitude adopted by the
Bolshevist Minister shortly after this time was such
as to make it appear that this possibility was being
prepared for, and potential grounds for a breach
of relations made ready. For some reason or other
Rothstein now ceased the propaganda which he
had actively carried on since his arrival.

By the middle of August the Bolshevist concen-
tration in the Caucasus was reported to have
increased to two hundred thousand men. An
episode now occurred which bore the appearance
of an attempt to pick a quarrel upon the part of
Rothstein. There was at this time in Teheran a
certain Polish Jew named Azrelenko, who, like so
many of his kind, had been a Bolshevist Com-
missar. The field of his activities had been Baku,

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 269

but, for some reason or another, a difference had
arisen between him and his colleagues, and he
had found it advisable to fly to Persia. Rothstein
now demanded his extradition upon the charge
of embezzlement, an offence which must be the
reverse of uncommon amongst Bolshevist Com-
missars if those who from time to time passed
through Persia on their way to Greece (which is
the haven sought by these gentry after enriching
themselves at the expense of the Gentiles) were
fair samples.

Now extradition treaties do not exist with Persia,
and consequently, whether or not Azrelenko was
guilty of the charge against him, the demand for
his surrender was without justification. In the
circumstances there was strong ground for believ-
ing that the real motive underlying the demand
was political, and for inferring that Azrelenko
knew more than was convenient regarding Bol-
shevist intentions in Persia. Sirdar Sipah, simple
soldier that he was, was not concerned with such
trifles as treaties, and anxious to oblige Rothstein,
had Azrelenko arrested and imprisoned in the
Cossack barracks outside the town. The latter
proved to be a man of resource, and taking a leaf
out of the suffragette and Sinn Fein book, promptly
hunger-struck. As a result, he was removed with
a guard of four Cossacks to the hospital in the
town. Here he succeeded in getting into com-
munication with his friends, and arrangements
having been made, managed to escape through a
skylight. A motor was in waiting, and he and
certain other anti-Bolshevist Russians, who were
apprehensive of sharing his fate, were immediately
driven to the country residence of the French
Minister, where they took bast, or, to be more
exact, sought diplomatic protection. France in
Persia looks after Polish interests.

270 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Rothstein immediately lodged an ultimatum
demanding that the refugees should be removed
from the Legation. This was picketed by troops,
and I believe that I am correct in stating that at
one time Sirdar Sipah issued an order that the
Legation should be entered, and that, had not
the Cabinet received word in time, this would
have been done.

Rothstein now modified his demands, only in-
sisting that a formal demand for Azrelenko's sur-
render be made, and also a demand for the recall
of Monsieur Hoppenot, the French Charge d' Af-
faires. In addition, he required that the Foreign
Minister should be dismissed. The latter demand
was complied with. The Corps Diplomatic now
intervened, and an undertaking was obtained both
from Rothstein and Sirdar Sipah that the im-
munity of the French Legation would be respected,
the matter being referred to Paris.

In the end an arrangement was come to whereby
Azrelenko was surrendered to the police upon the
understanding that he was to be tried by a mixed
commission under the presidency of Monsieur de
Raymond, the Belgian Minister, Rothstein having
undertaken not to apply for his extradition, and
the Persian Government not to agree if he did
apply. How such a commission could be expected
to deal satisfactorily with such a legal case I must
confess that I do not understand.

Rothstein's conduct throughout was rather sur-
prising in the disregard for diplomatic usage
which it displayed, and one cannot, as I have
already said, help feeling that the reason for his
action lay elsewhere, and that either he was desir-
ous of finding a pretext for covering his own dis-
missal, which was reported, or that he desired to
take advantage of a clause in the Bolshevist-
Persian Treaty, whereby Soviet troops were in

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 271

certain conditions authorised to enter Persia, and
thus to billet troops upon the country. Whatever
the reason, he was not supported by Moscow in
his extreme action.

The two principal results of this diplomatic
storm in a teacup were that for the moment Roth-
stein's propaganda received a very decided set-
back, Persian national feeling having been offended
by his dictatorial attitude ; and that the Govern-
ment was badly frightened at its narrow escape
from alienating the entire diplomatic body.

The discussion as to the future of the South
Persian Rifles had meantime dragged on without
any arrangement being arrived at. Both Govern-
ments were agreed as to the value of the corps,
but neither was willing to bear the expense of
maintaining it. The British Government, while
adhering to its policy of getting quit of its Persian
commitments, was willing that a limited number
of British officers should remain, if the cost was
borne by Persia. The Persian Cabinet, on the
other hand, adopted the attitude that were they
to continue to employ British officers in the south,
they would have no valid excuse for not employ-
ing Russians in the north. They were fully alive
to the fact that in the event of the South Persian
Rifles being disbanded, there would be no troops
left in the south capable of maintaining order,
since numbers and distance made it impossible for
the Cossacks to operate there ; but they failed to
appreciate the fact that the policy of the British
Government had changed, and that no longer
would doles and subsidies be continued indefinitely.
The consequence was that, just as a year before
Mushir-ed-Douleh had refused to believe that the
termination of the subsidies was really proposed,
and consequently refused to take any steps to
reorganise Persia's finances, so now Qavam-es-

272 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Salteneh was confident that the British would
continue to defray the expenses of the South
Persian Rifles. This is not a question of opinion,
since Sirdar Sipah himself admitted that this was
the attitude of the Government.

The consequence was what might have been
expected where one side was determined to be
quit of its commitments, regardless of the future,
while the other was satisfied that the first would
never risk the adoption of such a course. No
arrangement was arrived at, and orders were
issued that disbandment should be proceeded with,
a third of the corps being paid off each month
from August to October. Since returning to Eng-
land I have seen it announced in the press that
seven hundred men were to be retained, but for
what purposes and on what conditions of service
was not stated. It is obvious that seven hundred
men cannot have been intended to carry out the
duties which formerly required six thousand.

That the disbandment of the corps was an error
from the point of view of the Persian Government
is, I think, obvious, since it will not be found
possible to maintain anything approaching an
equal degree of law and order in the south with
any other corps, or at anything approaching a
similar cost. That Persia can but ill afford mili-
tary expenditure is true, but a small proportion
of what was being squandered in the north would
have sufficed to keep the South Persian Rifles in
being, and the south consequently in a state of
law and order. The south, however, was a long
way off, and with the intriguers of Teheran, " out
of sight out of mind " is a favourite motto.

Whether the British attitude was well advised
or not time alone can show, but it is not im-
probable that the policy will eventually be found
to have been of the penny-wise description, for,

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 273

while the expenditure in North Persia was in the
nature of reckless extravagance, being made in
country where we had no real or permanent in-
terests, money laid out in the south falls under
quite a different category. The Persian Gulf has
for centuries been a British sphere of influence,
and in the south India and Persia have a mutual
frontier, while British oil interests, of vital import-
ance to the Navy, promise to develop greatly in
the not distant future. As a consequence the
British Government cannot afford to regard with
equanimity the possibility of Southern Persia re-
lapsing into a state of anarchy, a condition from
which it is never very far distant. Even before
the war it was found necessary to send troops to
Persia, and in 1911 an Indian cavalry regiment was
established at Shiraz for a year. It may thus
very well eventuate that it will ultimately be
found that the course which has been followed is
the most costly one for Britain and India; but,
so long as the British Government continues to
squander money in places where it has no genuine
interests, while the Indian Government indulges
in unproductive and unnecessary luxuries like the
new Delhi, the genuine interests of the Empire
must continue to be ignored.

The British position in Persia was by no
means improved by the speech which Lord Curzon
made in July upon Persian affairs. In particular,
his statement that he had been a friend of Persia
for thirty years was not well received, and, to put
it mildly, was not concurred in by the Persians.

As has been already mentioned, the new Govern-
ment had experienced difficulties in Khorasan.
Meshed, the capital of the province, lies five hun-
dred and sixty miles to the east of Teheran, and
although it is possible to travel by motor between
the two towns, the road is none of the best. On

8

274 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

account of the distance, it is not easy for the
Teheran Government to exercise efficient control
in the province.

It will be remembered that during the Govern-
ment of Seyd Zia, Qavam-es-Salteneh, who was
then Governor of Khorasan, had been arrested
by Mahomed Taki Khan, the colonel in command
of the Khorasan Gendarmerie. It was not there-
fore to be wondered at that when, after the fall
of Seyd Zia, Qavam-es-Salteneh became Prime
Minister, Mahomed Taki Khan should have felt
rather apprehensive of the consequences to him-
self, particularly since the Qavam, having been
robbed at the time of his arrest, might be expected
to harbour thoughts of revenge.

Mahomed Taki Khan was a man who had re-
ceived his military training abroad, had a very
respectable record as a soldier, and had under
his command a force of three thousand men. In
addition, he was believed to have in his possession
two guns and five thousand rifles which the British
Government had sold to Persia, although a certain
vagueness existed as to what had become of these.
In these circumstances it was not to be expected
that he would prove a willing and submissive
victim.

To begin with, the Government considered it
wiser to take no action against him, and when,
upon the division of the spoils of office, the Gover-
norship of Khorasan fell to Samsam-us-Salteneh,
an ex-Prime Minister and former Ilkhani of the
Bakhtiari, he deemed it expedient to nominate
Mahomed Taki Khan as Deputy Governor. The
latter sent a polite reply to the effect that while
he would be delighted to receive Samsam, it must
be understood that it was only upon the distinct
understanding that he did not bring any Bakh-
tiari in his train.

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 275

Upon this the Cabinet decided that Mahomed
Taki should be superseded, and Colonel Gleerup,
the Swedish Commandant of the Gendarmerie,
was despatched to Khorasan with a Persian
colonel who had been appointed to take over the
command. Mahomed Taki had meantime been
extending his influence towards the west, and at
Sabzawar met Colonel Gleerup and his companion.
It is to be feared that he did not show the respect
due to his superior officer, for Colonel Gleerup' s
explanation that he was upon a tour of inspection
was received with incredulity, while the Persian
colonel's statement that he was upon a pilgrimage
to Meshed excited open derision. After being de-
tained for a short time they were both permitted
to depart, and returned to Teheran after a some-
what uncomfortable experience.

The Government had now to admit that Ma-
homed Taki Khan was in what amounted to open
rebellion, and accordingly steps were taken to
deal with him. The Cossack success in Mazan-
deran had eased the situation, and it was found
possible to divert a considerable force to deal with
the menace in Khorasan. Accordingly it was
determined to despatch a force of four thousand
Cossacks to restore order in the eastern province,
and, by the 1st of September, the first detachment
had left Teheran. Mahomed Taki Khan was not
idle, and there was reason to believe that he was
incorporating into his forces some of the tribesmen
who, during the war, had been trained in the
East Persia Levy under British officers. In addi-
tion, it was reported that Mahomed Taki Khan's
brother, Hadir Kuli Khan, who commanded the
Gendarmerie in Isfahan, was actively recruiting
amongst the men discharged from the South Per-
sian Rifles, whose disbandment had now been
begun. He had as yet made no move, but there

276 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

was always the disturbing possibility for the
Government that were the Cossacks, who had
been sent to the east, to meet with a reverse which
entailed a further weakening of the force in the
capital, he might move on Teheran with a force
possessing a considerable stiffening of British-
trained troops.

It is a little difficult to form an exact apprecia-
tion of what exactly Mahomed Taki Khan's move-
ment stood for, and to ascertain whether it was
primarily defensive, or whether it contemplated
a restoration of the Zia regime, and all that it
stood for, which, in the event of its re-establish-
ment, would almost certainly have included the
deposition of the Shah. Mahomed Taki Khan was
generally reported to have stated that the restora-
tion of Seyd Zia would follow his success, and it is
equally unquestionable that the new Government
had succeeded in bringing about such a revulsion
of feeling amongst the humbler classes that any
rebel success would have met with support in the
capital. This was not to be, for in October a brief
statement appeared in the papers to the effect that
Mahomed Taki had been defeated and killed.

By the middle of August the Majlis had at last
finished its internal squabbles, and was ready to
proceed to business. The first matter to be dealt
with was naturally the reply to the Shah's speech,
and here Prince Firouz came out strongly as the
leader of the extreme anti-British party — it might
almost be said the organiser. The speech had
contained a statement to the effect that Persia's
relations with all other countries were satisfactory,
and to this Firouz moved an amendment express-
ing regret that Great Britain formed the one
exception in this respect. This proved rather too
much for even the Majlis, and only five deputies
were found to support the motion.

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 277

But if they were not prepared to proceed to the
same extremes as Firouz, the deputies were never-
theless violently anti-British, and we began to
appreciate that we were destined to be the next
object of attack. Abuse of the mission now began
in the press, the line taken being that since the
military advisers had been got rid of, it only re-
mained to secure our removal in order to eliminate
the last consequences of the Anglo-Persian Agree-
ment. Rothstein was also known to be pressing
for our removal, so that expediency was added to
inclination upon the part of the deputies. Seeing
that if the matter came up for discussion in the
Majlis a defeat was certain, the Government deter-
mined to be beforehand with its critics, and upon
the 1st of September an intimation was received
from the Prime Minister that he could no longer
avail himself of our services, and that our con-
tracts with the Persian Government were therefore
cancelled. So terminated the plans of reform which
were aimed at under the Agreement, the sole
remainder of which was a revised Customs tariff.

It seemed possible that we would not be the
last victims of anti-European feeling, for, having
disposed of the British in Persian service, the
popular agitation was next directed against the
Swedes. The feeling was, however, against all
Europeans, irrespective of nationality, which caused
it to vary in degree alone. Of this a striking in-
stance occurred upon the 13th of September, the
great day of lamentation of the Persian year, when,
as I have mentioned elsewhere, the anti-European
feeling became so extreme that under threats of
violence the police deemed it necessary to remove
all Europeans from the vicinity of the processions,
an unheard-of incident in Teheran, where hitherto
courteous treatment at the hands of the inhabitants
could always be counted upon.

278 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

One more episode during these months calls for
mention in view of possible after-effects. It was
known that the Government were negotiating with
American interests during the latter part of our
stay in Teheran, and in the end of November an
announcement appeared in the press that a con-
cession to explore for and work oil deposits in the
five northern provinces of Persia — Azerbaijan, As-
trabad, Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Khorasan — had
been granted to the Standard Oil Company. Now
if nothing had previously occurred regarding the
oil deposits in these provinces, this would not call
for any remark, but in actual fact the position was
as follows. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company hold
the D'Arcy concession, which entitles them to a
monopoly of oil production in all the Persian pro-
vinces with the exception of the five just mentioned.
In the days before the Anglo-Russian Convention,
a concession to a national of one country had
usually resulted in a compensating concession to
a national of the other, and, in the case of oil,
the D'Arcy concession had, although at a later (
date, been counterbalanced by one which covered
the five northern provinces, which had been
granted to a Russian named Khastoria. With the
introduction of the Constitution it had become
necessary to the validity of concessions that they
should be ratified by the Majlis. There was, I
believe, a certain vagueness about the Khastoria
concession, but this was not considered to affect
its validity, for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
had considered it worth while to acquire it for a
large payment. Thus the concession which is now
reported to have been granted to the Standard
Oil Company was already in the possession of a
British company. It would accordingly be of
interest to know what steps the British Govern-
ment will take to assert the Anglo-Persian Oil

QAVAM-ES-SALTENEH 279

Company's rights. Apart from this, the granting
of the concession should be an advantage from
the British point of view. It cannot be questioned
that in pursuit of concessions the Americans have
been pursuing an anti-British policy in Persia and
Mesopotamia, and now that they have obtained
what they aimed at, and that the Standard Oil
Company has spread its tentacles into yet another
country, it may be hoped that this line of
action will cease. Even if this is not the case,
the result should be beneficial, for in future the
American interests in North Persia will serve as
a useful buffer between the real British sphere in
the south and the Russian pressure and intrigue
from the north, and upon American interests
will fall the first brunt of Russian aggression
when next the bear resumes his move towards
the south. In view of the selfish policy which the
United States pursued during the late war, and
their evident intention of making the most of the
peace at the expense of those who fought, there is
a certain satisfaction in the possibility of their
embroiling themselves in future complications.
Lastly, although this is only a personal opinion,
there is very little prospect of the Bolshevists
allowing either English or Americans to work
extensive concessions in what has been for cen-
turies regarded by Russia as her sphere of action.
Thus, although the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
has been dispossessed by American intrigue, there
is a fair chance that they will have the satisfac-
tion of watching their supplanter's difficulties in
the future.

Here I must leave the record of events in Tehe-
ran, for a fortnight after our dismissal I left Teheran
in company with an Arab driver, who had been a
Turkish officer during the war. My baggage had
preceded me in the charge of a very charming

280 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Kurd, who, as I was informed during my jour-
ney, bore a somewhat lurid reputation in his own
country for bloodthirsty propensities. Be that as
it may, it was impossible to wish for a more
agreeable or helpful servant on such a journey,
and my only regret was when on our arrival in
Baghdad he declared that he had had enough of
service.

The journey was by no means so exciting as
had been that of a year before. It is true that
I found Hamadan in a state of excitement due to
the discovery the previous day of an attempt upon
the part of local Bolshevists to assassinate the
governor, Salar Lashkar, who was a brother of
Firouz. The British Vice-Consul having to some
degree been instrumental in the discovery, this
tended to an improvement of relations between the
family and the British, a desire for which upon the
Persian side had been inferred prior to my depart-
ure from Teheran. It is to be hoped that any such
advances will be received with caution should they
proceed further. The plot was not so much the
work of Persians as of various returning refugees
with whom the town swarmed at that time, it
being believed that there were over five thousand
Armenians, Assyrians, and other Caucasians of
sorts established in the locality.

For the rest, the journey was practically devoid
of interest, the only events which broke its
monotony being the news that one of the villages
which we passed had been raided three days before,
and our driving into a hole in the dark which
resulted in a smashed wheel. The former was,
however, so much an event of everyday occurrence
as to excite no interest, while the latter might have
happened anywhere. On the 21st I reached rail-
head and left Persia, never, I imagine, to return.

281

CHAPTER XIV.

THE OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT is at all times difficult to forecast the future,
but particularly so in a country such as Persia,
where the greatest certainty would appear to be
that the unexpected will happen. It may, however,
be of some service to state the position as it seems
to be at the present time both in Persia and the
adjacent countries. With regard to the latter I
must in the main rely upon second-hand informa-
tion, since my experience of India and Mesopo-
tamia has been of the briefest, while the others
I have not visited. Persia cannot, however, from
the British point of view, be considered apart from
the rest of the middle east, and in particular from
Mesopotamia, and I have accordingly ventured to
touch upon the state of affairs in countries whose
future must directly or indirectly react upon that
of Persia. I am aware that my views will meet
with the reverse of approbation from many, and
that I shall be told that I do not know what I
am talking about; but while ready to admit this
as regards many points so far as I am personally
concerned, I cannot do so with respect to many
of those with whom I have had the opportunity
of coming in contact, and discussing the various
countries with which their work had made them
acquainted.

The position in Persia in the middle of Septem-

282 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ber 1921 was as follows. In the north-west the
position of the Government was weak, a con-
siderable part of the province being directly or
indirectly under Turkish or Kurdish control. In
the spring the Government troops had, through
the rashness of their commander, sustained a
somewhat serious set-back, while Tabriz, always
a centre of extremists, was very much disposed
to go its own way. Farther to the east the greater
part of Ghilan was under the control of a native
republic, which the Jangalis had established under
Kuchek Khan. The Cossacks were certainly suffi-
ciently strong to deal with this in many places,
but it was questionable whether they would be
able to effect anything against the Jangalis should
they take refuge in their thorn jungles. It was
in addition doubtful whether the elimination of
Kuchek Khan could at the moment be regarded
as entirely advantageous, since, by bringing the
Persian Government into direct touch with the
Bolshevist base at Enzeli, occasion might arise
for various grounds of quarrel, such as the dis-
posal of the rice crop already referred to. More-
over, while Resht, formerly the chief town of the
province, and now reduced by the Bolshevists to
a state of semi-ruin, could at any time be occupied,
no advantage was to be gained from such action
so long as it was not possible to gain control of
Enzeli. The Cossacks, after their experiences
during the previous year, might be expected to
be very chary of again venturing upon an advance
towards Enzeli unless definitely assured against
the intervention of the Bolshevist fleet, while it
might be anticipated that the Moscow Government
would be reluctant to give any assurance which
would hinder them from intervening to protect
the local soviet, or to prevent the suppression of
the influence of the party of revolution in a base

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 283

which might at any time be necessary to their
plans.

Khorasan, as already stated, was in open
revolt under Mahomed Taki Khan, and were he
to be successful in defeating the Cossacks who
had been sent against him, it was probable that
he would risk the march upon the capital, with
the object of overthrowing the Government and
re-establishing the reformist rule. In this event
it was to be anticipated that Hadir Kuli Khan
would co-operate from Isfahan, where he was
meantime engaged in strengthening the force
under his control by the enrolment of British-
trained recruits. In the south the only force
capable of maintaining order and keeping the
tribes within bounds was in process of dissolution.
In the western provinces there was considerable
unsettlement. Some of the younger Bakhtiari
khans were occupied in family squabbles. In
Luristan a general bast had only recently been
brought to a conclusion, while the situation in
Kurdistan was such that serious developments
might at any time occur.

In Teheran the Government existed upon the
sufferance of Sirdar Sipah, who in turn depended
largely upon the favour of the Shah. At the same
time the Cabinet was endeavouring to maintain
the appearance of a constitutional Government
by securing the support of the Majlis, which, in
number but little above a quorum, was — under the
control of an extremist group — mainly concerned
with its own interests. There was reason to
believe that both Prince Firouz and Sirdar Sipah
were anxious that the Shah should make a second
foreign tour, each aspiring to the regency in his
absence. Such a course would have probably
met with His Majesty's approval, were it not
questionable whether, if he left the country, he

284 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

would ever return, and even this contingency
he might have been prepared to face if permitted
to take the crown jewels with him.

Lastly, there was every prospect that after
the middle of October the Treasury would be
empty, since no attempt had been made to put
revenue - producing reforms into effect, with the
only prospects of refilling it consisting in the
chance that the bank might be content to con-
tinue lending indefinitely upon the security of
future oil royalties, or that an American loan
might be arranged upon the same security.
Either of these contingencies would, it is true,
have been but putting off the evil day by squander-
ing the future revenues of the country, but this
process had been in full swing for some time, and
the difficulties of future Governments weighed
lightly with one whose main concern was to
satisfy the demands of its taskmaster. Should
this be no longer possible, there were those who
anticipated an outbreak on the part of the Cos-
sacks, although this was not the general view.
It must always be remembered that a state of
bankruptcy, which in a European state would
unquestionably precipitate a crisis of the first
order, seems to make very little difference in
states such as Turkey and Persia, where the
officials rely upon outside emoluments to an ex-
tent which renders a lengthy suspension of salaries
possible.

Lastly, and most important, there was the
Bolshevist menace ; and what the Bolshevist
intentions were was a matter of utter uncer-
tainty. It might be that, having eliminated
British influence, they would be content to trust
to peaceful penetration, or rely on the expecta-
tion that the alienation of the interests which
had hitherto provided funds would result in

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 285

internal disturbances which would furnish an
excuse for armed intervention under the treaty.
Also there was the possibility that if Sirdar Sipah
was unsuccessful in dealing with Mahomed Taki
Khan, these two, with the addition of Kuchek
Khan, might engage in a three-handed indecisive
contest, which, besides paralysing the forces of
law and order, such as they were, would furnish
the excuse for armed intervention. If European
relations rendered this inexpedient at the moment,
the same result could be attained by an incursion
by the troops of one or other of the so-called
independent republics, who could always be re-
pudiated once their aim was accomplished.

Since September, if press reports are to be
relied upon, Sirdar Sipah has succeeded in achiev-
ing decisive victories against both his opponents,
while the Government troops have sustained a
serious defeat in Azerbaijan. It is impossible,
however, from the meagre reports in the daily
press to assess these facts at their true value,
and accordingly they may mean more or less than
appears at first sight. In addition, it is possible
that the concession to the Standard Oil Company
may have resulted in either a considerable cash
payment, or a loan, either upon the royalties
payable by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, or
those which are presumably payable under the
new concession. Apart from these facts no change
has, so far as I am aware, occurred since my
departure.

Such being the present position in Persia, what
is the outlook for the immediate future ? There
are apparently three possibilities — that things will
continue much as at present, that another revolu-
tion will take place, or that a general break-up will
occur. In a more highly-organised country the
chances in favour of one of the two latter alter-

286 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

natives would be considerable, but we cannot
apply European standards of conduct to Persia
with any expectation that they will furnish a reli-
able gauge of action.

The chance of any revolution taking place
which would effect a vital change in the position
is, I believe, remote. That Sirdar Sipah might
expel the present or some future Government
by force of arms, or that, conversely, he might
be overthrown by a conspiracy on the part of
the politicians and his military rivals, is always
possible ; but such an event would only result
in the transfer of office from one group of the
same class to another. The hope that such an
event would import more than the transfer of
the sweets of office from the dispossessed to their
supplanters, or that a change of Government in
such circumstances would be the prelude to an
attempt at reform, may be disregarded.

That any genuine revolution will be attempted
is improbable in the extreme. The Zia coup was
only rendered possible by the fact that the pro-
bability that the British evacuation would be
followed by an advance upon the part of the
elements of disorder in Ghilan, induced the only
military force in the country which seriously
counted, to co-operate with the reformers in an
effort to dislodge a Government which declined to
do anything. Now that the military are in the
position of controlling the Government, the chances
of such an event are almost negligible. It must
be kept in view, as has already been pointed out,
that the numbers from whom men with sufficient
education and knowledge of modern methods can
be drawn are, apart from the present ruling
class, extremely limited. Seyd Zia had the
utmost difficulty in finding suitable members for
his Government, and even these were almost

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 287

entirely destitute of administrative experience.
Moreover, the failure of the Zia Cabinet had a
very disheartening effect upon the rational party
of reform.

Action by the extremists seems equally impro-
bable, apart from Russian intervention. That
there is a certain amount of discontent is un-
questionable, but that there is any considerable
body of opinion in favour of Bolshevist doctrines
I do not believe. Had the reverse been the case,
it was to be expected that Kuchek Khan, who
openly advocated the overthrow of the aristocracy
and the establishment of a republic, would have
met with more success during the years for which
he exercised control over very considerable num-
bers of rebels, but in practice his influence was
almost entirely confined to Ghilan.

A general break-up is equally unlikely mean-
time, provided always that the Bolshevists refrain
from armed intervention, and that nothing occurs
to induce the Shah to fly the country. An armed
occupation of the north by Russia would almost
certainly result in the provinces throwing off all
pretence of adhesion to any Teheran Government,
which might result from such interference. The
Persian does not understand the conception of a
republic any more than the peasants of Southern
Russia understood the policy of " pale-pink im-
perialism " imposed upon General Wrangel by
the Western Powers, and were the Shah removed
the only cohesive influence would have been
eliminated, and local and tribal influences would
have full play. Such a contingency would almost
of necessity involve British intervention in the
south.

Any hope of financial reform may equally, I
believe, be considered as out of the question.
That the resources of the country are adequate

288 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

to make it self-supporting is undoubted. That
no great measure of reform would be neces-
sary to achieve this end I for one believe, but
an essential condition would be the suppression
of the present corruption, and this would entail
the employment of foreign advisers with prac-
tically dictatorial powers. Such powers will never
be given by the present ruling class. Financial
advisers may be appointed, and will be welcomed
from any country which is prepared to advance
money, but when they endeavour to make their
posts other than well-paid sinecures, excuses will
be found to get rid of them, or at least so much
energy will be concentrated on rendering their
reforms nugatory that matters will remain as
before. It is true that in the past Persia has
been in a position when her income and expendi-
ture failed to balance, and that reforms have
been given effect to which have put her finances
once more upon a sound basis. At the accession
of Nasr-ed-Din Shah there was a deficit of one
million tomans upon a budget of ten, and Amir
Nizam, his first Prime Minister, restored matters
within the brief period of two months ; but in
these days there was no foreign debt to be faced.
As it was, the unpopularity which he incurred
was so great that the intrigues wilich resulted
ultimately cost Amir Nizam both the favour of
his sovereign and his life.

In all the circumstances it would appear pro-
bable that, apart always from foreign interven-
tion, matters will continue much as at present,
one semi-bankrupt ministry succeeding another
for brief periods, each in turn considering the
present alone, and pledging such of the country's
assets and future revenues as are within its power
to foreign lenders, thus rendering more certain
and bringing nearer the time when a final crisis

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 289

must occur. Side by side with this rake's progress
we may expect that the centrifugal movement,
which first manifested itself at the time of the
deposition of Mohamed Ali Shah, will continue
to grow, and to become more fully realised. As
has been mentioned, there is a school of opinion
which regards the events of that time, not as
having consisted of a revolution, but as having
been the first outward manifestation of the fact
that the real power had passed from the town
khans, who like the country were semi-bankrupt,
to the heads of the great country families and
tribes. As yet this fact seems to be appreciated
by few, even of those concerned, apart from the
Bakhtiari khans and the Amir Af shar. The former
to-day constitute for all practical purposes an
imperium in imperio, and it would require little
to render them entirely independent. Azerbaijan
is to a great extent outside the control of the
Government, and, in addition to Bakhtiari, Pars
and Kermanshah are even now almost ready
to disregard the central Government. Whether
events will be permitted to proceed to such an
extent as to bring this about, or whether a states-
man will arise possessing both the support and
force of character necessary to bring about the
necessary reforms, time alone can show. There
are not wanting amongst those of the younger
generation who have been educated abroad, men
who fully appreciate their country's needs, and who
have learned to adopt a more altruistic attitude
than is at present customary ; but whether any
such will be able to gain sufficient support to
enable him to embark upon drastic reforms, and
whether, having obtained such support, he will
have the strength to proceed ruthlessly, regardless
of personal risk and class interests, is very doubt-
ful. Such men are rare.

290 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Let us now turn for a moment to the position
in Mesopotamia. My first feeling upon entering
the country — and it is, I believe, a common one
— was amazement that any one should have the
smallest wish to have anything to do with it;
and my second, to admire the wisdom of the
soldier who, on having the reputed site of the
Garden of Eden at Gurmiah pointed out to him,
said that " it would take no ... flaming sword
to keep him outside." Proceeding from the
individual to the general, one was tempted to
wonder what had induced the British Govern-
ment to occupy Mesopotamia, and why, the war
being over, it continued to do so instead of clear-
ing out at the first opportunity.

It is easy to understand the motives which led
to the first expedition at the beginning of the
war. The preservation of the Persian oil-fields
was of vital importance, as was also the denying
of the Persian Gulf littoral to the Germans and
Turks. These objects were adequately secured
by the occupation of Basra and its hinterland,
and it is notorious that the original expedition
was directed to securing these objectives alone.
What it was hoped to accomplish by extending
the objective of the expedition to the occupation
of Baghdad, and ultimately of the whole country,
it is impossible to say. We have been told that
the result was to hold up large numbers of the
enemy, but if the truth were known we may suspect
that we would find that the reverse was the case
in the ultimate result. In a recent book the odds
in our favour have been stated as having been
six to one. I have suggested that the reason
may have been that some of our amateur strate-
gists, determined to pursue side-shows at any
cost, considered that the capture of Baghdad
might serve to divert popular attention from

Babylon the great is fallen.

Tshtar Gate, Babylon.

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 291

failures in more vital directions, or it may be
that recollections of the ' Arabian Nights' stirred
the War Cabinet, which, ignoring more depend-
able if less romantic records, trusted that the
Baghdad of good Haroun-al-Raschid had survived
the intervening millenium. Whatever the reason,
to Baghdad they went, but why they stayed it
is even more difficult to say.

Imperial necessities cannot have had anything
to do with the matter, for the occupation of Basra
and its hinterland would effect all that is neces-
sary in this respect. The extension of our rule
further to the north only provides a potential
field for future trouble, and serves as an irritant
to Turkey and the native population alike, since
in these parts religion counts for much. At no
time have our interests lain in that direction.
It is true that the evacuation of the greater part
of Mesopotamia would deprive Mr Winston
Churchill of a fruitful field for his ingenuity ;
but while I must admit that, from what I have
heard of his schemes, these evince indications of
genius, they at the same time possess character-
istics which lead to the belief that Mr Heath
Robinson must have been called in to assist in
their framing.

We have all heard that Mesopotamia was once
the granary of the world, and that it might easily
once again occupy that position, but the cost of
bringing this about has not been pointed out
with equal clarity. Great Britain is not the only
country which is alive to the advantages of de-
veloping such countries as Mesopotamia, and it
is scarcely surprising to learn that the Turks
had been occupied with the problem of restoring
it to its pristine prosperity. The question had
been investigated by an eminent engineer em-
ployed by the Turkish Government, and he re-

292 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

ported that the project was perfectly feasible.
The matter was not proceeded with for the same
reason that it will not be proceeded with to-day
— namely, the question of expense. If I remem-
ber rightly the estimated cost was not far short
of forty millions, and allowing for the unforeseen
developments which almost invariably arise in
schemes of such magnitude, probably fifty millions
would have been nearer the actual cost. It might
be thought that there was no reason against
dealing with the country piecemeal, but the factors
of desert and marsh are of such a nature that
the question of irrigation and drainage must, as
regards the main parts of the project, be handled
as a whole. What the cost would be to-day it is
impossible to say, — probably a hundred million
would not be in excess of the ultimate cost, — and
if one thing is certain it is that neither Great
Britain nor Mesopotamia will be able to provide
a fraction of such a sum for this purpose for many
a day to come.

Moreover, even assuming that the money could
be provided, there is no labour available to culti-
vate the newly-irrigated land. The entire popula-
tion of Mesopotamia only amounts to about
three millions, and that section of it which lives
by agriculture is already fully employed. I have
heard it suggested that the wandering Arabs
of Arabia would be glad to settle and take to an
agricultural life, but I am unaware that this is
more than a supposition. There always remains
coolie labour from India, and it must be admitted
that the Indian element in Mesopotamia is on
the increase; but any proposal for the importa-
tion of such labour upon a large scale would
meet with opposition from the present population,
and would, in all probability, raise violent opposi-
tion in India. Truth to tell, there is strong reason

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 293

to believe that a great part of the objection, of
which we hear so much, to the conditions of coolie
labour abroad is based not so much on philan-
thropic grounds, as on the fear that the depletion
of the home market will compel native employers
to pay better wages. For the above reason it is
impossible to regard irrigation projects as furnish-
ing the raison d'etre of the British occupation.

After agriculture, oil is frequently mentioned
as a reason for retaining control of the country,
but, on the face of it, there would seem to be suffi-
cient oil available under the Persian concession
to provide for the needs of the British Navy
for many years to come. That being the case,
the expenditure in blood and treasure which the
continued occupation of Mesopotamia must of
necessity entail would scarcely appear to be
justified upon this ground, particularly since it
has been declared that there is no intention of
making Mesopotamian oil a British monopoly.
It has, of course, to be kept in view that a
syndicate, prior to the war, obtained a concession
from the Turkish Government for oil territory
in the vicinity of Mosul, and it would be of interest
to know who are concerned directly and indirectly
in this venture.

Setting aside Imperial necessities, agriculture,
and oil, it is difficult to discover any redeeming
feature in Mesopotamia. Off-hand, those which
are readily called to mind are dates, ruins, and
the beauty of some of the fabrics in the bazars,
but none of these impress one as legitimate reasons
for occupying the country.

None of the obvious reasons seeming to furnish
the real reason, it is impossible not to call to mind
large numbers of prosperous-looking and furtive-
eyed individuals, attired in scarlet fez and white
ducks, who throng the streets of Baghdad in

294 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

particular, and to wonder whether they might
not have something to do with the matter. They
also appeared to furnish a solution of the problem
which has exercised many worthy people — namely,
the ultimate destination of the ten tribes of Israel.
I have never been able to understand why these
should be supposed to have decided to remove
themselves from the neighbourhood of the places
to which they were transported, and in view of
their numbers in Mesopotamia and adjacent coun-
tries there is every reason to believe that they
did not do so. In Baghdad alone the Jews form a
third of the population, and if appearances go for
anything, much the most prosperous third.

The suggestion that Jewish interests may fur-
nish the reason for our retention of Mesopotamia
must, I admit, be regarded as a somewhat frivolous
one, but I am not sure that there may not be
something in it all the same. It is notorious
that Jewish influence with the present Cabinet in
general, and the Prime Minister in particular,
is great. Mr Lloyd George and King Feisul alike
have as financial advisers members of the house
of Sassoon.

To appreciate how far this influence may extend,
it is only necessary to consider the position of
Palestine at the present time. Our reasons for
occupying the country are about as unsound
strategically, I imagine, as those for going to
Mesopotamia, but as to those for remaining we
are left in no delusion. Palestine is to be turned
into a national home for the Jews, and the British
taxpayer is to have the honour of bearing at
least a considerable part of the expense. The
reason for this is that the Jews wish for Palestine,
but I have yet to learn that desire alone is a
sufficient title to the possessions of others. What
is the Jewish justification for claiming Palestine ?

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 295

About 1200 B.C., during a time when internal
weakness compelled Egypt to withdraw her garri-
sons, the Jews crossed the Jordan, and in a series
of campaigns, conducted in a manner which
must have made the German General Staff despair
of being able to emulate their barbarity, conquered
part of the country. That they ever succeeded
in establishing themselves in the whole of Pales-
tine would seem to be somewhat doubtful. In
any case, their tenure of the more fertile parts
was at all times precarious, seeing that the country
lay on the route between the great civilisations
of Egypt and Mesopotamia. In due course they
were conquered, and large numbers deported to
other countries, and of these only a fraction
evinced any desire to return when given the
opportunity of doing so by Cyrus the Great.
Thereafter those who had returned continued in
more or less subjection under Persians, Alex-
ander's successors, and the Romans in turn,
until the latter, to whom they were in the nature
of an Irish problem, growing tired of their per-
petual riots, suppressed them under Hadrian, and
banished all from Jerusalem.

Thus the Jewish claim to Palestine is grounded
upon the fact that they succeeded over three
thousand years ago in conquering the country
with every circumstance of barbarism, that they
more or less continued to occupy it for some
thirteen hundred years, and that they were ex-
pelled nearly eighteen hundred years ago. I am
unaware of any other claim which was based
upon a similar title ever being given one second's
consideration. With far greater justice could
Spain be turned into a national home for the
Moors, or New York for the Red Indians, since
both these evictions are much more recent, but
so far the consciences of America and Britain

296 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

do not seem to be seriously stirred over these
questions ; but then neither the Moors or Red
Indians have become the money-lenders of the
world.

The Government is liberal of assurances that it
is proposed to govern Palestine with strict im-
partiality as between Jew and Moslem, but there
is every reason to doubt whether any effect is
being given to such protestations. The Arab
point of view cannot be better stated than in the
words of the Arab Delegation, which at the time
of writing is visiting this country in an attempt
to obtain justice for their fellow-countrymen.
These are as follows : —

" Let it be understood that the Arabs of Palestine are
not anti-Semitic. As a matter of fact, they are more
tolerant of the Jew than the Christian peoples of the West
have been. What the Arab will not tolerate is the political
Zionist, the Zionist who has come into his country with
the idea of dominating him and becoming his master.

" No amount of assurance that this is not the intention
can avail when the Arab sees the Hebrew language, which
is spoken by barely 1 per cent of the population, recognised
as an official language of the State ; when the tide of
Jewish immigration pours into his country, bringing in a
mass of undesirable aliens who are a burden to the com-
munity ; while this foreign immigrant labourer deprives
him of his daily bread, and is paid at a higher rate of wages
than himself for half the amount of work which he, the
Arab, can accomplish ; and when contracts for public
works are, in the majority of cases, given to Jews whose
quotations are usually higher than those of Arabs ; when
he sees that the High Commissioner is a Jew and Zionist,
the Legal Secretary, the Controller of Stores, the Director
of Commerce and Industries, and the Chief of Immigration
are all Jews. Every department of the Government has
been swamped by Jews, the majority of whom are new
and without previous experience. Laws and regulations
are enacted aiming at checking the liberty of the Arab
and preventing him from expansion. The press is muzzled.
Patriotic Arabs are arrested on the pretext that they are
a danger to the State. Farmers, who for generations have

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 297

owned their lands and lived on them, are asked to sign
leases, the Government claiming that these lands had re-
verted to it as the successor to the Turk. The idea behind
this action is to establish the Government's title to these
lands so that in time they could be sold to the Zionists.

" The Government of Palestine desires to exert her in-
fluence in the management of the Islamic wakfs, in spite
of the fact that Moslem law emphatically prohibits any
one but Moslems managing Islamic wakfs ; and in spite of
the fact, too, that the opinion of the Islamic religious
body, which the High Commissioner convened, had plainly
expressed its unwillingness that the Government should
interfere with their wakfs, it still hesitates to put the
direction of these wakfs into Moslem hands. The wakf
properties of the Greek Orthodox Church, with which the
Turks never interfered, holding them as the sacred property
of the Church, which can never be sold, are being offered
for sale by a Commission appointed by the administration
in such large lots that only the Zionist can buy them,
while if they were divided up into smaller lots they would
find many Arab purchasers.

" This, and much more, the Arab sees daily passing before
his eyes, and his soul burns in him.

" The Arabs put their case before Englishmen and ask
them to judge if justice has been done in Palestine. They
put their case before the whole civilised world and ask it
to decide whether there is not reason for complaint."

Wakfs, it should be explained, are charitable
endowments.

The above is admittedly an ex-parte state-
ment, but so far as I have been able to ascertain
from those familiar with the country, it presents
an accurate picture of what is being done at the
present time. That the British public has been
to a great extent kept in the dark respecting a
policy so diametrically opposed to British senti-
ments of justice is certain. Almost as certain
is it that the Jewish influence in Downing Street
will render the Arab appeal vain, and that the
appeal to the civilised world will equally fall
upon deaf ears, since the prospect of getting rid
of one of the least desirable elements of their

298 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

populations will outweigh any sense of justice
in other countries. An additional incentive to
do nothing lies in the fact that the ultimate
odium will fall upon Britain. Not to mince
matters, the Cabinet appears to be following a
policy which will result in a very nasty piece of
oppression being fixed upon the British, without
their being aware that they have been guilty
thereof.

Let us now turn from the moral aspect to the
more material one of self-interest.

There is, I think, an undue tendency to regard
the Jews as a race, rather than as followers of the
same religion, and to judge of all Jews by those
whom we see in England, who, to a great extent,
are British by birth and education, and differ
in their outlook but little from those amongst
whom they live. Whatever may be the case at
the present time, there is every reason to believe
that in earlier times the Jews were by no means
averse to proselytising. If I remember rightly,
the Jews in the Roman Empire are estimated to
have numbered between five and six million, and
it is difficult to believe that all these had their
origin in a country the size of Wales.

In order to appreciate clearly the way in which
Jews are regarded in the East, it is only necessary
to consider the alien Jews who swarm in the East
End of London. Political refugee is a wide term,
and not infrequently it covers those who have
left their former country with the approval, if
not the actual assistance, of the police. Many
of these East End Jews are of criminal and revo-
lutionary tendencies, while the effect which they
may be expected to exert on the race amongst
whom they settle is well shown by the result of
the effort made by the Ministry of National
Service during the war to utilise them for national

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 299

work. While no attempt was made to take them
for the Army, it was considered that it might be
possible to use them for manual labour. Some five
thousand were medically examined, but through
disease their physique was found to be so low that
only about a hundred and eighty were considered
fit for work upon the roads, or less than 4 per
cent, and that at a time when even for the Army
no high standard was exacted. In the ultimate
result the number proved to be much less, for a
trial of a few weeks resulted in the greater part
of the hundred and eighty being proved to be
utterly useless.

Were it intended that the result of our present
policy in Palestine would be to free this country
of these aliens en bloc, there might be some excuse
for risking the odium which will be incurred in
other quarters; but as a matter of fact what is
actually happening is, that we are relieving other
nations of their undesirables, and that at the
risk — nay, certainty — of incurring the hatred of
the Arabs who assisted us during the war in
particular, and our Moslem fellow-subjects in
general.

When discussing the matter with an official
who had recently returned from Jerusalem, I
mentioned my apprehensions as to the oppres-
sion of the Arabs, only to be told that these were,
he believed, groundless, since seven hundred thou-
sand Arabs were not going to submit indefinitely
to oppression at the hands of seventy thousand
Jews, and that sooner or later a massacre would
result. Since this would almost appear to be
justified, and the direct result of the Jews' own
actions, there might be nothing in such a result
to cause apprehension to Great Britain, but, as
matters stand, the British Army would be called
in to slaughter the Arabs. In other words, the

300 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

situation will be that, having by a course of op-
pression and dispossession goaded the Arabs to
rebellion in self-defence, the Army will be utilised
to crush them ; so it will appear to Moslems.
The effect in India may readily be imagined.

I cannot do better than conclude this portion
of our inquiry with a few sentences from the
speech which Lord Sydenham, who has great
experience of the East, made at a luncheon to
the Palestine Arab Delegation. Mr Balfour's
declaration on Zionism was, he said, loaded with
dynamite. It had caused the loss of many lives,
and threatened the peace of the Near East. It
had been obtained, and support secured, by a
long course of underground proceedings of which
the British people had no idea. The Jews were a
ruthless people, who had no more right to Palestine
than the descendants of the Romans to Britain,
which they ruled longer and benefited far more
than the Jews in Palestine. The Zionist grip was
rapidly tightening upon the unfortunate people
of Palestine. " If we do not give peace to Palestine
now," he concluded, "there is no doubt that we
shall light a fire in the Near East which it will
strain all our resources to extinguish by using
military force against the people fighting for the
freedom of their own land." Such is the view of
an ex-Governor-General, and there I will leave
the question of Palestine.

Returning to Mesopotamia, and leaving aside
the motives which have led to the British occupa-
tion, let us consider the present position of the
country. The rebellion of 1920, if it effected
nothing else, served to show that to the mass of
the population our occupation was by no means
welcome, and althoagh this was crushed at a
cost of very heavy casualties upon both sides,
there is every prospect of further trouble when-

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 301

ever a suitable opportunity arises. I was rather
surprised to learn that it was regarded as a matter
of common knowledge that the rebellion had been
to a great extent organised by the supporters of
King Feisul, and that it was believed that the
necessary funds therefor had been provided from
the subsidy which Britain pays to the King of the
Hedjaz. If this is correct, and I received the most
definite assurances upon the subject, it furnishes
an even more flagrant instance than the Persian
Cossacks of the reckless way in which money is
being squandered in all directions, regardless of
the method of its ultimate employment.

With regard to King Feisul, we are led by the
press to believe that his elevation to the throne
of Irak was at the general wish of the population,
and we read of the treaty which has been negoti-
ated between the new king and the British Empire.
It all sounds very satisfactory that there should
be friendly relations between the Arab ruler and
the British, but in practice the whole affair is
little short of farcical. Feisul owes his throne
to British bayonets, and were these removed
there is small chance that he would remain on
his throne, or even risk a continued residence
after the departure of his protectors.

For the reasons of FeisuFs elevation we have
not far to seek. Many persons, Feisul in par-
ticular, are of opinion that Britain is under great
obligations to the King of the Hedjaz and his
family. A king was thought a desirable adjunct
to the new regime in Mesopotamia. There was
nothing simpler in the circumstances than to
bring king and kingdom together. The only
objection was that the greater part of the kingdom
had no particular desire for the king. The young
Arabs were in favour of Feisul, but unless my
information is very far astray, ulema, traders,

302 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

Kurds, and the tribes upon the Euphrates were
quite clear that they were not.

The British Cabinet had, however, decided that
Feisul should be king, and so king Feisul became.
The decree went forth that all British officers
should support his candidature, and those who
were reluctant to do so were left under no delu-
sions as to where their interests lay. When last
in Mesopotamia I heard of three cases where offi-
cers had been deprived of their posts for offences
ranging in gravity from holding and advocating
that a genuine attempt to ascertain the popular
will should be a prelude to his election, to
merely stating a conviction that Feisul would not
last for long. Native opposition was similarly
dealt with. One prominent pasha, who was guilty
of a somewhat emphatic speech at a banquet,
was seized and deported to Ceylon. Then, the
opposition having been silenced, a plebiscite was
held. I received a lurid account of the methods
employed by those who went round collecting
signatures in favour of Feisul, but these may
be summed up in the emphatic phrase of my
informant, that it was a " straw " vote. So Feisul
became king.

Unfortunately, I did not arrive in Baghdad in
time for the coronation, which, judging from all
accounts, must have been worth seeing. Since
there was no Mesopotamian national anthem,
" God save the King " was made to serve, to the
no small indignation of some at least amongst
the soldiers present. The finishing touch came
at the end, for a too-zealous underling began
to strip the throne of its trappings prior to the
dispersal of the gathering. This revealed to the
interested gaze of the spectators the fact that
the seat of the throne had been repaired, and
that the material used had once served to protect

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 303

the produce of a well-known firm of proprietary
whisky manufacturers. Thus throned on whisky
and supported by British bayonets, Feisul entered
into his kingdom.

What will be the outcome it is difficult to say.
The immediate effects have been to add to the
costs of an already over-burdened exchequer,
and to cause discontent. The new king's civil
list is to be a lakh and a half of rupees a month,
and thirty lakhs have been earmarked to build a
suitable palace for him. Where the money is to
come from is not evident. Prior to the adoption
of the new policy the country seemed to be in
a fair way to become self-supporting, but now
the reverse is the case.

At the present time the British Government
is anxious to realise its investment in the rail-
ways of Mesopotamia and the port of Basra. It
is of vital importance that the country should
own and control these, since otherwise there is
the very gravest danger of the transport monopoly
falling into the hands of one group. Those with
practical experience of the railways are satisfied
that they can be made self-supporting, but the
State is not in a condition to purchase them un-
less the terms of payment are of a very extended
description. Should they fall into the hands of
the company which at the moment exercises a
practical monopoly upon the Tigris, and the same
late befall the port (the only one in Mesopotamia),
the country will be utterly at the mercy of a group
of capitalists who are reputed to be fully capable
of appreciating that their own interests are of
primary importance.

As to the discontent which has resulted, I need
only mention the case of the Sheikh of Gurmiah,
at the junction of the Tigris with the old mouth
of the Euphrates, who has paid taxes regularly

304 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

since the British occupation. Upon Feisul's elec-
tion he intimated that he had issued instructions
to the tribesmen that they were not to pay taxes
to the new regime. He added that when British
rule was resumed he would be happy to return
to his former practice. He was presenting a
problem to the administration at the time of my
departure, for it is difficult to take strong measures
against those whose professions and acts alike are
loyal.

The possibilities of trouble are numerous. The
feeling amongst officers from the districts with
whom I talked appeared to be that the tribes
would be ready enough to take advantage of the
first opportunity to renew the trouble of 1920.
The Kurds and the Euphrates tribes do not want
Feisul or any one else. Sooner or later trouble
may be anticipated from the Turks in the north,
either actively or by the support of some rival
candidate who is a native of the country. The
most fruitful source of potential trouble is, how-
ever, to be found farther south in Arabia in the
person of Sultan Ibn Saud of Nejd. This potentate
rules over the fanatical sect of the Wahabis, who
might be described as the Puritans of Arabia.
What his following amounts to it is, I imagine,
not easy to say with accuracy, but I have heard
it put as high as two hundred thousand camel-
men by officers in Mesopotamia. This may be
an excessive estimate, but in any case he was before
the war vastly more powerful than the family of
the now King of the Hedjaz. What is even more
important, he is the bitter enemy of the family
of that sovereign, and naturally cannot be ex-
pected to relish the establishment of a member
of that family upon the east of his possessions.
Whether or not the threats which Feisul is reported
to have uttered against him are well founded, it

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 305

is only natural that he should not wait until his
enemy's family was well established upon both
his frontiers. Quite what this Arabian feud has
to do with the British taxpayer is not clear, but
the latter is at the moment paying Ibn Saud sixty
thousand pounds a year to let the King of the v
Hedjaz alone. According to recent reports even
this sum has proved insufficient, for Ibn Saud is
stated in the press to have opened a campaign
against his rival, a campaign financed upon both
sides by the British Government. Thus in Meso-
potamia as in Palestine the Government would
seem to be busily engaged ensuring further trouble,
and yet further outlay in men and money.

The case of India I will leave to others. There
also the Jewish rule has extended, and its result
is already evident, although it appears that Lord
Reading does not share Mr Montagu's desire to
excite unrest. Briefly the position to-day is that
an assembly has been put into power whose chief
ambition is to pass legislation prejudicial to Eng-
lishmen ; that the treatment meted out to General
Dyer, generally regarded as having saved the
situation at Amritzar, has been such as to render
it probable that upon the next occasion when
there is trouble, firing will not be resorted to until
the mischief has been done ; and that in the world
of finance Simla refuses to face the question of
munitions scandals and grant the inquiry desired
by Europeans and Indians alike. The latter action
is, justly or not, giving rise to gossip which is the
reverse of complimentary to the Simla entourage.
Talk of an outbreak compared to which 1857
would be a trifle one is tempted to consider as
exaggerated, but it is impossible to deny that
certainly some people regard the situation so seri-
ously that they have sent their families to Eng-
land. That reforms cannot rest where they are is

u

306 RECENT HAPPENINGS IN PERSIA

clear, but in what direction the next move will
be it is yet too early to say. Probably the best
from the British point of view would be an exten-
v^sion of the system of Native States, since under
this the British Residents would come to be re-
garded as the protectors rather than the oppressors
of the masses.

With regard to Russia, Turkey, and Egypt
nothing need be said, since the press makes their
affairs sufficiently public, although it is not realised
how narrow an escape the last-mentioned country
has had of also coming under Jewish control.

What can we deduce from the facts as being
the Cabinet's policy in the Near and Middle East ?
To recapitulate briefly. In India and Egypt they
are truckling to extremists ; in Mesopotamia and
Palestine, imposing their policy by force regardless
of the wishes of the inhabitants ; in Afghanistan,
adopting a policy which is in accordance with the
facts of the position; in Turkey, standing back
and letting Greece do her best ; and as to Russia,
adopting a line of action which is neither one thing
nor the other. The Caucasian republics we need not
consider, since these hothouse growths will almost
certainly fall to Russia or Turkey. With Persia
I have dealt in full. So far as it is possible to
gather anything from this hotch-potch of diametri-
cally-opposed policies, it is that weakness is being
shown where the interests of the Empire demand
strength, and that reckless expenditure of men and
money is being incurred where no interests of any
importance are involved. The one thing markedly
absent is a comprehensive policy.

The future policy in Persia would then seem to
be that called for throughout the Near and Middle
East — namely, firmness where our interests call
for it, as in India and Egypt, and the dropping
of the wild-cat schemes in which the Cabinet de-

OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST 307

lights. In Persia, British interests, whether political
or commercial, are confined to the south, while in
the north they are non-existent. All that is called
for, then, is a reversion to the policy of the Anglo-
Russian Convention, which incidentally was nego-
tiated by a Cabinet of which Mr Lloyd George was
a member. A clear indication that we meant to
maintain our interests in Southern Persia, by force
if necessary, in the event of the country relapsing
into anarchy, but that there our interest ceased,
coupled with a refusal to be drawn in future into
intrigue and a policy of bribes, would in time cause
the Persians to realise that Great Britain had not
designs upon their cherished independence, and
would lead to a return to the condition before the
war, when it was said that Englishmen alone could
go anywhere in Persia with absolute impunity.

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